Senkaku Diaoyu Islands Dispute

Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands Dispute Between China and Japan

Introduction and History of the Islands

The Senkaku Islands (also known as Pinnacle Islands and Diaoyu Islands) are composed of eight volcanic islands that are not inhabited and that have a relatively small land area of 6.2 square kilometers. The Japanese government claims the islands for Japan, while China also claims ownership of the islands. According to Seokwoo Lee, writing in the International Boundaries Research Unit (IBRU) publication, Territorial Disputes among Japan, China and Taiwan Concerning the Senkaku Islands (Boundary & Territory Briefing Vol. 3 No. 7), the islands are in the East China Sea about 200 kilometers northeast of Taiwan and 300 kilometers west of Okinawa (Lee, 2000, p. 2).

Lee writes that during the 16th century travel accounts of Ming Dynasty envoys mentioned three of the islands (their Chinese names were Tiaoyutai, Huangweiyu, and Chihweiyu), which they visited on their way to the Ryukyu Islands. The Senkaku Islands were considered at that time to be the "…boundary separating Taiwan from the Ryukyu Islands" (Okinawa) (Lee, p. 2). After the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 China agreed to "cede" Taiwan to Japan; the deal was made under the "Shimonoseki Treaty" (May, 1895).

Language under that treaty clearly indicated that the Senkaku Islands belonged to Japan: "China cedes to Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty the following territories… (b) The island of Formosa together with all islands appertaining or belonging to the said island of Formosa…"

However, in 1945 -- at the end of World War II -- Taiwan was "returned to China" due to the signing of the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation. In the Cairo Declaration Japan accepted that "…all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China" (Lee, 4). When Japan surrendered to the United States -- following the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki -- Japan basically had to turn over the administration of much of its territory ("Nansei Shoto") to the "U.S. Civil Administration." That territory included Okinawa and "…those islands, islets, atolls and reefs as well as their territorial waters' within specific geographic coordinates that included the Senkaku Islands" (Lee, 5).

Meanwhile, the discovery of "…the possible existence of large hydrocarbon deposit[s] in the waters off the Senkaku Islands… [that] might contain substantial resources of petroleum, perhaps comparable to the Persian Gulf area" (Lee, 6). Rongxing Guo explains that the discovery of potentially enormous fossil fuel resources near the islands is important to both China and to Japan because "The two nations are among the world's biggest energy importers" as they both hope to continue stoking the fires of their enormous economic engines (Guo, 2006, p. 96). In 1999, when Japanese scientists surveyed the "disputed fields" offshore from the Senkaku Islands, they reported that there might be "200 billion" cubic meters of natural gas under the sea in that region (Guo, 96).

The Dispute Referenced in The Pacific Review

Professor Min Gyo Koo teaches in the Department of Public Administration at Yonsei University in Korea. He specializes in researching territorial disputes and the "political economy of the Asia Pacific"; he reports that Japan and Taiwan and South Korea formed the "United Oceanic Development Company" and the issue of sovereignty issue was stashed aside for a time (Koo, 2009, p. 213). However, China soon asserted that "…foreign exploitation of the area would not be tolerated" (Koo, 213). And when the United States completed its responsibilities under the Okinawa Reversion Agreement with Japan, and basically turned Okinawa (and the Senkaku Islands) back over to Japan (which the U.S. had controlled since the signing of the surrender by Japan in 1945), that "…increased the tension even further," Koo explains (213).

Tokyo was sensitive to the growing tensions and in 1971 the Japanese decided to postpone going in for oil until a later time. Initially Washington supported the Japanese claim for ownership of the Senkaku Islands, however, upon reflection, the U.S. has taken "…a neutral stance over the dispute" which it continues to take because it believes that "…any conflicting claims are a matter for resolution by the parties concerned" (Koo, 216).

But by 1976 the issue was on the table again when Mao died and Deng Xiaoping took over the reins of socialist China. "His immediate reaction was to escalate the island issue," Koo goes on. In fact, on April 12, 1978, "…more than 100 fishing trawlers bedecked with Chinese national flags reached the area and more than thirty of them entered the islands' 12 nautical mile territorial sea" (Koo, 217). Tensions ran high because of that incident.

Again in 1990 tensions were again raised when right wing groups in Japan "sought official lighthouse status for a beacon" that had been built on one of the island in 1978. The Japanese government apparently accepted the application by the right wing group, and hence the lighthouse was upgraded to meet the technical standards of the Japanese Maritime Safety Agency (JMSA) (Koo, 219). The capital of Taiwan (Taipei) protested immediately, saying it would not "…tolerate Japanese invasion of Chinese territory"; and indeed on October 21, 1990, a group of activists from Taiwan tried to land on the islands to "…place an Olympic torch as a symbol of Taiwanese sovereignty against the Japanese lighthouse (Koo, 219).

Later in October 1990, China got into the dispute again, demanding that the Japanese government "…restrict the ultra-nationalist activities of its citizens" albeit China did not take any action against Japan as a protest. Koo believes that China had decided not to make a big issue out of the lighthouse situation, possibly because of its "…low international status after the Tiananmen Incident of June 1989 and its reluctance to further antagonize Japan" (219). Things stayed calm between the two nations until 1996 when "…another lighthouse was built on one of the islands" and moreover, a series of "…abrasive behaviours in the East China Sea" stirred emotions even further.

In fact a Taiwanese fishing boat had been "detained" near the Islands that caused strained relations. And more tension was apparent in 1997 when a pro-Chinese activist, David Chan, tried to land his boat on the disputed islands; Chan jumped into the water when the Japanese groups that had put up the lighthouses tried to block him from landing on one of the islands. Chan drowned, and that caused "…large-scale anti-Japanese protests and boycotts in Hong Kong, Taiwan and North America," and the anger on both sides rose to levels that frightened those who were hoping for peace between the two (223).

Koo (224) continues his scholarly article by pointing out that hostility between the two Asian nations was brought down to a more peaceful level in 1997 when Japanese Prim Minister Hashimoto visited Beijing in September, and in November the Chinese reciprocated when Premier Li Peng visited Tokyo. Not only did these visits seem to cool tempers on both sides, the meetings resulted in a "new fishery agreement" between the two (Koo, 224).

Toward the conclusion of his peer-reviewed article, Koo admits that as to how the Chinese and Japanese have managed to keep this dispute, there are no "conventional explanations" to explain it. The two countries have managed to avoid pushing for "…a more definitive political showdown with respect to the island dispute," and there is one possible reason why they have kept the disagreement from causing a major flare-up in their relations (or even a military incident, which at times has seemed likely) (Koo, 228).

The reason Koo gives is that both parties are very interested in "…maintaining the lucrative trade and investment relations that both countries have enjoyed since 1972" (228). Notwithstanding the tensions and accusations on both sides, and notwithstanding the fact that the issue of who has territorial rights to the Senkaku Islands has not been resolved, both sides "…have found it a convenient strategy to shelve final resolution attempts" instead of taking the risk of destroying the strategic and economic relationships Japan and China have enjoyed in recent years (Koo, 228).

The Senkaku Islands Dispute from the Chinese Perspective

From the perspective of China, the islands have been owned by China dating back to the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) and moreover, they were reportedly used as "…navigational aids and an operational base" for Chinese fishermen (Pan, 2007, p. 77). China says that it incorporated the islands into its "…maritime defenses in 1556," Pan explains; also, in 1893, just a couple years before Japan claims that it held title to the islands, Tsu His of Qing issues "an imperial edict, by which she awarded the Diaoyu Islands to a Chinese alchemist" who had reportedly harvested medical herbs on those islands (77).

Another reason why China clings to the notion that it, not Japan, owns the islands is a study by a Japanese professor at Kyoto University, Kiyoshi Inoue, who studied the issues closely and published a claim that the islands do indeed belong to China. Pan quotes the professor: "The so-called Senkaku Islands were recorded in Chinese documents in the middle of the 16th century at the latest" (78). After doing detailed research into the islands' ownership issues, Inoue concluded that "…these islands are territory of the People's Republic of China, the only authority over the entire China" (Pan, 78).

As regards the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the Chinese have never accepted that treaty as legally binding, Pan continues. In fact China issued a strong objection in the form of a formal protest with the U.S. government right after the peace treaty was signed in 1951, Pan explains. If the islands are really Japan's territory, then why did Japan "…claim the islands in 1895, but not earlier, for example, in 1885, when Japan took over today's Diato Islands?" Pan asks. Professor Inoue supports this aspect of investigating the ownership issue. Inoue agrees that the hesitation of the Japanese government when the governor of Okinawa asked to "…take over the Diaoyu Islands" shows that island was "clearly" Chinese territory, not just a piece of property "…the title to which was uncertain" (Pan, 82).

In Pan's conclusion, he notes that both Japan and China have done their best to "…downplay the issue, keep the dispute as low-key as possible, and prevent the trouble from deteriorating bilateral relations" (87). In fact by maintaining the "status quo" is what is most likely to be happening between these two nations as time goes on. A military conflict seems "improbable" because self-restraint over a relatively obscure issue is in the best interest of both sides, Pan writes (88).

The Senkaku Islands Dispute from the Japanese Perspective

In the first place, the Japanese are wary of China's intentions for many reasons; one specific concern is due to historical issues related to China's seeming arrogance and belligerence when it comes to the sovereign rights of nations outside its territory. For example, China's bullying of Tibet has gone on for over sixty years; in that time Tibet has technically been occupied by China and according to Students For A Free Tibet the citizens of Tibet are "…outnumbered by Chinese in their own homeland" (www.studentsforafreetibet.org). In Tibet the Chinese take "political prisoners" and those prisoners are "…subjected to further abuse on their release… [they are] deprived of their political rights," and their movements are restricted, the Students For A Free Tibet assert. Nuns and monks are prevented from returning to their nunneries and monasteries once they are released from prison; instead they are "…condemned to a life of extreme poverty" (www.studentsforafreetibet.org).

An example of this repression can be seen in the example of Nun Phuntsog Nyidrol, who served 17 years as a political prisoner in Tibet. This nun was released in February, 2004, but subsequently she has been "…under close surveillance at her parents' home…and has suffered from constant harassment and restrictions of her movements by the Chinese authorities" (www.freetibet.org).

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA) put out a fact sheet in October, 2010 which stated that the Senkaku Islands were "…neither part of Taiwan nor part of the Pescadores islands which were ceded to Japan from the Qing Dynasty of China in accordance with Article II of the Treaty of Shimonoseki" (MOFA). Hence, the fact sheet continues, the Senkaku Islands are not included in the territory "…which Japan renounced under Article II of the San Francisco Peace Treaty" (MOFA).

When the United States took over administration of the Japan (upon Japan's surrender in 1945), the U.S. also had administrative control over the Senkaku Islands. And the MOFA insists that "…China expressed no objection to the status of the Islands being under the administration of the United States under Article III" of the peace treaty; and because China did not protest the U.S. including the Senkaku Islands in its portfolio after World War II that indicates to the MOFA that China "…did not consider the Senkaku Islands as part of Taiwan."

In fact China did not protest or raise questions about the true sovereign ownership of the Senkaku Islands until there was a discovery that indicated petroleum resources lay beneath the earth's crust around the Islands, the MOFA continues. This fact sheet was published a month after a Chinese fishing boat entered the waters around the Senkaku Islands in September, 2010. Not only did the fishing boat (which was, according to the MOFA, an "illegal fishing" boat) enter the waters around the Senkaku Islands, there was a collision with a Japanese Coast Guard patrol vessel.

As a result of this international incident, a number of things happened: a) Japan protested the illegal fishing boat but expressed "regret" for the collision; b) Japan protests any deployment of Chinese "public vessels" to waters around the Senkaku Islands; c) Japan also protested the "unilateral announcement by the Chinese side on the 'postponement' of the second round of negotiations to conclude bilateral international agreements to implement the 2008 Japan-China agreements on natural resource development in the East China Sea"; d) Japan called for "calm and prudent action by China; e) Japan regrets that there was a postponement of the parliamentary exchange that was to take place in September, 2010; f) Japan is not pleased with China's threat that "…strong counter measures, for which Japan shall bear all the consequences" with reference to the fishing boat incident in September, 2010; g) "There is no doubt that the Senkaku Islands are clearly an inherent territory of Japan…" and this is based on "historical facts" and on "international law"; h) China's demand for an apology and compensation regarding the collision with the fishing boat that was illegally in Japanese waters is "...completely groundless and is utterly unacceptable for Japan"; and i) both Japan and China must continue making "efforts" to bring about a "Mutually Beneficial Relationship based on Common Strategic Interests" (MOFA).

The "Beinformed" journal explains that up until the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia issued a report in 1969 that "…disclosed that there were vast reserves of oil in the area," the Senkaku Islands did not seem to matter much to anybody." In fact the Beinformed article asserts that the real dispute over the Islands should be between Japan and Taiwan, "…but since China considers Taiwan itself as an integral part of mainland China… it thus considers Senkaku Islands as its own as well."