Resolving the conflict from these perspectives would move the transition towards success so that the more integrated technical problems of economics could be resolved.
The instrumental approach is also appropriate because the unspoken and conflicting agendas of the parties prevented those goals from being consciously recognized by all the parties, because they were unspoken and covert. Certainly the agenda of the white minority would be to maintain as much control as possible over the functions and decisions of government, in part because they distrusted the abilities and experience of the ANC to make sound decisions based on Mandela's careless statement concerning nationalizing of businesses, and his public redress of de Klerk. These goals were, however, recognized by the outside observers of the process.
As it turned, the two major players in South Africa, the white National Party and the ANC, succumbed to the pressures of the multi-faceted third point on the pyramid that encompassed all other interests. We can include in this point the interests of whites, who were tired of civil unrest and violence, and wanted to feel secure in their homes and to go about the business of rebuilding their lives and businesses and farms. For these reasons, the CODESA meetings became the key platform upon which to accomplish the interests of all the parties, but also the platform wherein it was revealed that both the major players, the National Party and the ANC, by way of failing to create a strong bond with the other interests, had failed (Ottaway, 164). This meant that CODESA was a failure (167) -- but not entirely.
As we look at the CODESA, it became the vehicle upon which the two major players came together with unspoken agendas of self-interest, and broke down under the weight of self-interest, which could have been successful had that weight been less one of self-interest and vying for power, and more one of sharing and distributing the interests and the power. However, CODESA defined the conflict in more broad terms, and caused the points for potential resolution of conflict and bringing the disenfranchised into the political process as partners and participants.
South Africa reflects the cultural paradigm: conflict is caused by interest, and indeed the interests at CODESA were varied, but dominated by the two stronger interests. The interests of the National Party and the ANC prevented a constitution from being adopted at CODESA II, which could have perhaps surpassed self-interests, and created sustainable constitutional rights for the masses and lesser powerful entities in the country.
This is not the conclusion that Ottaway arrives at. Ottaway does not move beyond the failure of the parties to successfully produce an outline for a constitution, but instead allows both the National Party and the ANC to be co-collaborators in failure when violence broke out in the townships in 1992, bringing about an end to CODESA, which was followed by the ANC issuing an ultimatum to the National Party that had to be met before the ANC could resume negotiations (177-178). However, negotiations would not have been necessary had the government implemented the ANC's demands, because meeting the demands would have transferred the reigns of power and control over to the ANC. That is where the events stood when Ottaway wrote her book.
We now know, however, that abandoning CODESA was perhaps the ANC's biggest mistake, and contributed to the internal problems that the ANC experienced, which resulted in the resignation of ANC President Thabo Mbeki (CIA World Factbook 2010). The ANC, however, has managed to maintain control of the country's...
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