Soviet Union and the New

Soviet Union and the New Russia as a U.S. Security Threat

At the end of World War II, roughly Summer 1945, Europe was in shambles. Millions had been killed, many of the governments so disenfranchised that they had to be rebuilt. The infrastructure in most of Europe was in shambles, but unlike the situation after World War II, the United States found a new determination in President Truman and his staff. Because they wanted to build up a democratic Europe, aid was put into place (the Marshall Plan) to help restore Europe to hegemony and self-sufficiency. However, because Europe was in such turmoil and there was somewhat of a power vacuum that France, England, the United States, and of course, the Soviet Union, wished to fill.

The United States insisted that Germany be brought back into Europe to prevent a repeat of Versailles; but the occupation of Eastern Germany and Eastern Europe by the Soviets prevented that from occurring completely. Politically, Europe had to elect new governments and set up new economic and transportation systems. Socially, Europe was somewhat divided, depending on the amount of war damage, displaced persons, new political systems, and ability to rebuilt their infrastructure appropriately. Clearly, without U.S. intervention, the war damage would not have been repaired as quickly and the resultant hardships encountered might have changed the socio-political spectrum of Europe and, with such horrible internal conditions, moved more of the population towards the Soviets (Foa, 2000). Europe, however, did not recover overnight. Into the 1950s Germany and England, for instance, still had a number of shortages and were certainly not back to full potential until the 1960s. What followed were decades in which Europe tended to operate as either part of NATO (Western Allies), or part of the Soviet, Eastern Bloc. Nationalistic tendencies were subsumed, in part because of the memory of the war, in part because of the polarization of the Cold War.

The Cold War -- the Post World War II Paradigm- Briefly, the Cold War is generally termed the period of tension between the U.S.S.R. And its allies (the Warsaw Pact) and the United States and Allies (NATO) after World War II. Tensions heightened after the surrender of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy when Josef Stalin of the U.S.S.R. occupied Eastern Europe and created, as Winston Churchill called it, "An Iron Curtain." During the 40 plus years after World War II, the antagonism between the two views resulted in trillions of dollars in spending, countless loss of lives, insurmountable human suffering, and drastic economic impact to not only the U.S.S.R. And USA, but to those aligned with each power. A seminal question remains, however, and one that remains debatable depending on the position of the scholar, what were the actual origins of the Cold War? and, based on the information available to the decision makers of the time, realizing that it was reasonable to believe in Stalinist aggression and form a protectionist and aggressive foreign policy to counter.

On one side, the Cold War was seen as a reaction to American aggression after World War II. America had not been invaded, and had an economy that was growing stronger and indeed was one of the only major powers whose homeland was untouched by the ravages of World War II (with the exception of Pearl Harbor). Compare this to the Soviet Union, with 30+ million dead, 25 million homeless, almost 1 million acres of productive agricultural land destroyed, and the infrastructure of the transportation system in shambles, and most major cities and industry ravaged. After the fall of Germany, the Soviets may have been on the winning side, but their economy was in shambles and they were in a position in which their entire internal structure was at risk -- and facing an ever powerful United States who, in one fell swoop, became the only nation on earth to harness the power of atomic weaponry (Linz).

The United States was, in fact, well aware of the vulnerability of the Soviets. A 1945 Report predicted that the Soviet Union was 5-20 years behind the United States in regrouping and repair of its own infrastructure and economy. If one imagines looking at the globe in 1946, the Soviet Union would see Japan as occupied by the United States, a looming presence in the Pacific and Indo-China by the United States, a Europe being propped up by the Marshall Plan and extreme loyalty to the Americans, an American economy still tooled for war, American technology far surpassing any the Soviets had at that moment, and finally a new President (Truman) who was strongly opposed to any Soviet grab for territory (Aid). This, combined with the psychological makeup of Josef Stalin would result in a paranoia and distrust -- and the feeling of obligation to protect his country from being the victim of the United States as it had been of Germany (Gordin).

On the other hand, Winston Churchill rightly saw that Stalin wanted a large "buffer zone" between the U.S.S.R. And Europe -- and was in a position in which he needed vast agricultural and industrial areas in order to repair the war damage -- what better location than Eastern Europe and the Slavic nations? President Truman, having not been a party to Franklin Roosevelt's dealings and negotiations with Stalin (or Britain, for that matter), had to rely on his experts who were, for the most part, hawkish. When he asked for Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace for an overview on the Soviet Union, Wallace pointed out that it was natural for the Soviets to feel entangled and entrenched, but Wallace had a long history of sentiment for the U.S.S.R. (Altman). From Russia's point-of-view, the U.S. push to establish democracy in Eastern Europe, where [it] never existed, seem[d] to be an attempt to reestablish the encirclement of unfriendly neighbors which was created after the last war and which might serve as a springboard of still another effort to destroy her (Iakolev). Add to this Truman's Secretary of State, Dean Acheson's view that Russia's motivation was continually aggressive (Whitman).

That is not to say that Truman had an easy time from 1946-50. Millions of service men and women were returning home to great expectations. No one knew what was going to happen in Europe, and the domestic fear of communism was growing. While some believed that the United States wanted to continue the policy of friendliness to the Soviets, negotiating any differences in the United Nations, there was also a clear message sent to the world in 1947, thereafter called the "Truman Doctrine," in which the U.S. policy was set to support the "free" peoples of the world -- and the definition of such be American style democracy. Post-war revisionists see this pronouncement as "the most important propaganda technique of the Truman Administration was the consistent interpretation of major international events [using] the terminology of the Truman Doctrine (Bostdorff). Thus, despite any belief after the surrender of the Nazi regime, "the American dream of postwar peace and the Big three (United States, Great Britain, USSR) cooperation was to be shattered as the Soviet Union expanded into Eastern and Central Europe" (Churchill).

For the United States, the 1950s was an Era of dramatic change. Winning the war, the resulting economic book, the political situation of helping Europe rebuilt, and the new mega-weapon all pushed the American paradigm into the forefront or world politics. America was "rich," and expected to help other countries, but was going through its own crises and growing pains socially and economically. Several large trends occurred during the 1950s, the Cold War between the United States and the U.S.S.R. developed, Africa began to be decolonialized throwing the economic and political situation out of balance, the Korean War brought the United States into another global conflict, tensions heated up in Egypt (the Suez Canal Crisis) and Cuba (Castro and the Cuban Revolution), and America went through a turbulent time with Anti-Communist feelings and Senator Joseph McCarthy's accusations and focus on "reds in the State Department" (Hanson).

The Cold War with the Soviet Union was based, really, on a high level of mistrust. After World War II the Americans had nuclear weapons capability, they had not been invaded so were on better footing economically, and the Soviet's need for buffer "protective" zones in Eastern and Southern Europe. Then, of course, there was the nature of the Soviet State -- the aim of spreading world communism, and American President Harry Truman's personal dislike and distrust of Joseph Stalin. Both sides feared and mistrusted each other to the point where minor signals and incidents signaled far more than the intent of simply security, instead, with the United States unwilling to share its nuclear secrets, a climate of unparalled tension that would last several decades began in earnest.

After the death of Joseph Stalin in 1954 there was a clear power vacuum. One of the true believers in the Bolshevik Revolution and intellectual heir to Lenin's policies was Nikita Khrushchev. In an unprecedented move, Khrushchev denounced many of Stalin's excesses and set about changing Soviet policy towards the developing world. This change, some call it flexibility, was the branch the Soviets offered to developing countries, like Cuba. Looking around and seeing the alienated or disenfranchized, Khrushchev felt the time was right to solidify alliances with anticolonialists in Ghana, the Congo, and especially, Cuba (Hopf).

After the Bay of Pigs fiasco, Khrushchev viewed President Kennedy as too indecisive and not prepared to make hard decisions, felt that Kennedy would back down even if he discovered missiles in Cuba. However, intelligence gathering continued after the Bay of Pigs in 1961, and regular U-2 flights over the island finally presented the evidence Kennedy needed to prove the Soviets were indeed, placing missiles off the American shore (Franklin).

During President Dwight Eisenhower's term one of his great concerns was the mounting tensions between the U.S. And the Soviet Union. Many conservative "hawks" in his government were demanding further and faster military build up and cited reports that the Soviets had exceeded the U.S. In the capacity to build and deliver nuclear weapons. This was only exacerbated in October of that year when the Soviet Union launched Sputnik, the first orbital satellite. It did not matter that the device did nothing but emit a pulse and lasted less than a few weeks in space. The perception was that the Soviets had led the race into space, and were close to adding military capability to their satellites (Mitchell).

Because the U.S. had no way of actually "knowing" what the true nature of the Soviet military might was, Eisenhower comissioned American intelligence to develop a plane that could fly over Soviet territory and photograph potential military installations. This, of course, was clearly illegal and highly secret, so the plan had to be light, fly quickly and high, and be everything possible to escape notice by Soviet radar. The unique and remarkable design that allowed for this type of performance made the winning design, the U-2, difficult and dangerous to fly, let alone elude high-powered Soviet MIG fighters (French).

The U-2 planes came to the world's attention in May of 1960 whenC IA pilot Francis Gary Powers was shot down over Soviet territory. At first the U.S. denied it was a spy plane, but based on evidence recovered and shown on international television, was finally forced to admit that it had sent the plane over Soviet territory specifically to photograph missle bases. The incident happened just two weeks before a scheduled East-West Summit in Paris, and resulted in the Soviets refusing to negotiate with the U.S. For fear of duplicity. Ironic, too, within weeks after this flight the United States placed its own satellites in orbit and were able to glean the same type of information safer, and without resorting to illegal actions (Bescholss).

Part of the joy of revisionist history revolves around the nature of chronology. It is far easier, three decades or more later, to review events when clearer heads prevail, or after additional material is unearthed from archives that show a clearer path. It is somewhat like a macro version of the Arm Chair Quarterback who, after seeing the post-game show, is able to minuetly find errors in coaching and execution from the previous game. This is a superb analogy when dealing with foreign policy events, particularly those that deal with such an enigmatic country as the Soviet Union. For years, Sovietologists used clues from Pravda, who was reviewing certain parades or official events, and what statements Soviet Press Agency TASS allowed over the wires. Sometimes these interpretations were correct (as in predicting the ousting of Nikita Khrushchev), sometimes incorrect (as in thinking the Soviets had far more missiles and fighter planes than thought based on photographs of fly-overs during official events). However, when it comes to the central issue of Cold War foreign policy, it is really the mistrust that began during World War II, exacerbated by Winston Churchill's issues with Stalin, and then Truman's dislike and distrust of Stalin at Yalta.

The "fault" of the Cold War was, much like the origins of the First World War, a series of misinterpretations that resulted in misunderstandings, fear, paranoia, and projection. The United States was, in fact, the only country in possession of nuclear weapons and the only economy that was poised and ready at the end of the war. The Soviets were, in fact, surrounded by suspicious and potentially hostile neighbors. However, Stalin had a history of guile and intrigue and made it quite clear that he needed more territory and felt that Russia deserved payment for the devastation felt during the war. Since both sides were ultimately so suspicious of each other, tensions grew, dialog lessened, allies were reestablished, and the global fight was on for the dominance of the Communist paradigm or Western-style democracy, a war not really ended until the Gorbachev regime in the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Thus, looking at the evidence of the time, Truman's meeting with Stalin, the Kennan telegram (Kennan), Soviet Atomic espionage, the "Iron Curtain," political and social events in Eastern Europe, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the exporting of communism into the developing world -- one can certainly conclude that while it may seem American foreign policy was a bit paranoid and reactionary, with the information available at the time, the response was likely not only reasonable, but prudent. In effect, combined with the hawkish nature of British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and American President Ronald Reagan, contributed to the fall of the Soviet Union, certainly a goal of Cold War policy.

The End of the Cold War and the Collapse of Communism- However, the Cold War effectively ended for Europe with the fall of communism, also known as the "Revolutions of 1989." These were the events that overthrew Soviet-influenced Communist States in Eastern Europe and, eventually, the Soviet Union itself. The reasons for this are complex, but may be grouped into four major templates: 1) the economies were bankrupt, the system broke and unable to perform; 2) Standard of living declined and people were dissatisfied; 3) a new generation of leadership, not born under Stalinism, saw that change was inevitable; and 4) Technology and communication improved to the point where Eastern Europe wanted to join Western Europe to profit from a new free-enterprise system (Brown, 2007).

The basic commonality for all the above is economics coupled with nationalistic tendencies. The Cold War was expensive for both sides, but particularly for the Soviets who, despite 5-year plans, were simply unable to continue to pour billions of rubles into defense just to keep up with NATO and U.S. spending. Money was continually diverted from the social needs of the population (food, housing, consumer goods) in order to prop up the military. Mikhail Gorbachev, for one, knew that the U.S.S.R. could not continue to fiscally support the occupation of Eastern Europe and to keep their governments in power (Gorbachev, 2000). Once this was relaxed, popular revolution took care of the rest. With the exception of Romania, most of these were fairly non-violent, the so-called "velvet" revolutions. By 1991, the Warsaw Pact was officially dissolved, and in July of that year, the U.S. And USSR declared a strategic partnership and an end to the Cold War. It was, however, easier for Eastern Europe to morph into a Western Style government than for the U.S.S.R., who had years of infighting, corrupt and inept governments, until finally many of the former republics were granted independence and Perestroika (Restructuring) finally realized (Media, 2007).

It is said that nature abhors a vacuum, and so also the political nature of Europe. The collapse of communism and the realization that globalism was now a reality, caused the unification movement in Europe to coalesce in 1993, with the establishment of the European Union (EU) with the treaty of Masstrict. It developed a single, regionalized, market structure through a system of standardized laws that apply in each member state so that citizens, goods, capital, and services are regional rather than local. With the establishment of a common currency, the Euro, the EU is also concerned with the overall economic and fiscal health of each member country. EU banks oversee localized financial institutions, and have the legal authority to enact localized changes in order to keep currency balanced. There are also branches of the EU that focus on legal and foreign policy issues, which sometimes blend into the economic realities of globalism (Europa, 2009).

The EU acts as much more than an economic modifier, though, and member nations are encouraged to participate in cultural sharing (music, the arts, etc.), religious tolerance, and of course sport. This changes the overall rubric of the EU in that it actively seeks out foreign trade and markets as a large regional economic sector, so successfully that it counts for approximately 30% of world trade output (How the EU Single, 2009).

Russia, however, is not part of the EU, and while encouraging relations with the European countries by economic and political necessity, begs the question- is Russia part of Europe? From a policy perspective, Russia's advances towards Europe to try to encourage greater cooperation in trade, travel, and cultural affairs are germane to U.S. interests since, taken together, the EU has literally changed the way the world works in the 21st century and is clearly part of the emergence of globalization (Russia-EU Summit, 2010). There are critics of the EU, most of whom focus on the reduction of European sovereignty -- giving up some national control so that the Union can prosper (very much like the pre-Civil War argument in the United States). However, the advantages clearly outweigh the criticisms. Under the EU: war is less likely because the countries are tied economically; EU restrictions benefit all the EU, not a single country; the EU currency is more stable, and favors trade; as a whole, the EU is a stronger economy than individual European countries; European can now move freely around the EU for jobs, tourism, or entertainment -- one community, one goal (McCormick, 2007).

Nationalism and the Collapse of Communism -- Many of the countries in the Eastern Bloc had been forced to bury their nationalistic tendencies in favor of Soviet domination (language, culture, etc.). Once communism began to collapse in Eastern Europe and finally the military and economic hold from the Soviet Union was released, countries in Eastern Europe finally regained some nationalistic identity and freedom, but faced two major challenges: the establishment of a new, constitutionally based, government that would rapidly switch their outmoded economic system to be in line with the West in order to take advantage of the EU model, and an outmoded social system that in some cases had not solved issues boiling since before World War II. Since 1939, with the invasion of Poland, most of this region had been devastated by either the Nazi advance into their lands from the West, or the subsequent push from the East by the Red Army with the result the same -- lack of infrastructure, puppet governments, large areas of agricultural land in ruins, and devastated cities, bridges, and railways.

Politically, the 20th century did not provide Eastern Europe with a great deal of experience in the democratic experience. Once the Soviets left, though the model constitution chose in most of these countries was neither the pure parliamentary model found in most of Western Europe, nor the presidential republic model found in the Americas. Instead, most of Eastern Europe chose the "French type" of semi-presidentialism, combining elements of both a president and a parliamentary into one type. For most of Eastern Europe, this meant a popularly elected head of state with a head of government who was responsible to a legislature. This, "change and evolution," allowed Europe and the United States to enter into the equation and establish its own relationship with former Soviet satellite states; riding Russia of its former buffer zone (Brown, 2010).

Evolution -- Government in Russia -- of course, one of the issues is that there is not really a tradition of democracy within Russia. Unlike Western Europe, which had a tradition of Enlightenment and varying political viewpoints openly discussed from the 16th century onward, Russia's Tsars kept any semblance of humanism and democracy at bay. From 1917 until the 1980s, the CPSU squashed, sometimes violently, and attempt at democratization within the borders or within client states (e.g. Hungary, Czechoslovakia, etc.). Since the 1980s, though there have been repeated attempts to establish a more settled system of government which would combine a strong and consistent central government (needed to provide stability and guidance) and the granting of appropriate power to the republics and far-flung regions of the country. This first experiment, glasnost organized by Mikhail Gorbachev founded quickly because the monopolistic CPSU lacked any semblance of credibility throughout most of the country -- its retention of power resulting solely on the military and secret police sectors (Hazan, 1990, 1-64).

The next phase of democracy was the brainchild of Boris Yeltsin, still one of the Bolshevik trained politicians but, despite his personal foibles, seemingly dedicated to change the dynamics of the country beginning with the Russian Federation and then slowly moving outward (Brown and Shevtsova, 2001). Despite some internal grumbling, this system was stable until 1998 when, in August, there was a collapse in confidence regarding the only partially reformed economic system. Ironically, this resulted in the Duma and majority giving power to former leading communists, Yevgeny Primakov and Yuri Maslyikov, a softer, but still dogmatic, form of communism (Ware, 1998). In 1999, President Boris Yeltsin resigned and Vladimir Putin became acting President, also winning both the 2000 and 2004 terms. Due to constitutionally mandated term limits, he was ineligible to run for a third consecutive term, but now holds the post of Prime Minister, seemingly managing the country from the wings while his successor, Dmitry Medvedev, holds the official title. Putin, a former KGB official, believed that the country was in chaos and that it was not ready for pure democracy, but rather the election of someone capable of wielding a strong hand to bring political stability and re-establishing the rule of law in the country. This period is often called "the Putin Paradox" because while simultaneously pushing forward economic and social reform he diminished dissent by using CPSU tactics against his critics. The country is democratic in name, but authoritarian (under Putin) in actuality -- in effect it is the new "right" that governs a frontier economy. This has resulted in a great deal of broad-based economic growth for some, and the creation of a wealthy upper class reminiscent of the old nomenkaltura elite of the Soviet Union. Thus, they haves have a lot -- the have nots very lettle, and, as some scholars comment, "if current trends continue, full-blown dictratorship in Russia is a very real possibility" (McFaul, 2004).

One might ask why Russia even bothers with a pretence of democracy; Putin, and now Medvedev, are highly popular, the Russian public likes a strong chieftan who, while not providing a perfect life, certainly has changed the amount of goods and services available to some. It seems that Putin and Medvedev both desperately want to be seen as a global power, with global ideas and economic clout. Having embraced democracy under Yeltsin, no one in the government wants to publically turn the clock backwards and certainly the elite want to be seen as equal to the West in the move towards globalization. Russian Analyst Lilia Shevtsova of the Carnegie Enowment for International Peace notes, "He [Putin} still has the desire to look like a civilized Russian modernizer. The Russian political elite, including Mr. Putin, would like to be personally integrated into the Western structure, the Western community" (Levy, 2007).

The collapse of the Soviet Union was one of the leading voices calling for a truly democratic Russia to rise from the wreckage in Moscow in the 1990s. People in Russia did not want even to hear the word democracy, and even now they are far more cynical about the "ism." They think it represents everything that has gone wrong with Russia. However, the political movements beginning after World War II tend to coalesce around a right-wing nationalistic approach, one in which there is nostalgia for the past, combined with a realization of globalism, but mistrust of foreign immigration, and of too much blending in culture, politics, and society.

Conclusions -- Threats, Counterthreats, and Expectations -- One way to evaluate the differences between the Soviet Union post-World War II and modern Russia is to review the political theory set forth by Samuel Huntington, affectively known as the Clash of Civilizations. The Clash of Civilizations is a political and socio-cultural theory, proposed by political scientist Samuel Huntington, states that cultural and religious identities will be the primary source of conflict in the post-Cold War world. Within this sphere of conflict, this essay will argue that the fundamental source of conflict in the emerging world will not be ideological or economic, but cultural. The theory itself was part of a lecture given at the American Enterprise Institute (Huntington, 1992), then further developed in an article in Foreign Affairs (Huntington, the Clash of Civilizations, 1993; and (Huntington, the Clash of Civilizations, 1997). Both were a response to other theoretical notions coming out of the literature of the time.

If we accept that civilizations are in conflict or cooperation based on cultural identity, even in this new paradigm of globalism, which has extended from simple economics to socio-political and cultural, we must accept the old adage of keeping our friends close, and our enemies closer. The new Russia is still governed by those who "learned" about power from a Stalinist system, but who now see the advantages of an economic hierarchy -- some even argue a more totalitarian elite (a new version of the nomenklatura) in charge without the ideology of Leninism, but a more capitalistic need for fiscal sustenance (Chapman, 2010).

We know and can accept that there will be grave and serious challenges in the 21st century. One may, however, hope that modern society has the technology to change behaviors, but perhaps lacks the political will to do so. Change cannot happen with only one country, nor can it happen immediately. Instead, globalism must move beyond the tax and trade mentality and to the cooperative nature of saving the environment for all humans. Since the environment is something shared by all, and also has no political or social boundaries, it seems a logical that conflict resolution might begin with concern over that aspect of all our lives. We share the global community with Russia -- but unlike the Soviet Union, we are not locked in a day-to-day struggle in which both sides were reasonably assured neither wanted a first-strike or open war; mutually armed destruction may have kept the peace for 50 years. Instead, we deal with a Russia that is akin in many ways to the Old West -- it's about the biggest gun in the corral at a particular time; we do not know which way the political wind blows for Russia -- whether they are Eurocentric or simply Slavophiles? We are not in a war of attrition with them, nor do we count on them as particularly reliable allies or trading partners. Thus, the major difference that history has shown us is that the Soviet Union, megalomaniacal as it was, was relatively predictable. The new Russia, clearly not predictable, is a rogue cannon regarding American Foreign Policy, and cannot that may or may not be vested in the globalism paradigm of the 21st century.