Structure and Performance of Operation Toenails of 1943

Command and Control Structure and Organization: Operation Toenails

Operation Toenails, also called Operation A and the New Georgia Campaign, was part of Operation Cartwheel, in turn a series of offensives by the Allied forces against the Japanese in the South Pacific during World War II (Miller 1970). This campaign was undertaken in the New Georgia group of islands at the central Solomon Islands from June 20 to August 25, 1943. Its purpose was to isolate Rabaul, a critical Japanese base, to protect Australia and to pave the way for succeeding initiatives (Miller).

The Question of Command

The Army and the Navy were in heated disagreement over a unified leadership in the entire Pacific (Miller 1970). The initial sentiment was for a joint leadership and mutual cooperation between General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral William Halsey. This idea was, however, rejected . The Joint Chiefs came out with a directive on July 2, 1942 that MacArthur would be the commander of operations of the southwest Pacific forces, while Admiral Halsey's South Pacific forces in the Solomon Islands will come under General MacArthur's overall command. The Joint Chiefs also decided on March 28 that all the units of the Pacific Ocean areas besides those assigned by them to task forces would stay under the overall control of Admiral Chester Nimitz. This limited General MacArthur's authority over Halsey's forces in the Solomon Islands. Admiral Nimitz would keep Admiral Hasley's forces and the Pacific Fleet not assigned by the Joint Chiefs under his control and command (Miller).

Structure

Most of the commands in the Southwest and South Pacific areas that would implement the orders of the Joint Chiefs were also in place beforehand (Miller 1970). General MacArthur as Commander-in-Chief had already set up the general headquarters, an operational headquarters. Chief of Staff was Major General Richard K. Sutherland. Under him were the four standard sections of general staff and three for special staff. An American Army officer headed each of the sections. Serving in the most important staff sections were American navy officers and officers from the Australian, Netherlands, and Netherlands Indies armed forces. The general headquarters might have appeared like a U.S. Army headquarters, but it actually shared responsibilities and authority with the other Allies (Miller).

Other Tactical Headquarters

Coming under the authority of the general headquarters are three tactical headquarters in Australia (Miller 1970). The Allied Land Forces was led by General Sir Thomas Blamey, an Australian. General Blamey was theoretically in-charge of tactical directions of all ground forces. Under him was the U.S. Sixth Army under Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger, who in turn, headed the operations of the First Marine Division. The First and Second Australian Armies were likewise part of General Blamey's leadership. The New Guinea force was the main tactical headquarters, which operated under him in early 1943. This was a virtually Australian and credited for operations in New Guinea (Miller).

Vice Admiral Arthur S. Carpender of the U.S. Navy was on top of Allied Naval Forces (Miller 1970). He was fondly called "Chips." His forces included the U.S. Seventh Fleet, which he also commanded, and big parts of the Australian and Netherlands Navies. But the most important part of Chips' command was the VII Amphibious Force, which was set up and placed under Rear Admiral Daniel E. Barbey early in 1943. And American airman Lt. Gen. George C. Kenney was in command of the Allied Air Forces. It was composed of the U.S. Fifth Air Force and the Royal Australian Air Force Command, Lt. Gen Kenney also headed the Fifth Air Force. But Deputy Commanded Brig Gen. Ennis C. Whitehead ran it for tactical purposes (Miller).

Top Command and Overall Objective

The series of attacks against Rabaul on orders by the U.S. Joint Chiefs in July 1942 was limited in scope and defensive in nature (Miller 1970). The objective was to protect Australia and New Zealand, not to defeat ir destroy Japan.. Their plan was to stop the Japanes' southward movement from Rabaul towards the air and sea communication links between the U.S. And Hawaii to Australia and New Zealand. The orders originated from basic decisions made by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill and U.S.-British Combined Chiefs of Staff. This top group from the very start aimed at defeating Germany and focusing at Japan. While they awaited and worked for the defeat of Germany, they turned towards the Pacific. When they did, they decided that Australia, New Zealand, the Hawaiian Islands, and the Midway should be protected from capture by Japan. In order to achieve these, the Joint Chiefs established the Pacific theater in places of conflict. They agreed with other Allied nations in March 1942 to establish two large commands. These were the Southwest Pacific Area and the Pacific Ocean Area.. The South Pacific sphere included Australia and surrounding waters, the entire Netherlands Indies except Somalia, and the Philippine Islands. The huge Pacific Ocean Area, on the other hand, virtually comprised the rest of the Pacific Ocean. Its control was divided into South, Central, and North. General MacArthur was the Supreme Commander besides the Commander-in-Chief of the Southwest Pacific Area. He was thus in command of all land, air and sea forces (Miller).

II. The Southern Pacific Area from the Allied Perspective

Initiatives would be concentrated in New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and the Bismark Archipelago (Miller 1970). These were familiar names but the area itself was quite unknown and among the least developed in the world at the time. Most importantly, this was the worst places to fight in. The tropical areas were uncomfortably hot and wet, mountainous and thick jungles. They were full of pests and tropical diseases, particularly malaria. Roads were short and ports and piers were virtually non-existent for needed ships. The Melanesians, their native inhabitants, were almost completely uncivilized. It was said that they were diverted from their cannibalistic and headhunting ways only by colonizers. But word got around that some resumed these practices when the Japanese freed them during World War II (Miller).

The Joint Chiefs of Staff directed General MacArthur and his subordinates to prepare plans and issue orders, based on their March 28 directives (Miller 1970). They revamped the two earlier ELKTON plans on April 26, followed by warning orders and operation instructions the following month. The April 26 plan was called ELKTON III and issued following a personal meeting between Admiral Halsey and General MacArthur in Brisbane. They discussed the timing and coordination of the initiative in New Guinea along with the invasion of New Georgia or Operation A. They agreed that the initial invasion of New Georgia would coincide with the capture of Woodlark and Kiriwina and not after the setting up of Southwest Pacific forces in the Huon Peninsula. Southwest Pacific leaders were not too much in favor of this. According to ELKTON III, offensives in New Georgia an Woodlark-Kiriwina would occur at the same time (Miller).