The Ripple Effects of American

The Ripple Effects of American Independence

The United States and the United Kingdom are today great partners on a divided world stage. Ironically, we may argue that this is a relationship which in its worst straits would help to plant the seeds for a reciprocating progressiveness that would leap back and forth across the Atlantic through the coming century. Bred in the thick of British colonialism, the United States would surface into existence with an ingrained nod to monarchical elitism and a full-fledged thrust toward constitutional democracy. The transition would suggest a new caveat to the people, with the expectations of political involvement and activism promoting suitable elected representation. In the United Kingdom, the rule of the British Crown and a feudalist system with highly unequal socioeconomic propensities, helped to maintain a culture of political ignorance amongst the publics while assuring leadership, authority and wealth to those who had inherited it. The events unfolding in the United States, though the point may well be debated in a historiographical discourse, may to a certain perspective be seen as the catalyst to the realization in Europe of political ideals theretofore only available in philosophical rhetoric. Thus, the impact of their actualization in the burgeoning United States would send a signal soon heeded by the French. And as the French Revolution would unfold into the era of Napoleonic expansionism, soon much of Europe would fall under the pale of constitutional democracy. The discussion here demonstrates that in the immediacy with which the French Revolution would succeed the American Revolution, the commonality of their respective aspirations toward constitutionality and their common struggles to define a balance between democratic governance and a centralization of authority descendent from monarchical principles, we can make the observation that France would represent a first and most crucial lynchpin in directing the external resistance to feudalism of America's revolution to the internal needs in a drastically unequal Europe. Certainly, the American Revolution was by explicit intent championed as a break from the philosophical repugnance of European feudalism, and most directly, British colonialism. Rejecting monarchy, the United States had presumed to stand in principled opposition to the undemocratic impulses which had instigated its founding. But the divide between the ideals of its British background and its progressive principles was immediately party to the structure of its originating government. Indeed, "the evolution of America's political parties was to a great extent the outgrowth of the British political system, which in an oversimplified analysis, can be said to have been divided into conservatives, who tended to support the monarchy and the power of the King, and liberals, who sought to restrain royal prerogatives and enhance the legitimacy of Parliament as an alternate power source." (Sage, 1) This is a matter of its emergent identity which we will subject to discussion hereafter. However, we can see that in its vying for independence, the United States would still demonstrate in some ways its immediate cultural relationship to Europe while explicitly seeking an evolution in the terms surrounding this culture. America's fight for independence would emerge quite naturally out of the needs of its people to establish a form of governance, of economy and of society reflective of the demands created by the path of development of the colonies. Moreover, this need would be increasingly revealed in the sentiments of progressive thinkers and public authorities throughout the European and American intellectual communities who were increasingly beginning to think according to an ethical standard concerning the treatment of all men. The late 18th and early to mid-19th century would be distinguished in the history of man as a period given over to revelations regarding the rights of man, resolutions concerning the proper governing of societies and rumblings of equality in parts of the world perpetually-to that point-understood in terms of sharp divisions across class, ethnicity and religion. Western Europe would largely be the seat of conception for the philosophical and discursive advancement of this period, with the intellectual centers of urban France and Germany serving as forum for the elevation of man as an individual and as part of a collective brotherhood. During a historical period which would come to be seen as the Enlightenment, various subjugated groups seized the emergent opportunity to demand the rights accorded them by the supreme creator. Fundamental amongst the principles of enlightenment would be the set of considerations put forth by a man, ironically, from the seat of America's subjugation. In his consideration on the balance between the presence of central leadership and the will of the individual, British political philosopher John Locke offers an evaluation of power which draws its inspiration from the natural law of reason. In an analogy upon which we may base a thorough discourse on this predilection, Locke describes a circumstance which he contends is indicative of the inalienable capacity of each man toward choice, regardless of the presence or absence of an intervening authority. He remarks that "a thief, whom I cannot harm, but by appeal to the law, for having stolen all that I am worth, I may kill, when he sets on me to rob me but of my horse or coat; because the law, which was made for my preservation, where it cannot interpose to secure my life from present force, which, if lost, is capable of no reparation, permits me my own defence" (Locke, Section 19). Here is the truest manifestation of Locke's promise that reason will ultimately dictate a power structure. Even as the law is a most imposing presence once one has entered into the confines of the social contract at the center of Locke's premise, it is a mere shadow of a consideration in the context described above. When threatened, and if given the opportunity, each man will have the power to defend himself. Executor of his own justice, in this scenario, a man is shown to make the active decision to exit the social contract. Where law and reason under traditional circumstances suggest that such rationality will be shared amongst all interactants within the physical confines of the social contract, when such can be evidently determined as to not be a mutual quality of intersecting parties-as with Locke's thief hypothetical-then one's obligation to the social contract is considerably diminished. Thus, to the Americans, who saw that the monarchy which governed and exploited them from afar was irrationally suited for their purposes, Locke's ideology is a visible presence in key revolutionary American writings. Indeed, America's most important contribution to the world community was both actual amd philosophical. Essentially, its actionable revolution demonstrated that the forces of monarchy could be dismantled, that a balance of democracy could be achieved and that the ideals of the rights of man were something more than mere rhetoric. Many of the most important pieces of literature contributing to the revolution would be fundamental in the formulation of events the world over during the 19th century. Thomas Paine's 1776 pamphlet Common Sense remains the most famous and representative of such literature. And indeed, the sentiment here delivered helps to explain how the patriots prevailed in conflict with the mighty British military, offering a template to the numerous independence movements which would be spurred in the wake of America's birth. Naturally, most prevalent among these would be France, whose tumultuous transition from feudalism to democracy would see it through myriad stages while offering a lighted path to so many other nations in Europe. .

In a text designed to produce a sense of revolutionary outrage, Paine crafts a philosophical treatise on appropriate governance designed to counter that which had very organically emerged in the colonies with the increasingly archaic nature of monarchy such as that imposed upon the colonists by the British. In his pamphlet, Paine openly calls for and advocates armed resistance as a means to the defense of the economic and governmental systems developing separate from the British Crown. He characterizes the distinction between kingship and the evolving colonial democracy as being irreconcilable, contending that "men of all ranks have embarked in the controversy, from different motives, and with various designs; but all have been ineffectual, and the period of debate is closed. Arms, as the last resource, decide the contest." (Paine, 82) Couched in Paine's sense of righteous indignation, the text largely drives toward this point by making the concerted argument that the colonists can tolerate the imposition of kingship so far as they can tolerate the sacrifice of the freedoms which had become inherently associated to persistence in the nascent America. This would be the undercurrent that would sweep the colonists into vehement support for the cause of independence, drawing a core philosophical connection between the anticipated form of government and the emotional disposition of those with the means to achieve it. And as this discussion shows, those means would be shown to be within the reach of dramatically outsized forces such as the American colonists, encouraging soon after the far more robustly numbered French peasantry to cast aside the shackles of oppression. In this encouragement, American would help to touch off something perhaps all the more miraculous given the proximity to its oppression to the European peasantry at large. First in the doctrines which would be formulated in the wake of French independence and secondly in the way that Napoleon Bonaparte would begin the spread of such doctrines to a continent driven by inequality, America's revolution could be said to have been the opening round in the deconstruction of colonialism and feudalism throughout Europe and thus, the world. Drafted in the image of the American Declaration of Independence, though perhaps more ambitious and sweeping even in its trajectories, the Declaration of the Rights of Men would dictate a universal principle arguing that all men are born equal and that any distinctions made between men according to the social conditions must be terms agreed upon by all parties. The constitutional document underscoring the spread of liberal ideology throughout Europe, it would be taken up by Bonaparte in an active dispensation of the philosophy in a context where such was sorely needed as a foundation upon which to build rapid change. In order for us to examine how successfully somebody such as Napoleon Bonaparte was able to achieve French national objectives, this is to indicate, we must first understand the nature of French objectives at this moment in history. This is a distinctly difficult moment in French history to characterize according to unified objectives. The revolutionary period which gave prelude to Napoleon's rise must, in fact, be understood in terms of the general disarray which consumed France in the political, social and economic contexts. 1789 is generally seen as the touchstone of the revolutionary era, with its chronological proximity to the recent American war for independence and its attendant constitutional doctrine playing a large part in inspiring this response to general discontent. The rigid class system which divided France into three distinctly unequal segments of nobility, clergy and peasantry-within which there were yet innumerable philosophical perspectives on how best to treat a France that was increasingly populated, gradually urbanizing and grossly inefficient as demonstrated by the poor economic conditions of so many-had doomed old France to inevitable decline. In fact, at this juncture, "when the King called for an Estates-General in 1789, the social tensions plaguing the old regime emerged as a central issue of the Revolution." (CHNM, 1) It was apparent that discontent with feudalism, catapulted by the revelations of the Enlightenment regarding natural rights, had reached a breaking point in France that would spill over into a decade of absolutely reckless, inchoate factionalism. Groups spanning the spectrum from Royalist to radical leftist (typically in the Jacobin party which would include Napoleon) would vie for authority, with idealism and political agenda playing equal parts in motivating individuals to align one way or another. And with the events in the United States proving ultimately permanent in dispatching of the unwanted imposition of democracy, there was now evidence for the first time since the decline of ancient Rome that a democratically governed republic could be conceived and formulated. Such is to assert that French objectives in this time are somewhat unclear except to say with great certainty that change was desired and that circumstances and influences had rendered change inevitable. Given the carnage of the French Revolution, of which the guillotine is the most notoriously lasting symbol, it would become greatly obscured that in fact the primary objective of the French Revolution was modeled like America's to achieve a greater plurality of representation and a dismantling of the monarchy-driven feudalist system in France and throughout Europe. Where the monarchies of the European states claimed various familial connections, as well as clear connections interest, the revolutionary groups in France would claim a connection amongst the unnumbered common people of Europe. Specifically, where destitution surely was a common presence throughout peasantry, it was not the only disposition to be found amongst those excluded from political leadership and cultural ascendance. Those who were educated, skilled and even moneyed would find it impossible to slip the detainment of hereditary ranking under the system theretofore reigning, providing a close enough identification of common grievances for all the excluded classes of Europe. The revolutionaries of France found themselves at the center of what the European monarchy would rightly view as a threat to the overarching world order. This is backdrop into which Napoleon Bonaparte would step. Amidst a ten year reign of disorder and pandemonium, his efforts would represent one of the few consistent assurances. The opposition of foreign royals to the emergence of the revolutionaries to power would take the form of an ongoing military confrontation, in which the revolutionary army of France would face off against the royal armies of Prussia and Austria to the constant and impressive victory of the General, Napoleon. So much was this the case that he alone would rise from the tumult of the decade to declare himself de facto leader of all of France. In his own characterization of this accomplishment, he would claim that "I closed the gulf of anarchy and brought order out of chaos. I rewarded merit regardless of birth or wealth, wherever I found it. I abolished feudalism and restored equality to all regardless of religion and before the law. I fought the decrepit monarchies of the Old Regime because the alternative was the destruction of all this. I purified the Revolution." (Chew, 1) If we may take anything as a mission statement or a proclamation of intent for Napoleon's ongoing militancy hereafter, this may serve as one with an inbuilt claim to justification. All ethical consideration completely aside, it would certainly be difficult to determine whether the indiscriminate bloodshed of the revolutionary period would be worse than the massive but state-sponsored bloodshed of the Napoleonic Wars. Less difficult to approximate however is the claim implied here by Napoleon, that it would be his effort that would make the aims of the revolution feasible. In the climate of terror and mob rule which precipitated Napoleon's lone ascent to authority, the elimination of feudalism was anything but certain. Only the elimination of order had there succeeded. (CHNM, 1) Therefore, we must first recognize that the wars which Napoleon engaged on the behalf of the revolutionary would be the first to endorse an as yet unachieved sense of constitutional order based upon the populist vision for entitlement to mobility and property ownership. Most evident of his accomplishments would be the expansion of French borders and the vanquishing of historic enemies of the French popular movement during this time, but no less than an equal accomplishment would be his centrality in therefore endorsing state-sponsorship of a system contrary to the restrictions of feudalism. A reflection on Napoleon's role as a party to the revolution and his ultimate exploitation of this role to step up to a seat of uncontested rule illustrates his importance in galvanizing this popular movement with meaningful military leadership. Amidst the chaos and indiscriminate bloodshed which would dominate the ten years from 1789 and 1799, Napoleon would ascend to the rank of general, a position which had long demanded-which it would not achieve until its desertion of the Royal party-a suitable and effective strategist. To that juncture, and under the typically critically lambasted family Bourbon Kings, in whose line Louis XVI ruled, France remained the inferior of all its closest continental competitors. As Wiegely's text observes, "the French Army of the mid- eighteen century could not match the skills of the Prussians or the British, and probably fell short of the battlefield toughness and resilience of the Russians and Austrians as well." (Weigley, 256) This would, as we have discussed, prefigure the success of revolutionary forces in bringing about the dismantling of the monarchical military, with America's template for success helping to elucidate this military vulnerability. It also reveals here a very clear distinction between the imperial rule which preceded Bonaparte and his own brand. Namely, the military force previously constituting France's armed corps would be demonstrably weaker than those of its neighbors at a juncture when the retraction of colonial expansion was driving an interest in consolidation by European powers. This is to note that its military disinclination, comparably speaking, during the declining reign of Louis XVI would place it at a point of susceptibility during a time when such could segue easily into the outright loss of sovereignty to foreign dominance. The vocal objection to the allowance of this vulnerability would be a political identifier for the position held by revolutionaries, though as a cause for subversive revolutionary action it would naturally pale in comparison to such motives as devastating poverty and an absence of political opportunity. In addition to the chaos this would allow within the French cities where fervor was at its highest pitch, this military meagerness would present France as ripe for the picking by many of its neighbors. Thus, Napoleon would be faced with a conflict of interest in the formulation of an order founded on the democratic principles of the Declaration but cognizant of the prevailing power structure in European continental affairs. In order to help address the balances which would here be achieved, we can again see that the discourse which was first acted out in the United States would precipitate the approach taken by those such as Bonaparte. Namely, this is evident in the rancorous debate that would persist at the Constitutional Convention. In fact, the Constitutional Convention and all ensuing conflict over the conceptualization of the burgeoning United States would reflect the difficulties in reconciling traditional forms of socioeconomic hierarchy and governmental authoritarianism with emergent conceptions of natural rights and human equality. The sometimes disparate forces of capitalism and democracy would be molded into a practicable form of governance with the drafting of the U.S. Constitution. In many ways however, as well- illustrated by the leanings of the monumentally influential The Federalist Papers, the Constitution would ultimately be conceived with a distinctive bias toward the retention of a hierarchical society and a governmental power there-from elected. Such liberal progressives as Thomas Jefferson would be consulted in smaller quotient than would be staunch federalists during the process of conception. As James Madison argues as one speaker under the shared nom de plume, Publius, in commenting on groups rising in protest of the government that "the friend of popular governments never finds himself so much alarmed for their character and fate as when he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice." (Rossiter, 71) Identifying popular objection to policy or ideology as a threat to the solidarity of the newly formulating nation, Madison represents well here the over-arching impetus of The Federalist Papers. These are designed to accord the government with a protection of power. In Thomas Jefferson's writings, we find outright hostility toward this extrapolation of government powers. More than that, later in his life, it seems apparent that he is resistant to the association established between the 'principles' stated in The Declaration of Independence and those found in the Constitution. Where the latter is endorsed by the Federalists as a watershed doctrine of civilization's history, Jefferson says of the former, "neither aiming at originality of principle or sentiment, nor yet copied from any particular or previous writing, it was intended to be an expression of the American mind." (Mansfield, 12) Jefferson's assertion of a wholly organic process suggests that the philosophy found in the Declaration was perhaps endorsed by the intensity of British tyranny or by the sense of something significant coming into being on a state level. In either respect, the core principle found in his work is that the rising of individual liberties and of self-determination were inexorable. But this would seem to have subsided in the ensuing years during which the Federalist Papers would be published, with Jefferson's conception of the colonies as separate but partnered ultimately subsiding to political forces less intent upon individual rights outside of a protection of the government's sovereignty. Jefferson, by contrast, speaks early on the subject of states' rights. In Jefferson's Declaration of Independence, in fact, he makes a note of stating in the very crucially worded jab at Great Britain that "these United Colonies are, and of Right ought to be Free and Independent States." (Mansfield, 11) Unquestionably, Jefferson would by principle make the case that America's states are far from Free and Independent under the conditions of the Constitution. As Publius would express, this time through the channel of Alexander Hamilton, there was to be viewed a grave danger to America's principle of a strong federal government in the granting of latitude for state autonomy. Of the interacting states, Hamilton would remark, "to presume a want of motives for such contests as an argument against their existence would be to forget that men are ambitious, vindictive and rapacious." (Rossiter, 48) His contention would be that the foul and contemptible nature of the common man would pose a threat to the stability of any sovereign state if not kept in check by a central government inherently empowered to apply administrative authority to all states within its union. This not only differs from Jefferson's understanding of free government as being a representation of the people, or at least of the peoples' interests, but it also distinguishes itself philosophically from his view of man. Without question, the Federalist view would not shine a favorable light on the hoi polloi, holding this to be a rung of society not to be given the opportunity to prove itself aggressive and sociopathic in the interests of self-advancement. Jefferson did not share this view, instead paying interest to each man's equal right to liberty and his potential to pursue infinite ends with that liberty. Jefferson appears to view the United States as a progressive break from the monarchical imbalance of European society, where the Federalists seemed determined to channel this monarchical society into what was a fundamentally more egalitarian frontier. As we have noted, the revolution was a genuine threat to the leadership core in all of Europe, where feudalism had long represented a common plight for the peasantry of the whole continent. The debates which ensued in the Continental Convention showed that there could genuinely be a break from these old forms of government that could emerge out of the combination of vigorous armed confrontation and subsequent compromise of philosophical forms. This was also a pretext for the economic discontent which sparked revolt in France and which festered throughout the European cities and countryside. The success of a French revolution threatened the stability of other European monarchies, with a stated objective of the revolution being the recognition of natural liberties and property rights through the states of the European continent. As a leader of both a majority segment in this movement and, ultimately first ruler, and after 1805, emperor of France, Napoleon markedly associated himself with many of the principles of the revolution in both his domination of state and his ambitions beyond French borders. In his uncompromisingly ruthless assertion of French authority over his neighbors, Napoleon actively "argued that he was building a federation of free peoples in a Europe united under a liberal government." (Chew, 1) This was a premise which descended from the revolutionary notion that constitutionality would dictate a government designed for the people. (Chew, 1) By no means a democratic order, Napoleon's principal notion for the governance of state was one informed by the principles of liberal capitalism, and represented the first meaningful break in European imperialism from the dynastic monarchies which had reigned since the primacy of the Holy Roman Empire. The secularism and liberalism which were paired in Napoleon's perspective would inform the necessity of his warfare.