Three Strikes Law and Crime Sentencing Regulation

Introduction
Californian lawmakers and citizens, in the year 1994, ratified a key amendment in the crime sentencing regulation of the nation (touted as ‘Three Strikes and You’re Out’ or the ‘Three Strikes Law’). Implemented by the state legislature under Chapter 12 of the 1994 Statutes (AB 971, Jones) and by California’s electorate under Proposition 184, one of the main elements of this regulation is that it mandates at least twenty-five years of life imprisonment in case of individuals convicted thrice for several past aggressive or major felonies (Brown and Jolivette; Diamond). This rule was enacted following concerns raised after the perpetration of a number of high profile homicides by ex-convicts. Society began to widely believe that violent criminals who acquired release from jail went on to perpetrate novel, and usually more brutal and major, offences. In this paper, the regulation’s effect will be explored and how far it has successfully accomplished its goals will be assessed. A literature review, existing information on hand, and talks with prominent local and state level crime justice authorities will be used as the basis to conduct this analysis. An attempt will be made at ascertaining whether or not the law facilitates crime reduction or whether it simply increases prison inmates’ population?
Rationale and key features of the law
Released individuals who reenter the world of crime are possibly hardest to handle by local and state crime justice authorities. Imprisonment has no impact on their behavior and the idea of facing another sentence doesn’t appear to bother them. Consequently, lawmakers as well as citizens support lengthier sentences for such criminals (The New York Times; Diamond). Proposition 184 advocates assert that the imposition of lengthier sentences for repeat criminals would have twofold benefits: Firstly, lengthier sentences (or sentence enhancements) imply communities are safe from their malevolence for longer durations. Further, being threatened with a lengthier sentence would dissuade a few criminals from further perpetrating offences.
Besides increasing incarceration durations for particular types of repeat criminals, California’s famed Three Strikes regulation brought in other amendments as well. Most notably, an individual found guilty of perpetrating a crime, with a history of being found guilty of brutal or major offences, will be meted out a lengthier sentence.
Impact of the law
Impact on the Prison Population
From the time of its enactment, the regulation has immensely influenced the incarcerated population’s composition. Californian courts have incarcerated more than 7,500 third-time offenders and more than 80,000 second-time offenders in the state’s prison. (Over 50% of the latter have even completed their sentence and are now back in society.) A decade after the law’s enactment, nearly 43,000 prisoners (roughly 26% of the overall jail population) were serving their sentences according to the 1994 Three Strikes rule (Brown and Jolivette). Third-time offenders constitute roughly 7,500 of these inmates while second-time convicts account for over 35,000. Statistical figures reveal an increase in third and second striker prisoners across the decade 1994-2004. Initially, striker prisoners’ population increased swiftly. But over time, a significant decline has been witnessed, with several second strikers out on parole after having served their stipulated time.
According to analysts’ forecasts at the time the law was implemented, by the end of a decade, more than 100,000 prisoners would be added to state prisons. This growth rate has evidently not been witnessed, owing to several potential factors such as district attorneys’ and judges’ discretion to reject certain past strikes (Sutton, 2-3). Although there is no court record of the frequency of application of this discretion, California State University’s Jennifer Walsh surveyed district attorneys and discovered that past strikes could be disregarded in case of as many as 25-45% of third-time convicts, leading to shorter incarceration durations (Taibbi, 2; Brown and Jolivette).
Three Strikes advocates justify their stand by claiming that the rule would have twofold benefits for the state: 1) Incapacitation effect: Repeat criminals would be isolated from society for lengthier durations, preventing them from perpetrating novel offences in that time; and 2) Deterrent effect: Severe punishments under the rule would serve to dissuade certain potential criminals, thus reducing crime rates (The New York Times).
According to the California Crime Index of the Justice Department, California State’s crime rate, on the whole, started dropping prior to the rule’s enactment in 1994. Indeed, from 1991 to 1994, a ten percent fall, on the whole, was witnessed in crime rates (Brown and Jolivette). Following the law’s enactment, the state’s crime rate witnessed a continued drop (by 43% from 1994 to 1999). However, after 1999, an upward trend has been observed (roughly eleven percent, to be precise). Likewise, from 1991 to 1994, brutal offenses underwent an eight percent drop, with a further forty-three percent drop from 1994 to 2003. A noteworthy point is that: such drops apparently contribute to the nationwide drop in crime rates. According to Miller, US crime rates experienced a 31% fall from 1991 to 2003; in the same time period, brutal offences underwent a 37% drop. Scholars note numerous potential factors playing a role in crime rate drops in the end of the last century, such as increased strength of the economy, shifting demographic trends, decreased handgun utilization and better law enforcement procedures. 
Estimated Public Safety Impact of Three Strikes
The central challenge when it comes to an accurate assessment of the law’s effect on public safety is: differentiating between effects linked purely to the law and transformations which would have taken place even if the law weren’t implemented. That is, without Three Strikes, would California have witnessed a continued drop in crime rates anyway? Or, was the law, in any way, responsible for speeding the falling crime rates or lengthening their duration?
Literature analysis, in addition to discourse with prominent criminologists, reveals the existence of scant consensus between scholars with regard to Three Strikes’ effects on societal safety, even following several years of its implementation. According to certain early reports (e.g., the Secretary of State’s 1999 report and the Attorney General’s 1998 report), Three Strikes is largely to be given credit for the 1990s’ crime rate decline. The aforementioned two reports state that the drastic crime decrease in California post-Three Strikes is clear proof of its positive effect on societal safety (Miller; Brown and Jolivette). Further, the latter report observes that the state witnessed the largest crime rate decline among all states after 1994.
But other assessments question the above early reports and the law’s subsequent effect on societal safety. Several scholarly studies indicate that the law probably moderately affected Californian crime rates; the effect wasn’t as great as predicted by initial forecasts. For instance, the variations in the rule’s county-wise enforcement were examined. If the law was properly functional, counties which applied Three Strikes more frequently would achieve appreciably greater crime rate declines as compared to others (Sutton, 7-8). But the researchers failed to note any significantly divergent county-wise outcome, indicating the law wasn’t the chief contributor to the substantial crime decrease following the year 1994.
One cannot observe any obvious agreement concerning Three Strikes’ public safety effects. Specifically, data constraints (including number of criminals deserving prosecution under the law) and the innate challenge of determining how many offenses were averted tend to complicate a conclusive assessment of Three Strikes’ effect on safety and crime (Miller). Currently, the degree of safety accorded to California residents by Three Strikes remains open to debate.
Scholars cite numerous justifications for Three Strikes’ potential shortfalls when it comes to guaranteeing societal safety. Firstly, application-related differences for different counties moderate its comprehensive impact, decreasing the percentage of criminal incarcerated for lengthier durations. Secondly, if California’s observed crime rate fall was occurring independently of the law (on account of some other social or crime justice contributor), the trend may have led to a smaller number of Three Strikes qualified cases as compared with prior projections. Thirdly, a few scholars indicate that the ‘striker’ cluster perpetrates only around 11% of overall California state crimes; thus, their imprisonment wouldn’t significantly influence the total crime rate. Lastly, certain criminal justice studies reveal that, for several reasons, being threatened with more severe sentences has no appreciable dissuasion effect on perpetrators (Brown and Jolivette; Taibbi, 5).
Conclusion
The Three Strikes rule of California State has not done much to influence violent crimes rates; instead, taxpayers have had to put in eight billion dollars for incarcerating several thousand convicts (largely convicted for non-violent crimes). Local and state level crime justice systems will be impacted majorly so long as it continues to be generally imposed (as authorities have been doing ever since the law came into effect in the year 1994). Notably, prison inmates will increase in number with increased incarceration of third- and second- time offenders. The former will increase in number till no earlier than the year 2019, the year when the earliest third strike inmates will be qualified for parole. This increase, in addition to the striker inmate population’s aging, will perhaps significantly impact the Californian prison system in the near future, by, increasing, among other things, capital outlay and operational expenses.


Works cited
Brown, Brian, and Greg Jolivette. A primer: Three strikes: The impact after more than a decade. Legislative Analyst's Office, 2005. Web.
Miller, Bettye. “Evidence Does Not Support Three-strikes Law as Crime Deterrent.” UCR Today. (2012). Web.
Sutton, John R. "Symbol and substance: Effects of California's Three Strikes law on felony sentencing." Law & Society Review 47.1 (2013): 37-72. Print.
Taibbi, Matt. "Cruel and unusual punishment: The shame of three strikes laws." Rolling Stone 27 (2013). Web.
The New York Times. “3 Strikes and You're Out: After 20 Years, Is the Law Working? | Retro Report | The New York Times.” Youtube. (2013). Web.