United States in Iraq Stay or Go

Temperatures and tempers are soaring in Iraq, and every day the news flashes tell the stories of one, two, three, or more American soldiers who died in combat. Whether it was justified or not, the actual war to seize power from Saddam Hussein came and went in a matter of weeks. On a high note, the United States public rallied behind the President and imagined throngs of joyous happy smiling Iraqi men, women, and children. The mews media has cooperated gracefully, and CNN, Fox, NBC, and every other major news network delivers exactly what the White House wants us to hear: that Iraq is better off with the Americans in control. Granted, Saddam was a dictator. He and his minions grew fat off his nation's main natural resource: petroleum, while most Iraqi citizens lived without some basic human rights and freedoms. Hussein and his regime also systematically persecuted whole ethnic groups, causing millions of refugees to seek solace in neighboring nations like Jordan. However justified the United States feels in entering Iraq without explicit international consent, the question remains of how to deal with the present situation. Even the journalists grow disillusioned by the moment, as they witness countless deaths on both sides. As the post-war phase draws out, it becomes increasingly bloody and increasingly costly for the American public. Furthermore, the Iraqi people don't seem too pleased with the state of affairs. Reporter Marina Jimenez notices the Iraqis are "angered by images of U.S. tanks rolling past their homes and children in hospital beds, they vow to fight for a regime they once fled," (1). Because of the immense humanitarian, economic, and political repercussions for both sides, the United States should cease trying to control the sovereign nation of Iraq.

In an article in the June 4 edition of USA Today, Dave Moniz recounts a series of American troop deaths from ambush: at the time his article was printed, nineteen troops had been killed since the war ended, nine of which occurred in the first week of June. The exponential growth in ambush and attacks on American soldiers shows that a sizable resistance movement is burgeoning in Iraq. Although U.S. officials claim that these "pockets of resistance" are not organized, the vacuum created by the absence of Saddam Hussein becomes more salient. In fact, even if the resistance movement is unorganized and decentralized now, there is no reason to believe that it will not become more systematic as the U.S. presence becomes less tolerable for the Iraqi people. Pat Roberts, a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, assuages the American public that resistance "would be undercut by proof that Saddam is dead," and yet following the deaths of his two main son-heirs, attacks on American troops did not wane.

Politicians seem detached from the human toll of the American presence in Iraq, instead viewing the situation in cold, economical terms. Soldiers become numbers, impersonal casualties, rather than names. In fact, the U.S. government acts with secrecy, deliberately withholding information from the American public in the hopes that it will not lower morale or lose support for the American cause. Politicians even refuse to communicate with each other. David Morris of Congress Daily reports that Defense Undersecretary Dov Zakheim "refused to tell the (Senate Foreign Relations Committee) how many U.S. troops were in Iraq," (1). These attitudes and practices prove that the American presence in Iraq is grossly inhumane.

However, the American people also seem detached, in large part because the media continues to portray death in such a trivial light. Iraqi bigwigs are painted on playing cards; the loss of American soldiers felt strongly only by friends and family members. Until casualties reach staggering numbers, the American public might not react at all: it seems the people are more concerned with money. Foreign Relations Chairman Richard Lugar, quoted by David Morris, states that American support for the rebuilding of Iraq is dependent on whether "their money is being spent effectively and that other nations are contributing a fair share," (Morris 1). The quick and easy war prompted the American public to believe that the entire "war on terrorism" and the "liberation of Iraq" is all a game. Hence, the playing cards. This kind of war fosters an attitude of disproportionate detachment from the human element. Ironically, the American presence in Iraq could eventually instill in the public a greater sense of the value of human life, especially as more and more troops perish. With "six degrees of separation," it is possible that eventually everyone will know someone who knows someone who died, if American presence continues.

The humanitarian costs of the war are of course not limited to the American side. In fact, one of the problems that the situation creates is a sense of "us and them." The Iraqi people have done nothing to harm Americans, and yet most American citizens feel hostile toward Iraqis. If civilian Iraqis die, it doesn't seem to matter. The same situation occurs in Iraq. Marina Jimenez notices that Suhall Nagam, an Iraqi citizen living in Jordan, is "unfazed by reports of corpses and burnt-out cars," (1). Not only are Iraqis becoming inured to the death and devastation surrounding daily life, they may also be growing increasingly hostile toward Americans. "I hope they all die," says Hagam, who calls the Americans and British "the invaders," (Jimenez 1). No wonder people like Hagam harbor such resentments. The American military is instructed to use force whenever necessary; their presence is more than imposing, it is downright threatening. "Ordinary Iraqis seem dismayed or scared at the sight of American troops," says Fareed Zakarla in his piece entitled "How to Make Friends in Iraq," (27). The Iraqi public's "mood is souring on Americans," Zakarla continues (27). The American presence in Iraq creates a climate of fear, misunderstanding, and intolerance that can only have negative consequences for our country and the Middle East.

The political effects of the continued American presence are equally as dire, as they have potentially long-lasting detrimental effects on the region and perhaps the globe. The fear and resentment toward American troops sets the stage for anti-Americanism. If Americans weren't already the target of hatred, their imperialistic stance in Iraq will only increase this sentiment. Fareed Zakarla reports that for many Iraqis, "resistance to America is a religious duty," (27). As Iraqi people watch their little children's eyes grow wide in terror as they witness tanks rolling through their town, killing neighbors, friends, and family members, it is easy to see how the American presence there is politically disastrous. These conditions are probably what contribute to the coalition's relative isolation within the international community. Once again, the American government and the conservative media fail to perceive the human element, instead focusing solely on economics: "Mr. Bush could offer the countries that help us out some oil discounts in the future," claims Bill O'Reilly of Fox News (1). It is no wonder many nations opposed the war in the first place and continue to oppose the occupation. As a result, the United States could be isolating itself from the international community, creating more enemies than it needs.

The political repercussions of the American presence in Iraq are felt at home, abroad, and within Iraq. At home, American citizens want to feel that the costs of the occupation do not outweigh the benefits. The government stands to lose a lot of support if the occupation proves unsuccessful: increasingly costly and deadly. Public support "may erode over time," according to Foreign Relations Chairman Richard Lugar (Morris 1). Hendrik Hertzberg of The New Yorker criticizes the Bush administration for remaining "resolutely hostile to nation-building at home" while it attempts to build a new Iraq (1). Many of the public services and infrastructures that the Americans are proposing for Iraq are ones needed at home; it will be hard for many Americans to accept their hard-earned money being spent halfway across the globe. Hertzberg attributes the actions of the government to "the global democratic-imperial ambitions of the present Administration," (40). Indeed, imperialism does appear to be a conscious motivator for the White House. Fareed Zakarla states, "There is a growing cottage industry in Washington of new imperialists, people who argue that America should embrace its role as a liberal, imperial power," (27). In spite of the pitfalls of past imperialistic endeavors around the globe by various nations, the United States fails to take the cue and back down. As Zakarla warns, "If history is any guide, it will also produce nationalism," which would be in opposition to the United States (1).

However, the most severe repercussions of a drawn-out occupation will be felt directly within the borders of Iraq. Trudy RXXXX of the Philadelphia Inquirer states that the U.S. military presence "makes some Iraqis nostalgic for a dictator," (1). The Americans have placed a heavy-handed military presence in the country, but when it comes to elected officials, none are in sight. Paul Bremer, the top civilian administrator in Iraq, wants to create a constitutional convention that would "appoint" a committee to write the constitution of Iraq (Tyler 2). Appoint, not elect. The United States wants to control every aspect of Saddam-free Iraq; the meaning of "democracy" seems to be eluding U.S. officials. The Iraqi people understandably hold "deep reservations about Mr. Brenner's insistence on putting off elections, and his opposition to turning over sovereignty to a provisional assembly or government," (Tyler 2).

Instead of focusing attention on the real problems of humanitarian services, infrastructures, institutions, and creating a new constitution for the people of Iraq, the United States concentrates on military might. The occupying forces, both American and British, hope to build a new Iraqi army of 40,000 soldiers within three years (Tyler 1). Moreover, salaries of now unemployed Iraqi military men, those who once served under Saddam Hussein, will be paid. The creation of a new army and the payment of "up to 250,000 'idled' Iraqi soldiers" will have a huge bill (Tyler 1). While Iraq does need some basic military and the United States can afford to help, this seems like a disproportionate diversion of monies. The Iraqi people need more than just a military; they need services, schools, and safety from imperialism.

The solution is not simple, however. The Iraqi people are incredibly diverse in their ethnicity, economic status, and opinions and visions of their own nation. Their diversity makes it more difficult to create a viable government. The United States, with the help of an international coalition, could help various ethnic factions within Iraq create a heterogeneous, representative democracy. However, as the American presence in Iraq continues to irk and disillusion the average Iraqi citizen, our country loses its legitimacy. As a result, the Iraqi people will begin to mistrust the intentions of Americans even more than they already have. Trudy RXXX suggests leaving "the rest of the job to the Iraqis themselves," (1). In other words, the Americans have done enough damage.

However, the common view in Washington is to "stay the course," ("Welcome to Iraq"). The President promised not to stay "a minute longer than necessary," and some believe that the Americans should also not leave too soon, citing Afghanistan as an example. One of the main problems with staying the course is economics. The author of Newsday article "Welcome to Iraq" admits that the nation-building going on in Iraq "must not be done on the cheap," (1). President Bush and the American government must take responsibility for the condition Iraq is in now and devote the necessary time, energy, and resources to rebuild the nation.

The problem with this seemingly ideal attitude is that the motivation and objective of rebuilding Iraq is blatantly self-serving for the United States. The American public, let alone the government, do not really care about the fate of individual Iraqi citizens. They are still viewed as dangerous, backwards, or as potential terrorists. Americans probably harbor unspoken desires to completely colonize Iraq, mostly in the hopes of seizing the second-largest proven oil reserves in the world. By putting off holding elections, diverting money more into military power than into social services, and by perpetuating myths about the Iraqi people through the media, the American government is admitting that oil and oil revenue is our top priority. This is why the exorbitant costs of nation-building are being downplayed: the eventual profits will refill the coffers. The costs of reconstruction and of continued military presence in Iraq are not being released (Morris 1). Obviously, if the American people were made aware of these costs, support would dwindle fast.