The US Efforts to fight Boko Haram

The US Expanded Effort against Boko Haram
Introduction
The Nigerian nation has, for long, been burdened by ethno- religious violence and communal conflicts. For instance, in the country’s middle belt (i.e., Plateau state), several outbreaks of gory violence have been witnessed between diverse communities, ever since the democratic system of governance was reinstituted in the country in the year 1999. Furthermore, the urban hubs – Kano and Kaduna – have faced riots as well, with a conflict simmering in Bauchi’s Tafawa Balewa district for many decades now. To outsiders, the conflict may seem to be grounded in religious differences, i.e., tensions arising between the blocs of Christian and Muslim citizens of the country. But a closer look at the goings- on reveals that politics — or to be more precise, the government patronage control — is largely to blame for these conflicts. Moreover, election- related disagreements have resulted in breakdowns along Christian and Muslim, as has been witnessed in the polls of 2011, when youngsters of south Kaduna went wild. The eruption of violence in such situations generally springs from one particular group asserting governmental apparatus control over the remaining groups in an ethnically diverse and highly heterogeneous region of the country (Walker, 2012, p. 2).
Of late, the US has been collaborating with the Nigerian government in its efforts to combat the Boko Haram terror outfit. The government of America considers Boko Haram to be an entity threatening its African interests, besides posing a potential threat to America as well. In November of 2013, the American government labeled the Boko Haram outfit an ‘FTO’ (Foreign Terrorist Organization). Nigeria being the most densely inhabited country and the largest democracy in the African continent, the American government considers it an important strategic partner which plays a major role in continent- wide peacekeeping efforts, and is a critical trade, direct investment and economic growth partner for America. As asserted by a senior official within the American government, one among the most prioritized subjects of US foreign policy with regard to Africa is security and peace in the Nigerian nation (McQuaid & Asfura-Heim, 2015, p. 2).
The regions suffering from the impacts of Boko Haram violence are inhabited by roughly thirty million individuals. This violence has given rise to a humanitarian crisis in the Lake Chad area, displacing over 2.8 million innocent individuals and cutting off a further three million individuals (approximately) from humanitarian access. According to United Nations statistics, over 5.6 million individuals in the area require emergency food assistance. The majority of displaced individuals have been provided shelter by host communities; they don’t reside in camps. Almost 1.6 million citizens of Nigeria who have been displaced have made off to Maiduguri – capital of Borno state – which also suffers from ongoing bombings, in spite of the Nigerian army’s expanded presence in the area. The UNHCR claims that the extensive military operations conducted by Nigeria’s armed forces has just as much a disruptive impact on daily life in the country as the attacks of the Boko Haram. The attacks by the Boko Haram have inflicted damage on the nation’s roads, schools, residences, hospitals and markets, deterring displaced citizens’ return. The UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund) believes Boko Haram violence has brought about the closure of over two thousand schools in the country, disrupting over 1 million children’s education (Blanchard, 2016, p. 4).
International Refugee Law
According to the Convention of 1951, once a refugee passes into the territory of any nation who is party to this convention, they get to instantly derive benefits from specific rights; also, additional rights accrue due to the duration and nature of their attachment with the country providing refuge (Hathaway, 2005, p. 155). Hathaway (2005) differentiates between 5 different attachment levels that accord refugees with distinct levels of rights that span from the refugee bound by the nation’s jurisdiction to an exclusive collection of rights reserved solely for refugees able to prove that they have taken up durable residence within the state. Divergent views may be found on refugee attachment level with host nation necessary for enjoying the right to free movement (as outlined in the convention’s 26th Article) (Maple, 2016, p. 5).
Are developing countries merely mimicking the approaches of the western world when it comes to the freedom of movement of refugees? That is, are such effective movement restrictions not restricted to the given sample but actually prevail in other areas of Africa and beyond? It has been suggested that by limiting the ability of working and aiding education and healthcare efforts, American and European countries might be engaging in similar de facto freedom of movement limitations. For instance, it has been commonly witnessed among European resettlement cases that support and service access is linked only to the area or city the refugee is directed to reside in, decreasing their likelihood of any secondary movements in the region or nation (Maple, 2016, p. 26).
International Law and US policy
Chad’s refugees have scant hopes of attaining any durable solution. Darfur’s continued intra- community fights and disputes occurring within northern Nigeria and CAR render voluntary repatriation an unlikely option for most refugees.
Refugee Law National legislation. The 1996 Constitution of Chad provides for political asylum, besides prohibiting political refugees’ deportation. Implementation of a draft refugee law in the nation has been put off since the year 2007 (Zetter & Ruaudel, 2016, p. 12).
Access to protection. Most refugees who come in from the southern CAR and the Eastern Sudani nations are allowed prima facie entry, thereby being automatically accepted by the Chad government as refugees and having access to the nation’s educational and healthcare services. Refugees in urban areas are bound by the process of refugee status determination via CNARR. After gaining approval, they also begin to enjoy the rights enjoyed by prima facie refugees (Zetter & Ruaudel, 2016, p. 13).
Freedom of movement. Though Chad belongs to the Community of Sahel- Saharan States, implying free individual, interest and capital movement among member nations, the reality is that individual entry is at the discretion of the host nation (Zetter & Ruaudel, 2016, p. 13).
Right to work. The labor law of Chad does not make any specific references to refugees’ working rights; rather, it only provides provisions linked to foreigners in general. As per Chad’s labor law, employing any individual of foreign origin involves an employer application that has to include copies of the foreigner’s passport and visa; this application has to be approved by the Office National pour la Promotion de l’Emploi’s Director. The entry visa requirement is evidently applicable to non- refugee foreigners; refugees’ access to the nation’s labor market, on the other hand, is bound by requirements similar to those imposed on nationals. Moreover, in spite of these specific requirements, except for employment in security and defense organizations, nationality ought not to serve as a deterring factor when it comes to recruitment, job performance, and distribution (Zetter & Ruaudel, 2016, p. 13).
US Policy and Air Power
Air power is no one- solution- for- all approach. Some aspects of the proposed strategy call for coercive, collaborative application of airpower, while other areas necessitate limited or no airpower employment. As has been mentioned above, this approach calls for coercive, collaborate airpower application, particularly drone strikes targeted at individuals or clusters of Boko Haram members. The United States has employed drone strikes in similar scenarios to combat terrorists in places like Syria (ISIS), Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. However, other more nuanced and sensitive areas requiring cooperation also exist, where the air power strategy does not work and might end up having counterproductive effects. The Department of State has identified several areas in which the government of Nigeria’s actions against Boko Haram have been hampered; these include non- cooperation among security organizations, a sluggish justice system, corruption, resource misallocation, and insufficient judge and prosecutor training. Clearly, air power cannot effectively tackle such problems in the nation’s judicial system and government; here, other cooperative approaches may prove fruitful (Hines, 2017).
For example, for long, America has had training programs in place for foreign prosecutors and judges and offered support when establishing judicial systems which are in line with the Western model of “rule of law” and “due process”. The Justice Department’s OPDAT (Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training) sends its career federal- level prosecutors to particular countries to carry out this advisory and training mission. Further, the Newport- based DIILS (Defense Institute of International Legal Studies) of the defense department holds regular resident courses targeted at foreign prosecutors and judges, in addition to sending its training units to other countries for training civilian and military judges and prosecutors. This extant cooperation template may be employed in Nigeria’s proposed policy to combat Boko Haram, and may help deal with a few issues identified by the Department of State. A sound judicial system that is founded on rule of law and due process may effectively indict and prosecute Boko Haram terrorists who perpetrate crimes and terror activities (e.g., sex trafficking and abductions), besides armed forces personnel or governmental law enforcers abusing human rights to a criminal level. A sound legal process may compliment air power application for targeting Boko Haram and its members when authorized by international legal doctrines. This complex strategy may ameliorate the latest issues caused by the Boko Haram terrorist organization (Hines, 2017).
While all air power approaches adopted are linked to chances of incurring casualties and collateral damage (?as has, in certain cases, been witnessed in operations involving drone strikes), previous policies surrounding air strikes by way of drones have effectively ended up damaging terrorist operations and killing terrorists. Accordingly, America ought to take into careful account the increased current support to African nations including Nigeria, through utilizing surgical air strikes using drones for deterring, degrading, and ultimately destroying the Boko Haram terrorist organization (Hines, 2017). The drone operators of the United States have become more closely involved in military operations for bolstering the MNJTF’s efforts. From their base in Cameroon’s Garoua, operators provide troops in Africa with ISR images which aid friendly forces in avoiding major ambushes by the Boko Haram in Nigeria’s vegetation- dense terrain (Chapman, 2016, p. 13).
Conclusion
The terror outfit, Boko Haram, has created significant issues for Nigeria and adjacent countries. The organization has performed abductions and planned and executed attacks fitting the description of ‘acts of terror’ perpetrated by recognized terror outfits such as ISIS and al- Qaeda, in addition to affiliating itself with both aforementioned terrorist organizations. ISIS and al- Qaeda have officially been identified as terror groups by the US, leaving no cause to treat the Boko Haram outfit any differently. America has already formulated a strategy (based on international law) to respond to the abovementioned groups. The strategy has been adopted without any appreciable harm to American interests or international criticism (Hines, 2017).



















References
Blanchard, L. P. (2016). Nigeria’s Boko Haram: Frequently Asked Questions. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved from https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43558.pdf
Chapman, G. L. (2016). Boko Haram-Changing the narrative. (Bachelor’s Research Report, Air University). Retrieved from http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1031381.pdf
Hines, G. (2017). What do we do about Boko Haram? Retrieved from https://medium.com/human-development-project/what-do-we-do-about-boko-haram-2415c71a8b01
Maple, N. (2016). Rights at Risk: A thematic investigation into how states restrict the freedom of movement of refugees on the African Continent. New Issues in Refugee Research, 281. Retrieved from http://www.unhcr.org/57ee60d57.pdf
McQuaid, J., & Asfura-Heim, P. (2015). Rethinking the U.S. approach to Boko Haram: The case for a regional strategy. Retrieved from http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a613687.pdf
Walker, A. (2012). What is Boko Haram? Retrieved from https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR308.pdf
Zetter, R., & Ruaudel, H. (2016). Refugees’ right to work and access to labor markets – An assessment. Retrieved from https://www.knomad.org/sites/default/files/2017-12/KNOMAD%20Study%201-%20Part%20II-%20Refugees%20Right%20to%20Work%20-%20An%20Assessment.pdf