Utilizing the Science of Criminology

¶ … Policy Efficacy: Terrorist Activity since 9/

Terrorism

The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 changed the world forever. This one of the most successful and large-scale attacks in the history of transnational terrorism. These attacks sent effects and shockwaves into the everyday lives of Americans and New Yorkers for over a decade. This paper asks how the counterterrorist policies measure up? Are they working? How do we know if they are or not? The paper clearly defines the terms to be used and considered over the course of the discussion as a means to add transparency to an already vague and opaque topic. The paper concludes that counterterrorism tactics as they currently stand are ineffective for several reasons including lack of political, international cooperation and no standard by which to gauge policy efficacy.

Research & Policy Efficacy: Terrorist Activity since 9/11

Criminology is a truly a science of the nature of humanity on several planes. Criminology is concerned with specific sets of behaviors -- deviant and criminal. It seeks answers regarding the scope of criminal behavior in the individual and in society. Criminology, in a way, is an impossible task -- to understand human behavior in a scientific manner when often humans behave in ways inconducive to scientific study. The pursuit to understand the causes of, the nature of, extent of, and control of criminal behaviors is a noble one, nonetheless. Terrorism is a more prominent deviant and criminal behavior exhibited around the world today. Numerous countries are the sites of terrorist activities and many other countries are the targets of terrorist activity. Well-executed terrorist acts affect the world and most especially the location of the terrorism forever.

The terrorist activity that occurred in New York City on September 11, 2001, has altered several aspects of American culture. American law enforcement and government have made drastic changes to their policies regarding the prevention of, intervention of, and penalties for terrorist activities. The American people and specifically New Yorkers experience a new kind of vulnerability after this attack. Many Americans prayed and rallied for justice for the lives lost in the tragedy. Utilizing the science of criminology and with reference to policies implemented since September 11, 2001, the paper endeavors to evaluate how & if polices contribute to the prevention & response to terrorist threats from within a utilitarian framework.

Regardless of opinions on who was responsible for the terrorist activity, which destroyed the World Trade Center in New York City on September 11, 2001, Americans, especially New Yorkers cannot deny that there have been drastic and vast amounts of policies regarding public safety, law enforcement, individual rights, and behavior appropriate for public spaces. These policies have changes the lives and perspectives of many Americans. The media/press, law enforcement agencies, and government agencies tell the public that the policy changes serve as protection for the average citizen from terrorism and other forms of danger. More than ten years have passed since terrorist act upon the World Trade Center. Have the lives of New Yorkers and Americans improved directly because of the policy changes since 9/11? Are we safer? Is there less terrorism in the country? Do the policy changes implemented since 9/11 reflect sound research? This paper examines policies implemented since September 11, 2001, proposing a standard by which the policies may be held against, a practical framework within which they can be considered, and then subsequently evaluates the efficacy of such policies.

Numerous policies regarding the prevention of terrorist behavior are now in effect in various areas of the country as well as specific areas of cities across American cities. The changes in policies regarding the prevention of terrorist behavior have changed American culture. Americans should consider what research was gathered that heavily contributed to the changes in policy and the subsequent changes in their culture. Americans should consider the agencies or bodies that conducted the research and how their missions and/or business allies' missions contributed to the way the researcher was conducted, who gathered the research, the standards & quality of the collection and analysis, and for what ends the results of the researched are used.

Changes in policies after 9/11 occur on several levels. Local law enforcement has new policies regarding response time, confirmation of activity, and dissemination of relevant resources to contain the situation. There is legislation that operates on the federal level in regards to which kinds of methods federal agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, and Homeland Security can gather information and how they may use that information in investigations and litigations. There are augmented changes to policy regarding the rights of the average American citizen particularly under the condition a citizen is within the custody of an agency dedicated to the prevention of terrorist activity. With these changes and more, it is evident Americans whether in pursuit of terrorist prevention or not should be certain these policy changes have been well researched and that the policies in place accurately reflect that same quality research. These policies have and continue to affect the lives of a great deal of Americans on a daily basis in key areas. Americans should be sure that so many deep changes come from sound research and that there are no discrepancies between the research and the enforced policy.

Let the terms being considered by the paper be made transparent. What do we mean when we say terrorism? How is terrorism different from criminal and deviant behavior, or is it not so different? In "Collective vs. unilateral responses to terrorism," Sandler clearly states:

Terrorism is the premeditated use or threat of use of violence by individuals or subnational groups to obtain a political or social objective through intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the immediate victims. Terrorists try to circumvent the normal political process through violence perpetrated on a public who may then pressure the government to concede to the terrorists' demands. On 11 September 2001 (henceforth, 9/11), the four hijacked planes graphically illustrated the havoc and destruction that terrorists can wreak on society. (Sandler, 2005,-Page 75)

Terrorism involves planning. Just as premeditated murder necessitates a slightly different punishment than spontaneous murder or murder that was committed in self-defense, law enforcement agencies regard terrorism as in a category of its own, predicated on meticulous planning, adherence to detail, and posing as an average citizen. Terrorists have objectives; they are goal oriented. Though we may not agree with their methods of expression and ways of getting attention, we cannot deny that terrorists do not commit intense acts of violence for anarchic reasons.

There is always an intended message in conjunction with the violence of terrorism. The violence is often part of the message or the entire contents of the message itself, depending on the target and the collateral damage. One of the messages the terrorists sent to Americans on 9/11 is that the United States of America is just as vulnerable to attack by terrorists just as another country, which may not be as wealthy and prosperous as the United States of America. Terrorists do not wish to converse with audiences, as Sandler states, terrorists use intimidation to get our attention. Terrorists do not abide by political or legal processes. Terrorists use violence as a way to capture attention and leverage with the governing body to acquire their demands. Terrorism is brutal and blunt. Though terrorist activities often demand incredible attention to detail, the violence and after-effects they cause often leave quite a mess.

The paper attempts to be a specific with the terms in at hand for several reasons. One reason the paper seeks transparency is because that is an issue related to the efficacy of policies regarding terrorism. Critics of policies argue that the policies are not transparent, that the terms within the policies are too vague, providing unreasonable latitude to law enforcement and government agencies. This lack of transparency contributes to the abuse of power by these bodies that are paid and supposedly dedicated to the protection of the country and of the citizens that occupy it. Moving forward, there is domestic terrorism and there is transnational terrorism. Domestic terrorism occurs within one country. The terrorists who commit the acts are from the country they terrorize, or at least are residents or citizens of that country. Transnational terrorism contains terrorists that may or may not be from the country terrorized. Transnational terrorists may be from one country, travel to another, terrorize it, and then return home.

Why is the difference between domestic terrorism and transnational terrorism significant to acknowledge? Just as there is first-degree murder and second-degree murder, there are differences in the degrees of terrorism and these degrees directly affect policies regarding enforcement as well as punishment. Sandler elucidates:

At the outset, domestic terrorism must be distinguished from transnational terrorism. The former is solely a host country affair where its citizens resort to terrorist attacks on other citizens or their property with the intention of furthering a domestic political or social agenda through violence and intimidation…By virtue of its victims, targets, institutions, supporters, terrorists' demands, or perpetrators, transnational terrorism involves more than a single country…Although domestic terrorism is far more prevalent than transnational terrorism (National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, 2004), the latter generates cross-border externalities that are difficult to address, and leads to collective action failures when unilateral responses by governments work against global welfare…Transnational terrorism, as practiced by Al-Qaida and its loose network of affiliates, poses a greater threat than domestic terrorism to world security as fundamentalist groups seek maximum carnage and financial repercussions (Hoffman, 1998). (Sandler, 2005, 77)

Transnational terrorism is a greater threat than domestic terrorism because transnational terrorists understand human nature and the great diversity of cultures on Earth. Every country and every culture handles defense and safety matters in different ways. Therefore, when citizens from multiple countries are in some way involved in a transnational terrorist activity, it is unlikely that the matter will come to an easy, simple, or direct resolution. The differences in methods and culture hinder cooperation, resolution, and apprehension of terrorists. Furthermore, Sandler adds that

To appreciate the collective action problems posed by transnational terrorism, one must recognize the asymmetries that distinguish the behavior of targeted nations and their terrorist adversaries. These asymmetries provide tactical advantages to terrorists who target assets from powerful nations. Nations must guard everywhere, while terrorists can identify and attack the softest targets. (Sandler, 2005,-Page 78)

Transnational terrorists intend to cause cultural rifts and profit off the time wasted when countries cannot agree on a swift, effective means by which to counter the terrorist activities and possibly recover any losses.

The disagreement among countries involved and/or affected by transnational terrorism goes beyond simply who has the jurisdiction or who has the best plan to get the bad guys and make them pay. The disagreement among countries affected by transnational terrorism is at play at a much deeper political and cultural level than the average person would consider. Just as there are countries that disagree as to whether Palestine actually exists as a country, countries adamantly disagree on who is a terrorist and who is not. We can imagine how a lack of general consensus on which parties constitute terrorist groups hinders conflict resolution a great deal. Sandler aptly writes:

National strength provides a false sense of security, thereby inhibiting governments from appreciating the need for coordinated action…In democracies, leaders' interests in the future are limited by the length of the election cycle and their likelihood of reelection. Agreements made with leaders of other countries to combat terrorism may be rather short-lived if a government changes…This short-term viewpoint limits intergovernmental cooperative arrangements that could follow from a repeated-game analysis, based on a tit-for-tat strategy. Because many counterterrorism actions among governments abide by a prisoners' dilemma game structure a myopic viewpoint works against solving the problem through repeated interactions, unless agreements can have a permanency that transcends a change in governments. The high value that governments place on their autonomy over security matters also inhibits their addressing collective action issues successfully. (Sandler, 2005,-Page 80

With the power and assets of an entire country behind a leader, he (more likely) becomes falsely arrogant in his ability to handle the situation independently. Sandler describes aspects of the political process, or the political process itself as a hindrance in the effort to effectively eliminate terrorist threats and activities. The fact that political leaders must be periodically elected and that leaders change with moderate regularity at the highest echelons of governance may actually work against world leaders in the world on terror. Until there is a significant shift in attitude regarding cooperation against terrorism, the terrorists, because they have more practical, cooperative, and honest practices, they have an advantage against those in office who remain divided, but nonetheless sovereign.

Is it really possible for terrorists to agree with each other? Various terrorists are cooperating with each other? How can this be possible? How can people capable of such blatant violence and destruction be also capable of cooperation and collaboration? Terrorists are cooperative because they must be; cooperation is prudent and cost effective. Sandler elaborates:

A much different situation characterizes the terrorists who have cooperated in networks since the onset of modern-day terrorism. From the late 1960s, terrorist groups have shared personnel, intelligence, logistics, training camps and resources (Alexander & Pluchinsky, 1992; Hoffman, 1998)… Despite different political agendas, terrorist groups share similar opponents -- e.g., the United States and Israel -- that provide some unity of purpose… Terrorist groups cooperate because of their relative weakness compared with the well-armed governments that they confront. Given their limited resources and grave risks, terrorists have little choice but to cooperate to stretch resources. Terrorist leaders tend to be tenured for life so that they view intergroup interactions as continual. This long-term orientation means that terrorist groups can successfully address prisoners' dilemma interactions through punishment-based tit-for-tat strategies. The temptation to renege on an agreement with another terrorist group for a short-term gain is tempered by the long-run losses from the lack of future cooperative gains. Terrorists appear to place less weight than governments on their autonomy, provided that shared actions further their goals. Unlike their government adversaries, terrorists are motivated to address their collective action concerns. (Sandler, 2005,-Page 80 -- 81)

Law enforcement and government agencies need to understand the organizational psychology and sociology of terrorist groups on a much deeper level if they are to prove ultimately effective in the war against terror. The powers that are suppose to protect the people are too busy bickering and remaining in their respective corners while terrorists continue to spread their messages through carnage and destruction because they made honest deals among themselves and cooperated with those who are very different from their indigenous groups. Policies regarding terrorist activities should reflect appropriate consideration for the social landscapes within a terrorist group as well as the ones between and among sets of terrorist groups.

What makes the attacks on 9/11 so significant that such significant shifts in policy content and implementation came to pass? Surely there are other countries that have suffered greater casualties, carnage and damage than the United States of America did on September 11, 2001. Hoffman clarifies the issue for his readers:

Indeed, in lethality terms alone the September11 attacks are without precedent. For example, since 1968, the year credited with marking the advent of modern, international terrorism, one feature of international terrorism has remained constant despite variations in the number of attacks from year to year. Almost without exception, the United States has annually led the list of countries whose citizens and property were most frequently attacked by terrorists. But, until September 11, over the preceding 33 years a total of no more than perhaps 1,000 Americans had been killed by terrorists either overseas or even within the United States itself. In less than 90 minutes that day, nearly three times that number were killed. To put those uniquely tragic events in context, during the entirety of the twentieth century no more than 14 terrorist operations killed more than 100 persons at any one time. Or, viewed from still another perspective, until the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, no single terrorist operation had ever killed more than 500 persons at one time. Whatever the metric, therefore, the attacks that day were unparalleled in their severity and lethal ambitions. Significantly, too, from a purely terrorist operational perspective, spectacular simultaneous attacks -- using far more prosaic and arguably conventional means of attack (such as car bombs, for example) are relatively uncommon. (Hoffman, 2002,-Page 304)

From a law enforcement perspective, on the most basic level, the terrorist events of September 11, 2001 demonstrated that policies regarding terrorist activity failed. The policies and procedures in place did not work. The U.S.A. became the victim of the most gruesome terrorist activity in the history of transnational, global terrorism and this occurred within one of the country's and world's greatest cities, New York City. The terrorists said to America, "If we can attack you here and like this, then there is no place you are safe; there is not enough money or weapons to protect you."

Thus, it is completely understandable that law enforcement agencies, government agencies, and policy makers went into action. Many of these bodies awoke to the most graphic reality-check the world has seen. Policies needed to stop this from happening again. There needed to be policies that could help intervene and cease terrorist activities before they escalated to the point of execution of their plans. There needed to be more policies, more effective policies, and more proactive counterterrorist measures to ensure the safety of the city, the country, and the country's reputation around the world. But were the policies that were made the best for the situation? Do the policies implemented reflect sound research or emotional impulsivity? Are the policies really keeping the country safer from terrorism? How would the American people know if they were or not?

In order for the argument of the paper to continue, another term must be made transparent: counterterrorism. What exactly is counterterrorism? How is it different from general law enforcement? What are the tactics that law enforcement agencies use to counter terrorism? Sandler argues that

Counterterrorism consists of government actions to inhibit terrorist attacks or curtail their consequences. There are two main categories of antiterrorism policies -- proactive and defensive. Proactive or offensive measures target the terrorists, their resources, or their supporters directly. By weakening the ability of terrorists to operate, proactive policies reduce the frequency and prevalence of attacks against all at-risk targets. Such actions include attacking terrorist camps, assassinating terrorist leaders, freezing terrorist assets, retaliating against a state-sponsor, gathering intelligence, and infiltrating a terrorist group. Defensive or passive policies try to protect a potential target against an attack or to ameliorate the damage in case of an attack. Defensive measures may involve the installation of technological barriers (e.g., bomb-sniffing devices, metal detectors, or biometric identification), the hardening of targets (e.g., barriers in front of federal buildings), the deployment of security personnel (e.g., sky marshals on commercial flights), and the institution of terrorist alerts. (Sandler, 2005,-Page 78)

This is key information to consider when attempting to evaluate the efficacy of policies since 9/11. Counterterrorism is a government issue. Policies are either proactive or defensive. Are they any that are both? Neither? Which policies are least or most effective: proactive ones or defensive ones? These are all important questions that policy makers and enforcers must consider. The general public has the right to consider and answer these questions itself. The general public also has the right to hold the government responsible for counterterrorist policies and their effects. The public is not in control of the situation; therefore, it cannot be held responsible. The government is supposed to be in control making the government accountable and responsible for the design, implementation, monitoring, assessment, and modification (when appropriate) to counterterrorist policies.

What are the strategies for counterterrorism? Are they working? How do we know? What is the public response? What is the affect of policy changes on terrorism? What is the affect of policy changes on terrorism on the public? Adams et al. outright challenge the efficacy and not so much the moral orientation of the counterterrorist strategy in the United States since 9/11:

In the wake of 9/11, the U.S. government employed several new counterterrorism (CT) tactics, some of which aroused a great deal of controversy. The controversial tactics included 'enhanced' interrogation, preventative detention, expanded use of secret surveillance without warrants, ethnic/religious profiling, the collection and mining of domestic data, and the prosecution of terror suspects in military tribunals. While there has been great debate over the morality and legality of these controversial measures, there has been significantly less attention dedicated to evaluating whether the tactics work to prevent terrorism. (Adams et al., 2011,-Page 4)

Some of these tactics are quite familiar to U.S. law enforcement and government agencies such as unregulated surveillance, racial/ethnic/religious profiling, and enhanced interrogation. Since 9/11, the use of such tactics is more common knowledge and a less kept secret from the public. In fact, there are policies and legislation that provide agencies the legal authority to execute such tactics. What does it say that little attention is paid as to whether the counterterrorist tactics are working in the crusade against terror? Why are agencies more concerned with executing counterterrorism rather than assessing counterterrorism? This lack of concern regarding assessment is shortsighted and reckless. It noteworthy to state that in light of the inefficacy of many CT policies, many agencies are publically disavowing and discrediting CT policies such as surveillance without a warrant, profiling, and enhanced interrogation. Perhaps in a small way, because the public is more aware of CT tactics, the public directly or indirectly becomes a part of the team of CT strategists. Or at least the reaction and/or backlash from the public to CT agencies regarding CT tactics influences the decisions made regarding CT policies, making it more of a conversation than tyranny in the name of CT.

Part of the reason why 9/11 happened in the first place is because there were grossly ineffective counterterrorist measures in place that did not prepare, intervene, or counter the terrorist activity. Is not the United States setting itself up for another attack by enforcing policies without scrutinizing their efficacy? If the policies do not work, yet the country continues to use them regardless, this makes the country vulnerable to another attack. No one knows which policies work and which ones do not. Therefore, how can the country be adequately prepared for another attack on the same scale or greater? It cannot. It will not. Adams et al. locate a substantial body of proof showing

…that controversial CT tactics may have been counterproductive in several ways: increasing the ratio of informational 'noise' to terrorist 'signal,' undermining the state's legitimacy among potential civilian informants, and legitimizing terrorists' preferred status as 'warriors.' In no case is there credible evidence showing that these controversial CT measures significantly helped catch terrorists or offered other strategic advantages outweighing their disadvantages. (Adams et al., 2011,-Page 4)