Introduction Until recently, the history of the Arab states with regard to Israel has been one of conflict and cold peace. With the signing of the Abraham Accords, the UAE has turned a page in Arab-Israeli relations. It now appears that a warm peace is possible in the Middle East and that such a peace is being pursued by the UAE in the hopes that it will help...
Until recently, the history of the Arab states with regard to Israel has been one of conflict and cold peace. With the signing of the Abraham Accords, the UAE has turned a page in Arab-Israeli relations. It now appears that a warm peace is possible in the Middle East and that such a peace is being pursued by the UAE in the hopes that it will help to unthaw relations among the other Arab states. However, for many Arab populaces, Israel remains a state to be viewed with wary.
Israel has been in some sort of conflict with Palestine since its inception nearly a century ago. For most of this time, the Arab world has supported the Palestinian cause against Israel. Wars have been fought, such as the Six Day War, and Israel’s size has grown. The Palestinian people, meanwhile, have been at the mercy of their own leadership, Hamas and Hezbollah. Currently, the UAE views these organizations and leaders as terrorists who have led the Palestinian people astray.
Following the Six Day War, Egypt eventually sought to establish a peace with Israel through the Camp David Accords in 1978. That peace was celebrated as a breakthrough in Israeli-Arab relations, but it has mainly been characterized as a cold peace—one that focused on security rather than on cementing a warm friendship defined by mutual growth and well-being. Egypt’s subsequent fall into disarray proved the extent to which the Camp David Accords achieved lasting peace. Jordan followed suit two decades later with its own cold peace, but after a quarter century this political peace is barely remembered between the two states.
The UAE has approached Israel differently, however. It has predicated its talks with Israeli by adopting a win-win position, seeking not just a political peace or a security peace but rather a peace that can enable both states to prosper and benefit from formalized ties. To this end, the UAE and Israel plan to work together on trade, tourism, energy, agriculture, security, and more—to enhance one another’s economy and contribute to the overall prosperity of the Middle East.
To some degree, the UAE and Israel both recognize similar threats in the Middle East: Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas are all seen by each as a source of concern. The formalization of ties between the UAE and Israel thus also represents a step towards addressing the elephant in the room—namely the acquisition of nuclear power by Iran and what this may mean for peace in the Middle East.
There are many reasons the UAE has chosen now to formalize relations with Israel. For one thing, its economy has increased rapidly in recent years, and establishing a warm peace with Israel allows it to have one more trade partner to whom it can ship oil, which is what has allowed its economy to soar. The UAE is also in need of new agricultural technology, which Israeli companies can provide. Additionally, the time was ripe for this type of peace with the Trump Administration seeking to facilitate a turning point in Arab-Israeli relations. The UAE’s dissatisfaction with Palestinian politicians and their ongoing corruption, the strategic and economic benefits of such a peace plan, the existence and growth of common enemies, and the need to secure a stable future for itself and for the Arab world all served as legitimate reasons to finally in 2020 reach out and formalize ties with Israel.
In this regard, the UAE has been unique in its approach to Israel. While it is true that other states, including Bahrain and Sudan, have also signed onto the Abraham Accords, and Egypt and Jordan too have both pursued peace in the past, the UAE is different. Critics allege, for instance, that Bahrain and Sudan only signed onto the Abraham Accords out of a quid-pro-quo arrangement with the US. But no such arrangement can be said to have motivated the UAE. Neither can the UAE’s peace with Israel be characterized as cold, like that of Egypt’s or Jordan’s peace with Israel of past decades.
Still, future challenges remain. The UAE has enjoyed a solid reputation up until now, but some states see the UAE as jumping the gun by formalizing ties with Israel when the Oslo peace has yet to be achieved. Other states seem interested in pursuing a similar relationship with Israel, such as Saudi Arabia—but the populace remains against it. On top of all that is the issue of Iran, and its insistence upon gaining nuclear power. It is also well known that Iran supports Palestine’s leaders, along with Hamas and Hezbollah. Thus, while the Iranian challenge is likely to persist, and other unknowns remain—such as whether any other Arab states will be willing to turn the page and move towards friendly relations with Israel—the UAE has taken a major step forward in securing its position in the Middle East and bringing a warm peace to the region for the first time.
The UAE’s relationship with Israel already existed in an embryonic stage prior to the Abraham Accords. The two states had collaborated on matters of intelligence and security. And the two shared a similar outlook with regard to Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah and the Palestinian leadership. With the signing of the Abraham Accords, a new phase in relations was marked. This phase is best characterized as the establishment of a warm peace between the two states: tourism is opening between the two, trade is set to flourish as Israel sells agricultural tech to the UAE and the UAE sells oil to Israel; diplomatic relations have improved, there is an overall very positive attitude and regard between the two.
And yet perhaps the most important reason the UAE has decided that now is the time to pursue formal ties with Israel is this: the geopolitics of the region has changed. Qatar relations with Iran and Turkey have turned the shape of things in the Middle East. By affirming its friendship with Iran, Qatar invoked the ire of other states, such as Saudi Arabia—yet Qatar held fast in its position, and has been continuously outspoken on the matter of Iran’s rights. Qatar and Iran, like the UAE and Israel, have developed their own warm peace of sorts. But below the surface, there are hostilities on all sides. Thus, following the Gulf Crisis with Qatar, the UAE needed a new friend in the region to balance the power. That friend has been found in Israel.
Israel was a good choice because the two states have common enemies and UAE leaders always want to be the first in all things, so they took the first leap of fate to be the first Gulf country to open up ties with Israel.
Will it work?
So far it appears that the friendship will yield much fruit.
But challenges remain.
First and foremost there is the long-standing resistance of much of the Arab populace towards Israel. In spite of what leaders in Sudan, Bahrain or other states may want, much of the population they represent still holds anger towards Israel over its treatment of Palestine. The people of the Arab world, in general, have no warm feelings towards Israel—so it is difficult for Arab leaders to attempt to initiate a warm peace under such conditions.
The UAE has been able to do so because it has to a large degree prepped its own people to being open towards Israel. It does not allow political opposition to air grievances openly in public, and it directs the sentiment of the people in such a way that they are in support of opening towards Israel. Moreover, the people in the UAE see the relationship as beneficial and see that they stand to benefit from trade, tourism and security collaboration.
Other states, including Bahrain, have lacked the kind of political stability that the UAE enjoys. Among the Arab states, there are few governments that have the reins of power as firmly in their hands as the leaders of the UAE. At the same time, the UAE is largely a state of expatriates and has a very cosmopolitan and modern feel to it. It is unique in the Gulf world because it is truly a unique state.
Now, with the winds of change blowing, and with Qatar, Turkey and Iran aligning, the Middle East appears to be in as tense a situation as it ever has been. Old grudges do not simply fade away, and the animosity between Iran and Israel is as heavy as it ever was. Iran is insisting that the West drop its sanctions against it and allow it to pursue nuclear power unabated. Israel is adamant that if the West relents on Iran, Israel will be forced to attack.
The rhetoric is high and the alliances are falling into place, potentially signaling that a titanic conflict is set to take place. And yet the hope of peace remains, and the UAE is committed to following through on its plans to bring a new order to the Middle East. One hope is that as more states open themselves to Israel, Iran will see the writing on the wall. The fear, of course, is that Iran will lash out—feeling increasingly isolated and marginalized in the region. The risks are as great as the reward, and no one knows what the future might bring.
But for now, the Abraham Accords are a sign that peace is possible. Stability is needed in the region, and by taking the first step the UAE shows that obstacles can and are being removed. No other state in the Middle East would have dared take this first step—but the UAE loves to lead, and so it may come to pass that other states may follow. When and which ones—no one knows yet.
In the meantime, red lines may be drawn, and the new geopolitical arrangements may shift some more. Qatar has a vested interest in maintaining the peace in the Middle East as much as any other state. Its friendship with Iran is ultimately no different from a diplomatic play that makes sense for itself. But if fighting were to break out, the question of where Qatar might throw its support is a good one.
Preventing a breakout of open conflict is a top priority for the UAE. It wants the Middle East to thrive—and it wants to avoid war. But it is also going to prepare for war at the same time. Already it is seeking to obtain weapons and aircraft from the US—but even this may be a challenge, for Israel fears what might happen should these weapons and aircraft fall into the wrong hands.
Thus, the peace is warm but also tenuous. Fears and concerns still abound, and many unknowns still exist.
Yet the benefits outweigh the risks. The UAE is moving forward with plans to rapidly change its own state by importing agricultural tech that can transform its arid lands into farming ventures. It plans to boost tourism, and Israel plans to do the same. The intercourse between Emiratis and Israelis should develop nicely in the coming months and years, barring any geopolitical hiccups. As the two states’ cultures become more intertwined and appreciative of one another, it stands to reason that future generations will also develop a reciprocal feeling of friendship for the state that has for so long been viewed as an usurper in the Middle East.
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