How the West Can Win against North Korea

Abstract

Today, relations between the United States and North Korea are at their lowest point since an armistice was signed between these two countries in 1953. The blustery and confrontational rhetoric that is constantly emanating from Pyongyang underscores the fact that the current tensions on the Korean peninsula could easily escalate into an all-out shooting war between these two nuclear powers, especially with most countries in the West preoccupied with the ongoing global Covid-19 pandemic and the corresponding global economic downturn. Against this backdrop, identifying potentially viable policy solutions that can not only deescalate tensions on the Korean peninsula, restore normal relations between the United States and North Korea and pave the path towards eventual reunification of the North and South Koreas represents a timely and valuable enterprise. To this end, the purpose of this policy analysis is to provide a brief historical overview of the relations between the United States and North Korea to determine how the current impasse was reached and a discussion concerning what steps the U.S. should take to achieve these outcomes. Finally, a summary of the research and recommendations for American policymakers concerning current and future relations with North Korea are provided in the conclusion.

Policy Paper: Denuclearizing North Korea

A History of North Korea and How Bilateral Relations Reached This Point

Many Americans at present first learned about the Hermit Kingdom following the end of World War II when tensions on the peninsula between the United States and North Korea began to escalate, resulting in yet another shooting war involving America. In reality, though, formal diplomatic relations between the two countries were established nearly a century and a half ago when the 1882 Treaty of Peace, Amity, Commerce and Navigation was ratified and the first diplomatic mission was dispatched to Korea in 1883 (U.S. relations with North Korea, 2018). The newly established relations between the U.S. and Korea only remained in place until 1905, however, when Japan took control of Korea’s diplomatic affairs (U.S. relations with North Korea, 2018).

After Japan’s defeat by the Allies in World War II, the Korean peninsula was split in to two occupation zones at the 38th parallel, with the northern half being controlled by the Soviet Union and the south falling to the control of the United States (U.S. relations with North Korea, 2018). In 1948, both countries were formally established as nations, with the northern half being designated the People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) in the south. Emboldened by Moscow’s apparent support, Kim Il-Sung, the North Korean leader, launched a military invasion of South Korea in 1950. In response, the United Nations authorized a military intervention by a coalition led by the United States which succeeded in pushing the communists into Chinese territory (U.S. relations with North Korea, 2018).

Alarmed at the UN’s tactical successes, the Chinese leadership authorized the Chinese people’s army to intervene and the bloody fighting that followed left the two Koreas geographically essentially right where they were when the hostilities started in 1950. An armistice that temporarily stopping hostilities and formally established the 38th parallel as the divided line between the two countries was approved by the belligerents in July 1953, but no peace treaty was ever signed and a state of war between North Korea and the United States still technically exists (U.S. relations with North Korea, 2018). The current political division of North and South Korea at the 38th parallel (the demilitarized zone) is depicted in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1. Political map of the Korean peninsula

Source: CIA World Factbook (2020) at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/attachments/maps/KN-map.jpg

Despite a number of diplomatic overtures to the North Korean leadership over the years with mixed results, the status quo has remained essentially unchanged for the more than half century since the armistice between the United States and North Korea was signed, meaning that conventional strategies have failed to achieve the desired result of reunifying and denuclearizing the divided peninsula. Consequently, identifying the constraints to progress in these areas represents a critically important enterprise for the United States and the rest of the international community and these issues are discussed further below.

Intelligence needs with respect to eliminating nuclear weapons from North Korea

The real threat that North Korea poses to its southern neighbor, the region, and the world is an issue that demands immediate attention. Indeed, North Korea has been the can that has been kicked down the road in varying degrees by successive administrations in the U.S. with the expectation that such a dysfunctional society could not ensure, but the Kim dynasty has demonstrated its resilience and resistance to foreign interference in its domestic affairs – including its nuclear weapons development program -- time and again. The net impact of these delays has been to allow North Korea even more time to pursue more sophisticated nuclear weaponry. For example, according to a recent study by Kim (2020), “Nuclear weapons development is the most significant issue at hand in Northeast Asia, and it threatens the security of all neighboring countries in the region. Not only are the parties concerned about North Korea's potential use of nuclear weapons in contingencies, they are also worried about the possibility of nuclear proliferation” (p. 132).

The rapid progress that has been made by North Korean nuclear scientists over the past decade makes it clear that nuclear proliferation represents a significant threat to U.S. domestic and foreign interests, but the destabilizing effects of these trends adversely affects the entire international community. In this regard, Kwon (2020) emphasizes that, “The Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea has consistently advanced nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missile programs whose destructive power and technology pose a security threat to the international community” (p. 27). Certainly, this assessment is troubling enough but it only scratches the surface of the challenges that confront the West with respect to North Korea today.

One of the more challenging aspects of dealing with North Korea in meaningful ways over the years, however, has been the profound lack of timely intelligence concerning the reclusive nation. Despite ongoing efforts by the Western intelligence community, North Korea remains a highly secretive, closed society that brooks no domestic dissension or security lapses. Moreover, the intelligence that is available from North Korea defectors and the other clandestine sources that are available to Western intelligence authorities is frequently unreliable or conflicting, making it extremely difficult if not impossible to determine what is actually taking place within political circles or domestically (Tamkin, 2020).

What is known at present with some degree of certainty is that while the North and South generally agree that reunification is a mutually desirable long-term objective, the top North Korean leadership is being forced to deal with a number of practical issues in the meantime that are needed to ensure it survives. The official U.S. policy with respect to North Korea has consistently been for the country to comply with international laws, cease further provocative behaviors and completely denuclearize pursuant to the terms of the Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks in 2005 (U.S. relations with North Korea, 2018). In addition, and more in line with what the Korean people themselves want, there is also the overarching matter of eventual reunification of the two Koreas. In this regard, the U.S. Department of State reports that, “The United States supports the peaceful reunification of Korea on terms acceptable to the Korean people and recognizes that the future of the Korean Peninsula is primarily a matter for them to decide” (U.S. relations with North Korea, 2018, para. 5).

Notwithstanding the provisions of the Six-Party Talks to the contrary, though, North Korea has simply ignored its provisions and conducted six nuclear tests since 2006 (Overview of North Korean threat,2020). Furthermore, all current signs indicate that North Korea has additional plans for further testing in the future. For example, according to the analysts with the Nuclear Threat Institute, “In defiance of the international community, the country has continued to escalate its weapons of mass destruction activities [and] in July 2017, North Korea successfully tested its first intercontinental ballistic missile and in September 2017 it conducted a test of what it claimed was a thermonuclear weapon” (Overview of North Korean threat, 2020, para. 3).

The focus on North Korea’s nuclear arsenal also overlooks the fact that the North has one of the largest military forces in the world today. According to a summary of North Korea’s military capability provided by the Council on Foreign Relations:

· North Korea is estimated to have up to sixty nuclear weapons and has successfully tested missiles that could strike the United States with a nuclear warhead.

· It has the world’s fourth-largest military, with more than 1.2 million personnel, and is believed to possess chemical and biological weapons.

· Despite UN Security Council sanctions and recent summits between North Korea, South Korea, and the United States on denuclearization, Pyongyang continues to test ballistic missiles (Albert, 2019).

The longstanding position of the North Korean government with respect to the West has been to leverage its military might to gain as many concessions as possible from the West in general and the United States in particular and to use these delaying tactics to continue its military buildup and nuclear weapons development program. The carrot-and-stick responses by the United States have simply encouraged these types of provocative behaviors, though, and North Korean launches a missile or two or conducts yet another nuclear test whenever it feels neglected by the international community and whatever American president happens to be in office at the time. As Kwon (2020) points out, “Despite the levying of severe international sanctions and offers of comprehensive compensation by the United States and South Korea, North Korea refuses to denuclearize” (p. 27).

Similar to efforts by the United States in the past, more recent overtures by President Trump to reach out to the little “Rocket Man,” Kim Jung Un, and some high-profile photograph opportunities, nothing of substance has been achieved to date. In this regard, Kwon (2020) advises that, “Progress on a denuclearization deal had been expected from several unprecedented summit meetings between Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un, but two leaders were unable to make any progress” (p. 28). In fact, the North Koreans even used dynamite to blow up the last remaining vestige of inter-Korean communication recently and the United States (Masterson, 2020), like much of the rest of the world, remains focused on the Covid-19 pandemic and revising lagging national economies (Maze, 2020).

The foregoing efforts followed similar overtures during the preceding years wherein the North Korean government would offer minor unilateral concessions while demanding major diplomatic moves on the part of the West. Following the failure of the 2019 summit between the North Korean and American leaders, North Korea has continued to ramp up pressure on the U.S. by threatening yet more missile and nuclear tests, as well as the launch of a state-of-the-art submarine that is capable of delivering nuclear weapons. Furthermore, it does not require a sophisticated intelligence network to determine the North Korean’s intentions at present. Indeed, Kwon (2020) notes that, “At the 5th Plenary Meeting of the 7th Central Committee of the Worker's Party of Korea, Kim declared that North Korea is no longer maintaining a moratorium on nuclear weapons and ICBM tests, and ‘should more actively push forward the project for developing strategic weapons” (p. 28).

This assertion has been borne out by North Korea’s actions over the past several months. For instance, in January 2020, the North Korean counselor to the country’s UN mission made it clear for the entire world that North Korea intended to continue testing increasingly advanced nuclear weapons as well as the weapons systems that are needed to deliver them to nations around the world, including most especially the United States, South Korea and Japan; however, North Korea has also threatened Australia. In sum, it is reasonable to conclude, based on empirical observations and the intelligence that is available that Kim Jung Un and his cabal intend to continue to hold the international community hostage with nuclear-tipped swords of Damocles. Based on his analysis of the current situation on the Korean peninsula, Kwon (2020) concludes that, “North Korea will not halt its nuclear and missile tests [and] many scholars and experts do not give a credit to Kim's denuclearization commitment” (p. 29).

While some international analysts shake their heads and wonder what the North Koreans are really up to, the net practical impact of its actions to date has been to buy enough time for the country to successfully develop and test increasingly powerful nuclear weapons and delivery systems. In truth, this has been one of the main tactics that has been used by the North Koreans over the years to delay any substantive changes in their nuclear policies while keeping Western analysts in the dark about their true intentions, but North Korea’s true intentions can be readily discerned from this pattern of behavior. For instance, Kwon (2020) points out that the delay tactics that have been used by North Korea “might gain time to upgrade its nuclear weapons and ICBM program secretly [by] merely pretending to engage in a denuclearization deal with the United States” (p. 21). Furthermore, “pretending” represents a highly cost effective strategy that has cost the West billions in defense spending while accomplishing nothing of substance in the process.

While North Korea’s delay tactics placed a temporary moratorium on further nuclear weapon and ICBM testing, it has essentially ignored these restrictions and continued to pursue test launches of several short-range ballistic missiles, some of which are purportedly capable of carrying nuclear weapons and delivering them as far as the east coast of the United States (Kwon, 2020). Because there remains a paucity of timely and accurate intelligence, though, much of what is being discussed in the top intelligence circles in the West is based solely on conjecture rather than any hard facts from the Western intelligence communities. Nevertheless, based on his analysis of the current situation in North Korea, Kwon concludes that, “Several security experts in the United States and South Korea believe that Pyongyang may surreptitiously continue to expedite enriching uranium for use in another round of nuclear weapons experiments” (p. 29).

The fact that North Korea continues to pursue this strategy despite a guarantee of security and increasingly generous offers of economic assistance from South Korea and the United States in return for denuclearization makes it apparent that North Korea is not interested in the West’s carrots or sticks but is rather focused solely on keeping the international community in the dark about its real intentions until it succeeds in deploying a sufficient nuclear arsenal to force these and far more concessions from the West. In this regard, Kwon (2020) emphasizes that, “Even though Trump and South Korea are ready to provide security guarantee and massive economic aid to North Korea in exchange for denuclearization, Kim Jong Un has opted for a series of short-range missile test launches instead of denuclearizing” (p. 29).

The actions by the North Korean government to continue its nuclear weapons development program can therefore be regarded as part of a long-term strategy that carefully considers the political atmosphere in the United States and assesses just how far it can go without provoking an actual military confrontation (Kwon, 2020). One way that North Korea has manipulated leaders in the United States is to attempt to lull the West into a false sense of security to allow them even more time to improve their nuclear arsenal. In fact, a recent investigation by The Washington Post points out that even while Kim and Trump were exchanging “best friends forever” letters, Kim was using the delay to “improve his ability to hide his most powerful weapons and shield them from future attacks” (Warrick & Denyer, 2020, para. 4).

Given the current political situation in the United States, further negotiations with North Korea in 2020 are unlikely. As a result, the current presidential incumbent or the democratic nominee will be faced with an even greater North Korean threat as 2021 unfolds even as the country struggles to cope with a perfect storm of other crises (Tamkin, 2020). Unfortunately, the best diplomatic strategy that the United States has to offer at present is to “remain cautiously optimistic” and for American diplomats to “reach out to the North Koreans and let them know that we would like to continue the negotiations" (Masterson, 2020, p. 31).

In the meantime, Kim Jung Un continues to consolidate his power base as well as his hold on his position, including assigning his sister, Kim Yo-jong, greater authority and responsibilities within the North Korean government (Pratamasari, 2019). This action serves to continue the longest communist dynasty in the world, and the only one where the ultimate authority in a nation is held within one family. For example, Pratamasari (2019) points out that, “North Korea stands uniquely apart from other nations with a governing familial dynasty” (p. 22). In sum, it is clear that the Kim dynasty has played yet another American president in ways that have helped perpetuate its existence for 4 more years by developing its burgeoning nuclear arsenal even as it claimed otherwise. It is axiomatic that when one strategy has failed to produce the desired results for three-quarters of a century, it is time to reevaluate and attempt something fundamentally different such as the diplomatic strategies that are described below.

Potential alternative diplomatic strategies to engage North Korea

Taken together, it is clear that the conventional diplomatic strategies that have been used in the past are not only ineffective for dealing with North Korea, they are actually exacerbating tensions on the Korean peninsula. Rather than “remaining cautiously optimistic,” the United States must take some type of alternative approach to resolving the North Korean nuclear problem and continuing to pursue meaningful changes in the Kim dynastic regime clearly requires a fundamentally different approach, including, potentially, the following diplomatic initiatives.

“Basketball diplomacy”: In 1971, President Richard Nixon succeeded in establishing normalized relations with the otherwise-intractable Chinese leadership through his so-called “ping-pong diplomacy” (Andrews, 2020). The popular and warm, friendly receptions that were given to the visiting American and North Korean teams (and the occasional intentional losses by the North Koreans to help the Americans save face) made it clear that sports can be a universal language of peace. Given Kim Jong Un’s demonstrated fascination with American basketball as well as the sport’s flamboyant star, Dennis Rodman, the U.S. could reach out to North Korea by inviting their basketball team to compete in a series of exhibition matches in the United States followed by a reciprocal visit by the U.S. team to North Korea.

Cultural exchanges with the West: North Korea has already allowed a few pop bands from South Korea to perform in the North, and a tour by South Korea’s wildly popular band, BTS, could generate an enormous amount of goodwill between the two countries (Chu & Lee, 2018). In fact, the North Korean president and his wife attended a performance in Pyongyang by the South Korean all-girl band, Red Velvet, in 2018. According to a news report about the event, “A day after North Korean leader Kim Jong Un made a surprise appearance at a performance by South Korean pop stars in the North Korean capital, South Korea was still digesting the rare instance of cultural diplomacy” (Chu & Lee, 2018, para. 4). The performance was sufficiently influential that North Korean intelligence authorities even made a rare apology to the South for having to restrict some access to reporters over security concerns (Chu & Lee, 2018). Furthermore, because North and South Korea share a rich and long cultural heritage, there are numerous other opportunities for exchanges between the two countries that could ease tensions long enough for diplomacy to achieve the desired results.

Withdraw all U.S. troops and nuclear weapons from South Korea: Military hawks in the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will undoubtedly loudly howl in response to this solution. Opponents of withdrawing U.S. and UN forces from South Korea will invariably argue that the tenuous peace that exists on the Korean peninsula is attributable in major part to the continued presence of more than 50,000 American and other UN troops in South Korea, it is clear that the North Korean leadership regards this military presence as the tip of a spear that is pointed directly at Pyongyang’s – and by extension—Kim Jung Un’s -- throat. If the shoe was on the other foot and North Korea had 50,000 troops stationed across the border in Tijuana, poised and ready to invade the U.S. at a moment’s notice, this perception might appear far less abstract to American policymakers. Withdrawing U.S. forces from South Korea would not only save tens of billions of dollars in scarce taxpayer resources, it would go a long way towards reassuring the North that the United States, Japan and South Korea are not colluding to invade and occupy them permanently. All of the 2nd Infantry Division and its support services, for example, could be reassigned to Japan or deployed elsewhere in the world or reassigned to the United States.

Sign a peace treaty with North Korea: The final step in denuclearizing North Korea will be for the United States to formally sign a peace treaty with North Korea to replace the current armistice agreement. This final step is congruent with the terms of the armistice which stipulate in part that its purpose is to “insure a complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea until a final peaceful settlement is achieved” (Korean War Armistice Agreement, 1953). Indeed, from North Korea’s perspective, remaining mobilized for war just makes good sense because, technically, a state of war between the North and the U.S. still exists. Formalizing a peace treaty with North Korea would go a long way towards reassuring the country’s leadership that denuclearization is in their best interests.