Why Lee Iacocca Rushed the Flawed Pinto on the Market

Ford Pinto Fuel Tank Controversy businesses for the most part do not offer products and services for the joy of going through the motions of production, marketing and sales. The driving motivation for any business is to earn a profit. In fact profits are the principal reason any private company is in business. Earning profits is as American as motherhood and the Fourth of July.

But what are the ethical boundaries a company should adhere to in order to assure a profitable outcome for stakeholders? This is the central issue to be addressed in this paper, and the issue that will be focused on is a darkly unethical decision by executives in the Ford Motor Company in the 1970s.

Knowing full well that the gas tank on the Ford Pinto could (and did) explode on impact, the decision-makers at Ford went ahead with production and balanced the cost of upgrading the gas tank with the cost of future lawsuits from drivers' deaths.

Why this thesis is valid: a) reason one: making a corporate decision strictly based on profit and pushing aside consumer safety issues is unconscionable; and b) reason two: being aware of the inherent danger of their product and not making the changes that would improve the car is inexcusable. Defense of the Thesis -- Corporate Rush to Profit The Ford Motor Company was facing very strong competition from smaller cars that got better mileage than Ford's gas-guzzling sedans, so they needed to introduce a more economical car.

In particular, the Volkswagen and other foreign autos were flooding the market and Ford understood that to remain competitive in the auto industry it had to come up with a car to compete with the Volkswagen; hence, the Pinto was rushed into production "…in much less than the usual time" even though it was known to be unsafe (Dowie, 1977).

Defense of the Thesis -- Refusal to Re-tool Machinery In pre-production processes Ford engineers found out that the gas tank on Pintos was susceptible to rear-end crashes, and that the fuel tank would rupture easily. However, all the machinery for assembly-line production was already tooled and in place and because Ford was in a big rush to make profits (by successfully competing with Volkswagen, et al.) the company decided not to upgrade the fuel system to make the car safe.

Ford President Lee Iacocca insisted that the car be in showrooms by a certain date, and because re-tooling the design and production of the car would take about 18 months, engineers went with the faulty design just to get the car into showrooms and on the road (Dowie, 48).

Defense of the Thesis -- Forty Test Crashes Showed Gas Tank Flaws In each of forty crash tests of the Pinto, it was revealed that when the Pinto was hit from behind by a car traveling over twenty-five miles per hour, that resulted in "a ruptured fuel tank" (Dowie, 48). And yet, under oath during lawsuits, Ford officials "denied…having crash-tested the pinto" (Dowie, 48).

Defense of the Thesis -- Iacocca Resisted Safety Changes Did anyone go to Iacocca and tell him the Pinto gas tank represented a potential deadly danger to drivers? "Hell no," said an engineer who was pivotal on the production of the Pinto. Anyone telling Iacocca that they should delay the rollout of the Pinto because of safety concerns "would have been fired," the engineer told Mother Jones reporter Dowie (48).

In fact, when a problem was raised that could have delayed the Pinto's rollout, Iacocca would "chomp on his cigar, look out the window and say, 'Read the product objectives and get back to work'"; Iacocca's favorite saying was, "Safety Doesn't Sell" (Dowie, 49). Defense of the Thesis -- Death Impacts More than the Victims When someone dies as a result of faulty manufacturing, in this case, the flawed Ford Pinto with its poorly designed gas tank, there are multiple victims.

In the case of the three teenage girls killed in 1978 in Elkhart County, Indiana -- when their Ford Pinto was hit from behind, burst into flames, and burned the three girls to death -- there were five levels of victims (Becker, et al., 2000). Level I: the three girls were direct victims of the corporate arrogance that led to the poor design and the failure to fix the problem.

Level II: the families of the victims of the tragedy (including cousins, uncles and aunts, grandparents, and the immediate families of the girls) are also victims. Level III: The friends of the girls, including their peer groups at school, neighbors, and boyfriends, are victimized as well. Level IV: People the girls knew from church groups and other activities, from their part time jobs, and their recreational activities are also victims.

And Level V: The community itself is victimized; people who read the local paper and watch local news on television are impacted as well (Becker, 306). Objection to the Argument It is true that the American car market in the 1970s was beginning to be flooded with not only Volkswagens, but also Japanese cars, such as Damsons. American Motors also had an economy-type car on the market and Ford was feeling the pressure to compete with these cheaper, gas-friendly vehicles.

Lee Iacocca simply did what any CEO or president of an auto company would do -- he pushed for speedy production in order to maximize.