Dueling Perspectives on the 1967 Six Day War Explained

Introduction

The Six Day War remains a controversial event in Arab-Israeli history — not only because of the considerable expansion of Israel's territory that resulted from the war, but also because of how the circumstances of the war have been interpreted by scholars and historians. Louis and Shlaim contend that the war was not something Israel's government had wanted (26); yet Popp shows that Israel's government was adamant in arguing to Washington that a war was imminent, even as McNamara insisted that Israel was misinterpreting the extent to which the Arab states posed a serious threat to Israel's security (301). It is true that the Israeli IDF was notorious for its hawkish rhetoric and that the Arab states had taken the IDF's words of provocation — particularly those of Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin — as inflammatory: "Rabin's strong language was widely interpreted in the Arab world as a signal of Israel's intent to overthrow the Syrian regime by force" (25). Thus, if the rhetoric of Rabin was of this nature, the argument of Shlaim that Israel was seeking to avoid war is unconvincing. More convincing is the argument of Popp that Israel was maneuvering for a great victory and was using the supposed threat of attack by the Arab states as a pretext for its own rapid expansion.

Background and the Build-Up to War

Shlaim argues in "Israel: Poor Little Samson" that Israel had "no agreed policy and no coherent strategy regarding how to deal with Syria" (25). The government held a defensive position while the IDF maintained an offensively-minded stance. In other words, the IDF sought an escalation of conflict while the government sought to prevent an outbreak of war (Shlaim 25). Yet Louis and Shlaim also contend that in-fighting on the Arab side — especially between Nasser and the Syrians — led to the defeat of the Arab armies of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan in the Six Day War. But if a lack of coherent strategy on one side made a significant difference in that side's defeat, why did it impact the Israeli side less so?

Popp shows, on the contrary, that the Israeli government was attempting to convince Washington that Egypt was planning a serious "imminent attack": "One of these warnings was even sent into a meeting of Eban with Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Earle G. Wheeler on May 26" (Popp 301). Washington had surmised that Israel was seeking to show to the US that war was unavoidable and had landed upon a preemptive strategy as grounds for a proper response. Yet as Popp notes, "McNamara had already cautioned Eban that 'the issue before us should not be a preemptive attack by Israel but how to prevent hostilities'" (301). Washington remained skeptical of the Arab threat to Israel in the days leading up to the attack. Even President Johnson viewed the Arab states' military posturing as non-threatening in the face of Israel's superior military might: "Our best judgment is that no military attack on Israel is imminent, and, moreover, if Israel is attacked, our judgment is that the Israelis would lick them," said Johnson (Popp 304).

If, as Louis and Shlaim also contend, the Arab states were disorganized and suspicious of one another's aims, and if in less than a week Israel was able to quadruple its size by taking the West Bank, East Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, and the Golan Heights, how is one to interpret the war as anything other than a calculated effort on the part of Israel's government and IDF to expand its borders — with the same swiftness and decisiveness it had demonstrated for nearly two decades during the establishment of settlements over Palestinian villages? If the rivaling Arab states were the trigger for the Six Day War, as Louis and Shlaim claim (7), the Arab states certainly bungled badly whatever initiative they believed themselves to have.

Louis and Shlaim also point out that the superpowers did little in the days leading up to the war (7). They state plainly that "America did not plan the war" and that the Soviet Union did little more than provide misleading information to Egypt about Israel's intentions (6–7). Mobilization of troops on both sides of the Syrian-Israeli border had occurred leading up to the war — but Louis and Shlaim again point out that "the Syrians did not, however, anticipate an actual war. They were unprepared" (11). If Syria was unprepared for war and Egypt was mismanaged by Nasser, what was the true state of affairs in 1967 when, in just six days, Israel achieved the largest expansion of its territory in the state's history? Popp implies that in spite of an apparent lack of coherent strategy between the Israeli government and the IDF, a plan had been formulated to seize the territories obtained and to use the build-up of troops by Syria and Egypt on Israel's borders as a pretext for swift action (305). This argument is all the more convincing in light of Israel's victory. The fact is that Israel had been pursuing an informal policy of expansion since its establishment, and the Six Day War afforded it the opportunity to expand greatly all at once under the auspices of a defensive military action.

The Facts of the Matter

Israel argued that Egypt had mobilized in the Sinai Peninsula, prompting it to take preemptive action. Israel justified its attack on the Egyptian air force using preemptive warfare principles (Kurtulus 220). Nasser had mobilized forces on Israel's northern border from Jordan and Syria — but it is also important to note that the Arab perspective was that Israel was supported by Western military technology and was viewed as a wing of Western imperialism (Crosbie). This perspective is not difficult to understand; after all, Communist influence in the Middle East had grown since World War II, and the West was eager to counter that influence.

The creation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964 placed control of the West Bank and Gaza squarely within the matrix of the superpowers' hegemonic pursuits. The purpose of the PLO was to be the "national organization of the Palestinians in Gaza and elsewhere that would take part in joint Arab action to regain the stolen land of Palestine and participate in the mission of Arab nationalism" (Sayigh 104). With Fatah and Arafat leading the push for the PLO to strike out against Israel from their bases in Jordan and Syria, and Egypt's Nasser pledging support, combatants were in place.

Conclusion: In Light of the Outcome

The outcome of the Six Day War effectively solidified Israel's power in the Middle East. Israel's swift action caught the Arab states completely off-guard in spite of whatever posturing they may have been doing in the Strait or in Sinai. The outcome indicates that Israel was far more focused and intent on achieving strategic aims than were the Arab states. On that point, Popp (2006) and Shlaim (2012) are in agreement. Where they differ is on the degree to which the war could have been prevented. Popp (2006) shows that, as far as the US was concerned, the Arab states had not been planning a strategic assault on Israel at all — and the outcome of the war was the same as had been occurring in Palestine for twenty years: further loss of Arab lands to Israel and an increased consolidation of power by Israel.

The outcome of the war considerably benefited Israel, allowing it to further its own expansionist program. It created a euphoric sense of victory throughout Israel, which celebrated with victory coins minted to honor the momentous occasion. The Jewish diaspora also viewed the Six Day War as a major turning point in the fortunes of Israel in the Middle East. Jewish immigration to Israel began to increase dramatically in the wake of the war, and the Jewish population of the state swelled.

In the Arab states, however, the reaction against the Jewish population was swift and severe. The Arab states saw the war as an atrocity, and unfavorable popular opinion as well as governmental action led to a Jewish emigration from Arab states into Israel. The UN offered Resolution 242 calling for the withdrawal of Israel from occupied territories; but it would be another twelve years before Israel would agree to hand over Sinai to Egypt following the Camp David Accords, and it would not be until 2006 that Israel would remove its military from Gaza.

The Six Day War was a turning point in the Middle East. The war enabled Israel to quadruple its size in a matter of days, seizing control of all of Mandatory Palestine, the Golan Heights, and the Sinai. Its justification for the preemptive strike on Egypt was not supported by the necessary conditions for preemptive war, yet Israel nonetheless made the case that those conditions had been met. The Arab-Israeli conflict would continue for decades and even today remains a major and bitter point of contention in the Middle East.