War, Statecraft, and Sustainability: Jomini to Nigeria

Introduction: Sustainability, War, and Statecraft Defined

As Clark (2008) points out, sustainability has been defined by the World Commission on Environment and Development as the capability of meeting "the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (p. 3). Sustainability is related to the recognized need of nations to conserve finite resources so that they are not depleted for the next generation. Intertwined with environmental sustainability are economic and social goals, as indicated by Kates, Parris, and Leiserowitz (2005). Commonly included among the social goals of a sustainable culture are equality, equitability, and a high quality of public health.

However, because conflicts arise between peoples over the use of resources, war breaks out not infrequently. War is typically defined as "armed conflict" and stands as a "direct opposition to sustainability" because nothing tends to deplete resources faster than war (Clark, 2008, p. 3). As Jones (2015) argues, war is the inevitable outcome of nations willing to use force to achieve their objectives, which are invariably the control or domination of a region, resource, or route.

Statecraft is the management or art of conducting the affairs of state. Rhetoric, agenda, social and political and economic platforms, use of diplomacy, use of military force, and use of resources—all of these play a part in the effective exercise of statecraft. Stillman (2003) notes that statecraft can be informed by deep cultural ideals and values that administrative bodies within the state personify and display in their administrative output. Statecraft, in other words, tends to reflect some aspect of the underlying philosophy of a society.

Jomini and Contemporary Times

Antoine Jomini was a Swiss general who served in the Swiss, French, and Russian armies at the end of the 18th century and the first half of the 19th century. He studied the Napoleonic art of warfare. Jomini's writings were highly articulate, thoughtful, and engaging, and they were used to educate generations of soldiers and leaders at institutions such as West Point, the famous U.S. Military Academy.

Jomini, like Clausewitz, believed in the strategy of uniting or connecting battles (Bassford, 1993). By linking individual or independent contests, a better understanding of "where and when to fight to realize the purposes of war" could be achieved (Kelly & Brennan, 2009, p. 12). Jomini likewise believed in a strong connection between politics and war—that is, in the relationship between statecraft and war. He believed that in war, force should be minimal so as not to deplete one's own resources. Pressure could be applied in creative ways, including through the intentional use of statecraft, to compel the enemy to submit (Nomura, 2012). For this reason, Jomini did not believe that war was an exact science but rather a fluid and dynamic art.

In contemporary times, the concept of war has expanded. Total war, as seen in the U.S. Civil War, World War II, and in today's proxy wars in the Middle East, is an example of how Jomini's ideas have had diminishing direct impact. Jomini stressed, for example, the idea of having "interior lines of communication" (Jones, 1985, p. 21)—but technology made this concept somewhat obsolete. The telegraph and railroad allowed messages and supply lines to be strengthened beyond what Jomini had envisioned. However, his ideas remained influential in terms of minimizing or maximizing force so as to avoid unnecessary casualties.

The Anaconda Plan and Total War

War, statecraft, and sustainability were linked in the American Civil War in the strategic vision that Lincoln expressed toward the South: in order to win the war, the North had to destroy the morale of the South by essentially cutting the region off from the rest of the world. Blockades were established as part of the Anaconda Plan (Office of the Historian, 2018). The North blockaded Southern ports so that the Confederacy could not import or export materials to sustain their war effort. Lincoln wanted to crush the South by starving it into submission. This idea would have been thoroughly approved by Jomini, as the Plan did not call for a great expenditure of force or risk too many casualties—yet it was highly effective in achieving the aims of the war as far as the North was concerned.

In World War II, the Allies applied the same idea in their war against the Axis: Germany was blockaded and Japan's cities were bombed even though civilian centers played no direct logistical role in the country's war effort. The aim was to annihilate the country's morale—just as Sherman had done in the American Civil War during his March to the Sea, laying waste to everything in his path. As Smith (1997) notes, Sherman's approach to total war was informed by his understanding of Jomini.

War, statecraft, and sustainability intersect in the concept of total war in that military forces are used to subdue the enemy—attacking the sustainability of an opposing society—while the state simultaneously applies political pressure to compel surrender, as the Allies did to the Axis powers. In the Middle East today, statecraft is used to support proxy wars in Syria, as the West aims at regime change there and in Iran by supporting rebels and protests, arming and training insurrectionists, and applying economic sanctions so that countries opposed by the West are essentially cut off from sustaining themselves. Psychological warfare was developed to a high degree during World War II thanks to C. D. Jackson, who headed the Psychological Warfare division of the United States government (Spartacus, 2018).

Conclusion: Statecraft, Sustainability, and the Internal Battle

Tinubu (2017) offers two further lessons: "Protracted years of gross mis-governance are a down payment on the rise of extremism. Second, the armed forces may contain violent outbreaks but they cannot fully resolve strife originating from a nation's political and social imbalances. Some type of political resolution is needed." Nigeria's war against Boko Haram is not wholly external to the country but is rather the outcome of internal strife within the country's own socioeconomic and political infrastructure and culture.

To defeat Boko Haram militarily is only one half of the battle. The battle is also internal, requiring the application of statecraft and faithful adherence to the idea of sustainability. Without these two principles firmly in place, warfare will continue and enemies like Boko Haram will continue to plague the Nigerian state. The greatest lesson for the Nigerian military is therefore the need to recognize the value and virtue of containment: the enemy may be external in one sense, but it is internal in another, and must be battled on both fronts simultaneously.

References

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Jones, F. S. (1985). Analysis and comparison of the ideas and later influences of Henri Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz (No. ACSC-85-1370). Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, AL.

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Office of the Historian. (2018). Blockade of Confederate ports. Retrieved from https://history.state.gov/milestones/1861-1865/blockade

Smith, M. A. (1997). Sherman's unexpected companions: Marching through Georgia with Jomini and Clausewitz. The Georgia Historical Quarterly, 81(1), 1–24.

Spartacus. (2018). C. D. Jackson. Retrieved from http://spartacus-educational.com/USAjacksonCD.htm

Stillman, R. J. (2003). Twenty-first century United States governance: Statecraft as reform craft and the peculiar governing paradox it perpetuates. Public Administration, 81(1), 19–40.

Tinubu, B. (2017). Strategic leadership: My personal theory and practice. Retrieved from https://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/01/tinubu-berates-buharis-economic-policy-seeks-review/