Airbus A380 and U.S. Airport Infrastructure Challenges

Introduction to the Airbus A380

When the Airbus A380 made its first public appearance at a major U.S. airport, crowds lined the perimeter of Los Angeles International Airport in cars and lawn chairs, waiting for a glimpse of the giant plane. Flying passengers and press, the massive airliner touched down at LAX in February, generating enormous public excitement. Yet at many airports across the country, visions of the airliner would have to wait — it was simply too large to be accommodated by most existing facilities.

What exactly is the Airbus A380? It is the largest passenger jet airliner ever built, and the first commercial double-decker as well. It weighs in at 1.239 million pounds at takeoff, and it can hold 853 passengers in full economy configuration or 555 in a traditional three-class layout. It cruises at Mach 0.85 and can haul 150 tons of freight. The plane was designed to carry both passengers and freight over long distances, with a range of 8,000 nautical miles (Moxon, 2007). Airbus specifically designed the A380 to handle long-haul Asia-Pacific-to-U.S. and Europe-to-Asia routes, and also developed the Airbus A380F variant created especially for long-haul freight needs.

Development History and Commercial Viability

Airbus first began developing the plane in 1994 and scheduled the first deliveries for 2006, but the company experienced difficulties in several design areas — from wiring to weight — and delivery times were extended three times. Because the development and deployment of the plane fell more than two years behind schedule, freight giant FedEx cancelled its orders for the A380F, choosing Boeing's 777 instead, and UPS cancelled its order in February 2007. This left no current customers for the freighter version, and freighter production was halted.

The delays cost Airbus several orders, with multiple customers canceling or scaling back because of the extended wait times. Singapore Airlines was the first customer scheduled to receive delivery of planes in October 2007. Other future operators included Lufthansa, Qantas, and Virgin Atlantic. Even amid this pressure, Airbus was already planning a 1,023-seat triple-decker aircraft for future production — a development that would create yet another round of construction and logistical challenges for American airports.

Public Acceptance and Airport Readiness

Many aviation experts questioned what Airbus was thinking when they designed the A380. A significant number believed the flying public might not accept such a large airplane — that passengers simply would not want to fly long distances alongside that many other people. One source was quoted as saying, "I know that I'd hate to be the 555th person to get off after I've been flying for 12 hours" (Velotta, 2006). The ever-present concerns of air travel — lost luggage, long lines, parking, and security check-in — could cause many travelers to bypass A380 flights as too time-consuming and crowded. Whether the flying public would ultimately accept the plane remained to be seen.

Regardless of passenger sentiment, the A380's sheer size was the biggest practical problem facing airports. It was simply too large for most existing facilities, and the modifications necessary to make airports A380-compatible were costly — prohibitively so for many. Airports in the United States were spending more than $900 million on changes to accommodate the A380 (Korry, 2007). San Francisco International Airport announced its readiness to welcome the A380 as early as 2004, while other airports scrambled to meet the increased demands posed by the plane's 500-plus passenger loads (Huff, 2007). Terminals needed to be enlarged, jetways had to be bigger and taller, and runways and taxiways required widening or reinforcement to support the heavier aircraft.

Conclusion: A Giant Gamble

The Airbus A380 represents a significant gamble for both its manufacturer and for the airports investing in its arrival. Too large to fly into many airports, its usage will inevitably be limited. Its order book, once at 166 or more, had dwindled to 154 following the FedEx and UPS cancellations, and further reductions were possible as other airlines reconsidered their commitments in light of ongoing production delays. Airports were readying their terminals, jetways, runways, and taxiways for the giant aircraft, but it remained to be seen how many travelers would actually want to fly on a plane carrying up to 853 passengers. It also remained an open question whether the money invested in airport modifications and aircraft development would ever deliver a sufficient return for Airbus and the airports that had geared up to receive it.

References

Huff, A. (2007). Airports: Super size me please. Retrieved from the AirportBusiness.com Web site: http://www.airportbusiness.com/online/article.jsp?id=10967&siteSection=2314

Korry, E. (2007). Jumbo plane triggers giant airport change. Retrieved from the NPR.org Web site: http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=553046414

Moxon, J. (2007). Everything about: The Airbus A380. Retrieved from the Flightglobal.com Web site:

Pastzor, A. (2005). LAX lags in accommodating the A380. Retrieved from the Post-Gazette.com Web site:

Sandstrom, M. (2002). Megadoor hangar doors for the Airbus 380. Retrieved from the Airports International Web site: http://www.airport-int.com/categories/aircraft-hangar-doors/megadoor-hangar-doors-for-airbus-a380.asp

Velotta, R. N. (2006). Not everyone wants the A380 at their airport. Airbus wouldn't fly into Las Vegas, aviation director stating "Changes at McCarran too costly." Retrieved from the Las Vegas Sun Web site: http://www.lasvegassun.com/sunbin/stories/sun/2006/jan/23/520008974.html