American Revolutionary War Tactics and Military Strategy

Introduction: Colonial Military Inexperience and Early Tactics

Prior to the beginning of the American Revolutionary War, circa 1770, military tactics in the American colonies were virtually unknown. The colonists had no need for a standing army, having long depended upon Great Britain and the English Crown for guidance, assistance, and support. When war broke out in 1775, however, American colonial leaders quickly realized that warfare tactics would have to be developed with great urgency. They turned to methods long established in Europe — tactics which required "large, well-trained and standing armies and extensive training in the use of new weapons,"¹ such as muzzleloaders, pistols, and other firearms.

New battlefield tactics had to be developed to accommodate these weapons, since the colonists and those who joined the colonial militias had little or no prior experience with them. One famous tactic used by the so-called "Minute Men" and the militia members was the formation of ranks of men, similar in nature to the ancient Greek phalanx, in which rows of men "lined up in three ranks deep, bringing the maximum number of muskets to bear on the enemy." By firing rank by rank, "the massed musketmen could fire a devastating nine volleys per minute," which in effect "blasted their opponents off the battlefield with concentrated musket fire."²

The colonial Continental Army under the command of General George Washington quickly mastered the art of 18th-century warfare. As the war progressed through the 1770s and into the 1780s, the British "Redcoats" — one of the most highly trained and efficient military forces in European history — became "cautious about attacking American soldiers when in fortified positions" in relation to the rank-by-rank formation. By the later stages of the war, "the lines of blue-clad, battle-hardened American Continentals... struck terror" in the hearts of British soldiers and even their most experienced commanders.³

The Fabian Strategy and Washington's Approach to War

One of the most efficient military tactics of the war was known as the Fabian strategy, in which face-to-face combat was avoided in favor of more limited confrontation that slowly wore down the enemy until they were completely exhausted and unable to return fire.⁴ This type of military strategy is most commonly associated with General George Washington, sometimes referred to as the "American Fabius," who was instructed in its use by General Nathanael Greene as a member of the Councils of War.⁵

When Washington became aware of the advantages of this strategy — which can be compared to guerrilla fighting techniques — he encouraged all of his generals to teach their men the "Fabian way of war," especially after the bloody defeats of 1776 by the British and in the Battle of Long Island in New York.⁶

General Nathanael Greene and the Three-Line Formation

In the case of General Nathanael Greene, military tactics were of particular importance. In 1781, Greene was compelled to instruct his Continental soldiers and militia volunteers on how to fight according to military strategies inherited from the British in the years before the war. As Charles W. Heathcote points out, Greene relied heavily upon the traditional rank-by-rank formation. In many battles against the British under the command of Cornwallis, he "arranged his army in three lines. The first line made up of untrained militia" quickly gave way to a second line "under the command of seasoned officers," while the third line "was composed of trained Continental soldiers" equipped with muskets.

In one famous engagement against the British, these tactics served Greene exceptionally well: the British forces "were stopped and crippled... losing hundreds of men," while American losses were far lower.⁷ The disciplined three-line system demonstrated that even partially trained forces, when well organized, could overcome a professional army.