This paper examines two foundational philosophical accounts of human nature, goodness, and evil through the work of Aristotle and St. Augustine. The analysis explores Aristotle's conception of the good as the highest end of human activity, achieved through the exercise of reason and the cultivation of virtue. It then presents Augustine's theodicy, which denies the substantive existence of evil and grounds moral action in free will and divine grace. The paper compares these frameworks across three key dimensions: human nature, the concept of good, and the problem of evil, ultimately arguing that Aristotle's pragmatic approach to virtue offers a valuable counterpoint to Augustine's metaphysical reliance on divine intervention.
The discipline of philosophy allows us to scrutinize, analyze, and study concepts that sometimes appear mundane to casual observation. More often than not, some of the more important concepts involving the fundamental discussion of human nature permeate our taken-for-granted realities. This paper examines concepts central to ethics and metaphysics: the nature of good and evil, the role of reason, and the problem of free will.
This essay compares and contrasts the classical philosophical discourses of Aristotle and St. Augustine. It first lays out the fundamental ideas of each philosopher and then provides a synthesis of their major philosophical accounts, organizing the comparison around three key themes: human nature, the concept of good, and the problem of evil.
Aristotle's conceptualization of the good has a practical approach. As one interpreter notes, "Every activity has a final cause, the good at which it aims, and Aristotle argued that since there cannot be an infinite regress of merely extrinsic goods, there must be a highest good at which all human activity ultimately aims" (Kemerling, 2001). Here, the ultimate good is theorized as an end goal of human activity. People direct their actions toward a particular destination: the achievement of the highest good. But what constitutes this good?
According to Kemerling, "the good for human beings must essentially involve the entire proper function of human life as a whole, and this must be an activity of the soul that expresses genuine virtue or excellence. Thus human beings should aim at a life in full conformity with their rational natures" (2001). Aristotle assumes that humans are rational beings and that conformity with this rational nature enables us to achieve happiness. Happiness is the highest good—the ultimate end of human life. Material wealth cannot make a person happy; only the perfect balance of reason and desire can. Aristotle states that "true happiness can therefore be attained only through the cultivation of the virtues that make a human life complete."
Virtue is another crucial concept in Aristotelian philosophy. For Aristotle, virtue is a "disposition to act in certain ways in response to similar situations"—something cultivated through practice and habituation. A virtuous action strikes the balance between extremes: between excess and deficiency. Thus, what is good (the end goal of human action that helps us attain happiness) is the perfect equilibrium of reason and desire, of excess and deficiency. It is the golden mean, the middle point between extremes.
Reason is deeply intertwined in Aristotle's discussion of ethics and the good. As the philosopher Richard Kraut explains, "if we use reason well, we live well as human beings, or to be more precise, using reason well over the course of a full life is what happiness consists. Doing anything well requires virtue or excellence, and therefore, living well consists in activities caused by the rational soul in accordance with virtue or excellence" (Kraut, 2007). For Aristotle, the cultivation of reason through the exercise of virtue is the path to eudaimonia—human flourishing.
St. Augustine addresses the problem of evil through three interconnected claims. First, evil is a "privation"—a lack or absence of good—and therefore cannot properly be said to exist as a substance at all. Second, human imperfections are overshadowed by the light of perfection as a whole when viewed from a cosmic perspective. Third, moral evil arises from the free choice of the will in rational beings (Ferguson, 1993).
Augustine maintains that evil does not exist in itself. Good things are predisposed to corruption because if they were the ultimate, supreme good, they would be incapable of being corrupted. Corruption therefore signifies the absence or lack of some good. All existing things are good insofar as they are capable of being corrupted; this capacity itself reflects their creaturely status. Evil, by contrast, is not a substance because it is not good. Since God created all things, God did not create evil. Evil is essentially an illusion—the absence of good perceived from a limited perspective.
Augustine's second point addresses the subjective experience of evil. From a finite, limited human perspective, evil appears real and troubling. However, when viewed within the totality of creation, a different picture emerges. Augustine writes, "all things taken together are better than superior things by themselves. All things include corruptible things, the destruction of which brings what existed to non-existence in such a way as to allow the consequent production of what is destined to come into being" (Ferguson, 2003). Destruction and corruption, seen from God's eternal vantage point, serve larger purposes. Evil is present in finite perspective but, when located in the grand scheme of things, may be a requisite condition for something greater to emerge.
The final element of Augustine's theodicy centers on free will. Because humans possess free will—the capacity to turn away from God—the problem of evil is resolved: evil originates not in God's creation but in human choice. People may know what is good yet choose what is bad. To be virtuous, therefore, we require God's grace. Augustine also describes lack of happiness as stemming from "ingratitude"—a failure to recognize and respond to divine goodness (Payne, n.d.).
The "free will solution" strengthens Augustine's denial of evil's existence. Since humans possess the freedom to turn from God, God's goodness remains untainted. Evil and corruption are products of human choice, not divine creation. Evil itself remains, in Augustine's framework, a non-substance—an illusion arising from the misuse of creaturely freedom.
The most striking difference between these thinkers lies in their anthropology. For Aristotle, humans are essentially rational beings. Reason constitutes their nature, and the exercise of reason in accordance with virtue defines human flourishing. Augustine, by contrast, grounds human nature in free will—the capacity to either follow God's grace or turn away from the divine. Aristotle adopts a pragmatic, naturalistic view of human beings, while Augustine adopts a metaphysical and theological framework. This foundational difference cascades through their respective ethical theories.
For Aristotle, achieving goodness, happiness, and virtue all depend on the proper exercise of reason. Good is something humans create through rational deliberation and habituation. Reason is the faculty by which we discover and maintain the mean between extremes. We bear primary responsibility for developing virtue.
Augustine inverts this framework. He places the source of human goodness not in individual reason but in divine grace. Humans cannot achieve goodness through their own efforts; goodness flows from God alone. Where Aristotle emphasizes human agency and rational self-cultivation, Augustine emphasizes divine initiative and human dependence. Happiness, in Augustine's view, requires not intellectual discipline but receptivity to grace.
Augustine's denial that evil possesses substantive existence—his dismissal of evil as mere illusion—presents a significant philosophical difficulty. Consider: if one person harms another, can we truly call this merely an illusion? Is not the injury real? Does labeling harm an "illusion" in defense of divine omnipotence adequately address lived suffering?
Here Aristotle's pragmatic approach offers an important corrective. If, as interactionists suggest, something is real in its consequences for human experience, then dismissing evil as illusion seems inadequate. Aristotle's virtue ethics, grounded in practice, reflection, and habituation, acknowledges evil and vice as real phenomena requiring moral attention and remediation. Unlike Augustine's framework, which locates morality ultimately in grace bestowed by God, Aristotle's theory makes virtue something cultivated through experience and deliberate practice.
Augustine's theodicy attempts to defend God's omnipotence and goodness by denying evil's substantive reality. Yet this theoretical move may sacrifice experiential and practical adequacy. Aristotle's approach—treating virtue and vice as cultivated dispositions requiring practical wisdom—remains grounded in observable human life and behavior.
St. Augustine's denial of the very existence of evil (as a non-substance) and his dismissal of evil as mere illusion present significant philosophical challenges. Aristotle's pragmatic approach to virtue—understanding goodness and vice as dispositions practiced, experienced, and reflected upon—offers a valuable counterpoint. While Augustine's metaphysical framework addresses theological concerns about divine goodness, Aristotle's virtue ethics provides a more workable account of moral development and the reality of human wrongdoing. The tension between these two approaches—one transcendent and grace-centered, the other immanent and reason-centered—continues to animate ethical and philosophical debate.
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