Army National Guard Retention: Challenges and Strategies

Introduction

The United States Congress has for many years been directly involved in ensuring that the country maintains a fully equipped standing military force capable of dealing with any external or internal threat. One of the ways it does this is by enacting laws that influence how the different branches of the United States military recruit and retain soldiers. For example, Congress has the power to set the maximum number of men and women a branch of the military can have, which directly influences that branch's recruitment policies (Kapp, 2014; 2012). Congress can also set compensation levels — including separation incentives, educational benefits, recruitment bonuses, retention bonuses, and salary — as well as the eligibility criteria for recruitment and retention, meaning the qualifications a person must meet to serve in any branch of the United States Armed Forces. Some of the eligibility requirements currently in place govern the behavior, citizenship, cognitive capacity, and age group of a potential recruit. Congress also sets and authorizes funding for enlisting and retaining soldiers. Finally, because Congress holds oversight authority on behalf of the public, it is its duty to monitor the quality and performance of each branch of the Armed Forces and to recommend remedial measures whenever issues are identified.

Retention is a rate — specifically, the rate at which soldiers voluntarily choose to continue serving as military personnel at the end of their mandatory term of service. Poor retention in some branches can unbalance the country's Armed Forces. One of the biggest concerns surrounding a low retention rate is that it results in fewer experienced soldiers and leaders, which in turn leads to lower job satisfaction and reduced efficiency. Poor retention was especially concerning a few years ago, when many soldiers opted to leave the military immediately after their mandatory service due to battlefield trauma and PTSD. Circumstances have since shifted. Experts are now more concerned about the government's own moves to reduce the size of the U.S. military, which they fear will cause many people to compete for the few remaining leadership and service positions. Some analysts suggest that promotions — a key incentive in the current military structure — will also be reduced in an effort to keep the military as streamlined as possible under the proposed leaner structure (Kapp, 2014; 2012). If this restructuring is fully realized, the military will likely become less attractive to many young people.

This paper investigates the issue of retention in one specific branch of the United States Army: the Army National Guard (ARNG). The sources utilized to inform this paper include official references from the Army Reserve and Active Component as well as civilian sources.

Statement of the Problem

The retention of experienced army staff — both officers and enlisted soldiers — is important for maintaining high unit morale and ensuring that units have natural leaders who are prepared to make them ready for war. Retention is also key to avoiding the cost and time required to retrain new enlisted soldiers and officers, and it is essential for ensuring that assigned tasks and missions can be completed quickly and efficiently. The best way to ensure that the Army National Guard retains as much of its personnel as possible is to instill the right attitude and ethos of togetherness in enlistees from the outset — before they begin experiencing the inevitable difficulties of military service (Kapp, 2014; Figinski, 2017).

The ARNG has not been able to meet its retention goals for many years, and this has become a significant issue in political circles. With the military branch's budget continuing to be reduced almost every year, the ARNG appears unlikely to reverse this trend in the near term. Many experts, researchers, and commentators have offered different explanations for why soldiers are leaving the ARNG immediately after completing their mandatory service (Kapp, 2014). The two most commonly cited reasons for poor retention are lack of useful training and lack of good leadership.

Research Questions and Methodology

This paper addresses the following research questions:

To find answers to these questions, a systematic review study design was employed. The study involved examining official documents, policy documents, reports, government papers, declassified documents, and journal articles. The search was conducted using ProQuest, EBSCO, and Google, with keywords including "national army retention," "Army retention strategy," and "retention in the National Guard." The search yielded a substantial body of relevant material that informed the final paper. Recency was a key inclusion criterion; only materials published within the last 14 years were considered for this study.

Literature Review: Factors Affecting Retention

Serving in the United States military is a high-demand job with very little worker autonomy. Some former soldiers describe it as one of the most stressful occupations they have experienced (Kapp, 2014). Soldiers are typically assigned tough tasks without sufficient resources to complete them quickly or effectively, and once a task is completed, they rarely have long before the next assignment arrives. The limited sense of control stems from the highly hierarchical nature of the U.S. Army, a structure common to most Western military organizations. While this structure makes personnel management easier, it is not conducive to professional autonomy and leaves soldiers with little choice or social support. Because social support is essential to wellbeing, soldiers often end up feeling exhausted and lacking the morale to complete routine tasks.

The recruitment and retention of officers and enlisted soldiers is critical to the Army National Guard. Without sufficient personnel, the unit cannot function effectively, and its operational power depends on its ability to recruit the right people in adequate numbers and to retain them over time. Despite the clear importance of recruitment and retention, the ARNG has not acted decisively enough to reverse its poor numbers. A recent report confirmed that poor retention is directly harming the unit's operations. Part of the problem lies in the ARNG's recruiting strategy, which focuses on attracting young people with no prior experience through broad advertising campaigns rather than identifying individuals with a genuine commitment to the Guard and developing those already recruited. These advertisements typically depict men and women in uniform training or in action, which draws recruits who are attracted to that kind of excitement. When the unit does not deploy to active conflict zones, that excitement fades, job satisfaction declines, and defections increase. In some cases, however, these advertisements do successfully attract individuals motivated by the income, education, brotherhood, and opportunities military service provides.

Before the September 11 attacks, military reservists typically trained just once a month and for a couple of weeks each summer. Following the attacks and in response to the heightened threat environment, reservists are now required to train almost full time (Figinski, 2017). As more countries seek U.S. assistance, the importance of reservists and the National Guard as a whole is likely to continue growing. However, the increased reliance on reservists has placed significant strain on their personal and professional lives. For many, extended training absences have disrupted their civilian careers. The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) of 1994 was enacted to address this issue; it prohibits employment discrimination based on military membership and requires employers to provide unpaid leave for employees fulfilling military duties (Figinski, 2017).

Nevertheless, there are indications that USERRA is not entirely effective in preventing discrimination against National Guard reservists. News reports from mainstream media outlets suggest that some employers refuse to hire National Guard reservists outright, preferring employees who will be available around the clock without interruption.

The Command Sergeant Major (CSM) serves as the organization's senior retention NCO. Every CSM is expected to take personal accountability for ensuring that the retention and attrition goals for their assigned command are met ("Retention of the Georgia Army National Guard," n.d.). The specific responsibilities include the following:

a. Emphasizing the responsibilities of Soldier Mentorship (SM) to First Line Leaders, First Sergeants, Sergeants Major, and other individuals in the NCO support channel.

b. Ensuring that the Non-Commissioned Officer Development Program (NCODP) incorporates SM training and highlights the responsibilities of First Line Leaders.

c. Stressing SM in every unit inspection and visit, with particular emphasis on retention-related and attrition-management activities.

d. Advising unit leaders and commanders on every action and event that affects SM.

e. Guaranteeing the development and implementation of the RMS Unit Sponsorship Program in order to integrate new soldiers into the unit. Successful application of this program leads to faster assimilation of new soldiers into the existing team, heightens their satisfaction, and results in higher retention and lower attrition.

f. Ensuring that counseling sessions and interviews are performed and recorded in the Retention Management Software (RMS) to standard and on time, in order to expose and address challenges related to soldier retention in the National Guard.

g. Ensuring proper information flow from organizational leadership to individual soldiers and their family members. By ensuring that all unit members and families receive consistent information, rumor control improves and the frustration of uncertainty is significantly reduced. Soldiers should be kept informed about unit plans and programs.

h. Incorporating retention and attrition objectives into non-commissioned officer assessment reports to ensure accountability among unit leaders.

i. Ensuring that both attrition and retention training are carried out using the full spectrum of retention tools available through the Recruiting and Retention Command (RRC).

j. Assisting the commander in developing a Unit Strength Enhancement Team (USET) to implement unit strength readiness campaign activities in synchrony with the assigned Recruiting and Retention NCO (RRNCO) during Inactive Duty Training (IDT) periods or in split-drill status as established by the commander ("Retention of the Georgia Army National Guard," n.d.). Every soldier assigned to the USET should be fully engaged in strength-related activities for the entire duration of their assignment.

k. Utilizing the Director's Strength Readiness Overview (DSRO) and Retention Management Software (RMS) to maintain transparency of the unit's strength readiness posture. The DSRO allows data to be pushed to junior commanders, ensuring that information is effectively communicated down the chain of command ("Retention of the Georgia Army National Guard," n.d.). The RMS was developed to transition attrition and retention tracking from manual, handwritten processes to automated procedures, making it considerably easier to monitor attrition and retention across all ten command levels. This data helps leaders identify loss trends, track soldiers approaching their End Time in Service (ETS), and identify career counseling opportunities.

l. Ensuring that unit personnel assigned to process incentive contracts in RMS are trained and understand the RMS re-enlistment and extension flowchart used in processing incentive requests.

References

"Retention of the Georgia Army National Guard." Retention Program Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) (n.d.). Retrieved from Retention SOP.pdfv4.pdf

Figinski, T. F. (2017). Research: Companies are less likely to hire current military reservists. Harvard Business Review. Retrieved from https://hbr.org/2017/10/research-companies-are-less-likely-to-hire-current-military-reservists

Kapp, L. (2012). Recruiting and retention: An overview of FY2010 and FY2011 results for active and reserve component enlisted personnel. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.

Kapp, L. (2014). Recruiting and retention: An overview of FY2012 and FY2013 results for active and reserve component enlisted personnel. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.

Pflanz, S. E., & Ogle, A. D. (2006). Job stress, depression, work performance, and perceptions of supervisors in military personnel. Military Medicine, 171(9), 861–865.

Takami, D. K. (2000). Recruiting and retention in the Army National Guard: Back to the basics and back to the future. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

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