Battle of Plataea: Greek Tactics vs. Persian Power (479 BC)

Introduction

The Persian Empire was built on a practice of conquest and enslavement. Its vast war machine moved across Asia and Southern Europe, subjugating peoples and stripping them of any form of self-determination or independent thought. This imperial philosophy set the stage for the Battle of Plataea in 479 BC.

The success of the Persian army rested on the principle of absorbing the best elements from every culture it conquered. After each victory, the Persians sought out the finest artists, scholars, and military personnel for their own use. As a result, the Persian army was an extraordinarily multicultural force. It was known for its overwhelming numbers, though some sources contest that not all counted among its ranks were soldiers — the totals also included wives, concubines, and camp followers, some of whom served as archers. The sheer size of the Persian army made it a formidable force. However, that same size was ultimately a factor in its defeat at the Battle of Plataea: an army of such scale was difficult to move and difficult to supply. As this paper will show, the Greeks were able to defeat the Persians through superior battle tactics.

The Two Opposing Forces

After the defeat of Athens, the Persian general Mardonius moved his troops to the Boeotian Plains. Historians estimate the size of his army at that time to be approximately 120,000 soldiers, along with some 30,000 men serving in supply roles and guarding lines of communication. It was a vast force that could not venture far from the Asopus River, which divides the Boeotian plain (Barron, 1996).

There were two chief divisions within the Persian forces at Plataea. Mardonius commanded a smaller, more maneuverable force, while the force under Xerxes was large but slow and difficult to supply. The battle took place in August, and neither side could travel far from its water source (Barron, 1996).

The Greek army numbered around 10,000 soldiers; nearly every Greek capable of bearing arms had come to Boeotia. They began the defense of their city greatly outnumbered (Barron, 1996). Though smaller in number, the Greek troops possessed considerable battle experience and superior training.

A note must be made regarding the troop figures for this battle. Herodotus is the primary source for its documentation, though he wrote about the battle after the fact and did not always provide accurate numbers. According to McGoodwin (2002), one estimate places the Greek force at 110,000 and the Persian force at 750,000. There are significant discrepancies across secondary sources regarding the actual size of both armies. All estimates, however, agree that the Greeks were heavily outnumbered. The lower figures appear more consistent with other battles of the period.

The Battle

The battle began with both sides facing each other across the great plain. The Greeks had developed the battle tactic of the phalanx, in which men fought shoulder to shoulder in ranks and files. It was considered an honor to fight on the left wing of this formation, and Greek leaders argued over who would hold that position (Barron, 1996).

Neither side would attack first, as each knew that the key lay in forcing the other to advance and abandon its water source. As Mardonius' supplies began to run out, he attacked a Greek supply chain in an attempt to provoke a response. Meanwhile, the Greek army continued to receive reinforcements. This standoff continued for a full day, with each side probing the other (Barron, 1996). The Persians poisoned the Greek water supply, and the Greeks sent their least experienced troops to find an alternative source. When this group separated from the main force, Mardonius concluded that the Greek army had split due to internal political disagreements. He believed the Greeks were divided and therefore vulnerable (Burn, 1962).

At dawn on the following day, Mardonius received word that the Greeks had fled. He pursued and attacked the well-trained Spartan troops. The Spartan commander Pausanias sent a messenger to the Athenians, who were in the process of moving from the plains to reinforce the Spartans, now under tremendous pressure. The Spartans managed to regroup and reform their ranks, holding their ground. The decisive turning point came when Mardonius was killed in battle. His death caused his troops to lose confidence. The reserve forces, commanded by Artabazus, were accused of immediately fleeing the battlefield (Barron, 1996).

Conclusion

The Greek army's chief asset was its Spartan troops. The Athenians contributed valuable experience, having previously faced the Persians and learned their tactics firsthand. Together, the Spartans and Athenians were seasoned combatants, and that experience proved decisive in the Greek victory at the Battle of Plataea. This battle stands as enduring evidence that sound training and cohesive tactics can overcome even a numerically overwhelming opponent.