Civil-Military Relations: Democracy, Control, and Latin America

Introduction to Civil-Military Relations

Civil-military relations are an important subject of discussion in almost every state, but they are even more crucial in countries undergoing transition to democracy and in countries plagued by years of military rule. Armies hold a strong grip on the politics of all societies: they represent the ultimate defense of a state, stand as the symbol of its sovereignty, and are the upholders of discipline, honor, and patriotism. Uniquely among powerful institutions, they not only possess arms but can also effectively employ them. With this immense power, military involvement in a country's politics becomes nearly inevitable.

Civil-military relations can thus be defined as involving "a multiplicity of relationships between military men, institutions, and interests, on the one hand, and diverse and often conflicting nonmilitary men, institutions, and interests on the other… The relation between the armed forces as a whole and society as a whole… The relation between the leadership of the armed forces (the officer corps) as an elite group and other elite groups… and… the relation between the commanders of the armed forces and the top political leaders of society — it is the foundation of the management of the use of armed force and the armed forces" (Segell, 2000, p. 1).

With this monopoly over a country's defense, the military can sometimes pose a threat to the very society it exists to preserve. This is the dilemma of civil-military relations, as Samuel Finer observes: "Instead of asking why the military engage in politics, we ought surely to ask why they ever do otherwise. For at first sight the political advantages of the military vis-à-vis other civilian groupings are overwhelming. The military possess vastly superior organization. And they possess arms."

Military relations with civil society are not a new phenomenon. The subject has been debated since nation-states came into being. Nearly two millennia ago, the philosopher Sun Tzu wrote: "Generals are assistants of the nation… when their assistance is complete, the country is strong. When their assistance is defective, the country is weak"; and "the ordinary rule for use of military force is for the military command to receive the orders from the civilian authorities, then to gather and mass the troops, quartering them together." When this subject is under discussion, one cannot ignore Niccolò Machiavelli, the first person to fully comprehend the nature of civil-military relations. He wrote: "the chief foundations of all states, new as well as old or composite, are good laws and good arms; and as there cannot be good laws where the state is not well armed, it follows that where they are well armed they have good laws."

Thinkers on the subject have tried to explain the relationship through the lens of war and combat. Nineteenth-century Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz wrote: "War is nothing but a continuation of political intercourse, with a mixture of other means," and this dictum has been the wellspring for most civil-military relations theory. Clausewitz felt that war was both autonomous and instrumental: "Is not War merely another kind of writing and language for political thoughts? It has certainly a grammar of its own, but its logic is not peculiar to itself."

Theoretical Foundations: Clausewitz, Finer, and the Logic of Military Power

If war is both autonomous and instrumental, the same can be said of warriors. Military officers must possess autonomy in the sense that they be permitted to perfect their martial expertise independently of civilian interference; yet they remain instrumental in the sense that determining the ends to which their expertise is put is not within their remit. On this point Clausewitz was clear:

"As Wars are in reality, they are, as we before said, only the expressions or manifestations of policy itself. The subordination of the political point-of-view to the military would be contrary to common sense, for policy has declared the War; it is the intelligent faculty, War only the instrument, and not the reverse. The subordination of the military point-of-view to the political is, therefore, the only thing which is possible."

Samuel Finer identified three ways in which the military can come into conflict with civilians. First, the military may confuse itself with the servants of the public rather than recognizing that it holds power, which "may lead them to contrast the national community as a continuing corporation with the temporary incumbents in office." Second, the armed forces may fall victim to the false notion that they alone are qualified to make decisions concerning the defense of the country. Third, the military may refuse to accept the role of genuine civilian leadership, seeing itself as the defenders of the nation only.

During the 1980s, many influential nations began the process of transition from military to civilian rule. Countries including Greece, Portugal, Spain, and states across Latin and South America gradually gave up military regimes and relinquished power in favor of civilian politicians. This development generated a vast body of literature, and prominent theorists studied the different arenas of military influence in society.

Alfred Stepan identified three key arenas. First, civil society, where "manifold social movements… and civic organizations… attempt to constitute themselves in an ensemble of arrangements so that they can express themselves and advance their interests." Second, political society, where "the polity specifically arranges itself for political contestation to gain control over public power and the state apparatus," encompassing political parties, political leadership, intra-party alliances, and legislatures, "through which civil society can constitute itself politically to select and monitor democratic government." Third, the state, described as "the continuous administrative, legal, bureaucratic and coercive system that attempts not only to manage the state apparatus but to structure relations between civil and public power and to structure many crucial relationships within civil and political society."

Within the scope of civil society, Stepan argued, it is extremely important to forge new "political institutions that have increased strength, autonomy, and legitimacy." Civil society must work toward building at least a few civilian institutes as repositories of capable, independent advice to government on defense matters, so that there exists a cadre of citizens who are masters in their knowledge of the force structure, organizational style, budgetary issues, doctrinal questions, and the specific details of weapons systems — resources that are "indispensable for the fulfillment of the military and intelligence oversight functions of political society, especially in the legislative branch."

Democratic Transitions and the Scope of Military Influence

With all this in mind, it remains essential to understand that civilians and the military need to build a relationship in which civilians determine the extent to which the military is given leverage in a country's affairs. Legislatures must ensure that there is a system of oversight sufficient to monitor the functions of the armed forces.

It is often argued that the state must limit the scope of military decision-making to the military sphere alone. If the military and the state disagree on their conception of democracy and the legitimate role of the military within it, the new regime must either impose its view or abdicate certain areas of government to the military. If it takes the latter option, it will have undermined its legitimacy and, therefore, its long-term viability. Negotiating the scope of the military's role in politics in a new democracy requires a careful but forceful executive who plays the role of persuader and directs attention toward building "professional, not personal, allies within the military."

Many communist regimes and established democracies seem to have achieved a workable balance, having built professional militaries of enormous size, sophistication, and strength that nonetheless submit to civilian authority. Latin American states have not been so fortunate. Leaders there face militaries that have questioned their political authority or, worse still, undermined it. For these countries, civilian control of the military often seems like an elusive goal.

However elusive, civilian control is a subject that neither Latin American leaders nor scholars can easily ignore. The development, quality, and survival of democratic systems depend on governments making the armed forces their political servants and policy instruments rather than the other way around. Elected leaders cannot credibly claim to have represented the popular will if they are held hostage to the will of non-elected men in uniform. Without the authority to set their own course of action, free from military constraints, threats, or vetoes, politicians and the institutions they serve may ultimately fall prey to deep public cynicism — which in turn could fuel doubts about the very legitimacy of the democratic regime. When democracies become discredited, they are most vulnerable to the designs of power-hungry generals.

Conclusion

All in all, civil-military relations are controversial and complicated. The very public that would hail the arrival of the military during a crisis would want to be rid of it once peace is restored. Democracy is always the more desirable of the two systems, but in underdeveloped countries there has been an increased tendency to depend on the army during periods when democratic governance appears to be failing. Until civilian institutions are strong enough to command genuine authority, the tension at the heart of civil-military relations is unlikely to be resolved.