This paper traces the history of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood from its founding by Hasan al-Banna in 1928 through its dramatic rise and fall in the early twenty-first century. It examines the organization's original goal of restoring the Islamic caliphate, its cycles of repression and resurgence under successive Egyptian governments, and its ideological influence on affiliated groups across the Muslim world, including Hamas and al-Qaeda. The paper also analyzes the Brotherhood's electoral victory following the 2011 Arab Spring, Mohamed Morsi's troubled presidency, and the military coup led by General Abdel Fattah El-Sisi in 2013, which resulted in the organization being designated a terrorist group.
The paper demonstrates effective synthesis of multiple secondary sources into a coherent historical narrative. Rather than summarizing each source in isolation, the writer weaves Warner, Alterman and McCants, and media interviews together to build a single argumentative timeline, citing each source at the specific point where its evidence is most relevant.
The paper opens with the Brotherhood's founding ideology and early militant activity, then moves through the cycles of state repression under Nasser and Mubarak, pausing to examine ideological offshoots such as Qutb's radicalism and the regional spread to Sudan, Palestine, and Syria. The second half shifts to electoral politics: the Arab Spring, Morsi's presidency, his constitutional overreach, and finally the Sisi coup and the organization's current suppressed state. The conclusion briefly gestures at the Brotherhood's enduring rural base and the competing liberal coalition.
The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1928 when Great Britain was still in control of Egypt. World War I had effectively ended the Muslim caliphate, and it was this institution that the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood sought to restore. There is broad recognition within the organization that this goal will not be quickly achieved, with estimates suggesting several decades of effort will be needed to accomplish the objective.
A teacher from a middle-class, educated family, Hasan al-Banna had participated in demonstrations against British colonial rule since his youth (Warner, 2013). Al-Banna was respected as both a preacher and an unorthodox thinker — attributes that led disgruntled workers from the Suez Canal zone to seek him out. Encouraged by their approach, al-Banna began a "pan-Islamic revival and solidarity movement," henceforth referred to as the Muslim Brotherhood (Warner, 2013).
According to Yasser El-Shimy, an Egypt and Middle East analyst for the International Crisis Group based in Cairo and a former diplomat of the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood "has worked assiduously to build the kind of conservative religious society and eventually build a kind of religious conservative state that would serve as a nucleus for the reestablishment of the caliphate" (NPR, 2013). In the beginning, the Muslim Brotherhood emphasized education and organization — but also agitation, as the group targeted the remaining British influence in Egypt and the emerging Zionism occurring in Palestine, which was a British mandate (Warner, 2013). Interest in the Muslim Brotherhood rose rapidly, prompting a move to Cairo where the organization became increasingly attractive to middle-class members and sympathizers (Warner, 2013).
Egypt was destabilized by high rates of unemployment and the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. Al-Banna protested the establishment of a military wing of the organization, but he did not prevail (Warner, 2013). As a result, the Secret Apparatus emerged and conducted attacks on police stations belonging to both the British and the Egyptians (Warner, 2013). When the Secret Apparatus killed a judge, official sanctions included an order to disband the organization, and the authorities conducted a violent crackdown on members of the Muslim Brotherhood (Warner, 2013). The situation continued to escalate: a member of the Muslim Brotherhood assassinated the Egyptian Prime Minister, Mahmud al-Nuqrashi (Warner, 2013). In 1949, al-Banna was murdered by gunmen in what was believed to be government retaliation (Warner, 2013).
Anti-British sentiment and nationalism continued to escalate, and 1952 brought a violent skirmish between British soldiers and Egyptian police, with arsonists nearly burning Cairo to the ground (Warner, 2013). In July of that year, a coup by the Free Officers Movement — a clique of army officers — brought down the British-backed King Farouk (Warner, 2013). The new government was headed by Gamal Abdel Nasser, whom the Brotherhood supported at the outset of the revolution, but soon mistrusted as Nasser gave no indication he was interested in sharing power (Warner, 2013). In 1954, a failed assassination attempt against Nasser led to waves of arrests and torture of prisoners, with the Muslim Brotherhood blamed for the plot (Warner, 2013).
Over the years, attempts were made to repress the Muslim Brotherhood, with both Nasser and Mubarak cracking down on the organization (NPR, 2013). During the 1960s, the Muslim Brotherhood was firmly in opposition to the Egyptian state and endured profound persecution: the government routinely detained, arrested, and brutally tortured members of the organization (Warner, 2013). 1965 brought a particularly devastating round of brutal suppression intended to wipe out the Muslim Brotherhood once and for all (Warner, 2013). A fabricated plot was used as a pretext to arrest roughly 18,000 people and imprison hundreds of them (Warner, 2013).
During the 1950s and 1960s, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood was forced underground to survive this era of extreme repression (NPR, 2013). By establishing social support networks and continuing their social and religious activities — such as charitable work — the Brotherhood managed to remain viable (NPR, 2013). Indeed, a tacit arrangement of semi-tolerance existed between Mubarak's regime and the Muslim Brotherhood, since the Egyptian state was unable to maintain certain social services and the Brotherhood stepped in to support the people (NPR, 2013).
The influence of the Muslim Brotherhood spread throughout the Muslim world, and as different regions adopted its tenets they also put their own stamp on the organization, developing several affiliated political parties (Warner, 2013). In Sudan, the Muslim Brotherhood had a presence dating back to approximately 1949 and generated an outgrowth that became the National Islamic Front, which came to dominate Sudanese politics around 1989 (Warner, 2013). In Palestine, Hamas founded a political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1987; the two organizations in Egypt and Palestine share linkages that continue into the present (Warner, 2013). After an uprising in Syria in the early 1980s, the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood was suppressed — until the Syrian Civil War. The chaos emanating from that conflict provided cover and incentive for a resurgence of power in the country, centered predominantly on opposing Bashar al-Assad's government (Warner, 2013).
One individual from the 1950s and 1960s is particularly notable: Sayyid Qutb studied in America and was shocked by what he perceived as the permissive culture associated with jazz music and feminist women (Warner, 2013). Imprisoned by Nasser in 1954, Qutb spent his time developing a radical and ruthless ideology bent on destroying any aspect of culture and society he did not regard as purely Islamic (Warner, 2013). Qutb was executed in 1966, but his writings were disseminated widely and inspired a young Muslim Brother, Ayman al-Zawahiri (Warner, 2013). The Muslim Brotherhood disavowed Qutb's writings, but that did not stop al-Zawahiri from leaving the Brotherhood and establishing Egyptian Islamic Jihad (Warner, 2013).
Al-Zawahiri went on to lead al-Qaeda and became one of its most prominent spokesmen (BBC, 2014). He was featured in dozens of audiotapes and videos between 2003 and 2014 — in September 2014, al-Zawahiri called for an Islamist resurgence in India (BBC, 2014). Zawahiri was indicted by the United States for the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Africa and — for his activities with Islamic Jihad during the 1990s — was sentenced to death in absentia by Egypt (BBC, 2014). In June 2013, Zawahiri called for the radical Islamic State to focus on Iraq and leave Syria; by February 2014, al-Qaeda had severed all ties with the Islamic State (BBC, 2014).
In July 2013, General Abdel Fattah El-Sisi conducted a coup d'état and was elected president in the disputed 2014 election (Al Jazeera, 2014). International observers commented on the low voter turnout, attributing it partly to the Muslim Brotherhood and other dissident youth groups who boycotted the election (Al Jazeera, 2014).
Sisi made clear in 2014 that eliminating the Muslim Brotherhood was a central plank of his presidential platform. The military-installed interim government that took charge following Morsi's ouster designated the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization (Al Jazeera, 2014). The Brotherhood's primary leaders were either in exile or in jail, and Morsi faced a trial that could result in the death penalty (Al Jazeera, 2014). Despite all this, the Brotherhood asserted that its members do not support violence against soldiers and that "they will never attack any Egyptian in any way whatsoever" (Alterman & McCants, 2015, p. 134).
The end of Islamist rule in Egypt alarmed salafists — members of which are considered strict literalists who take puritanical approaches to Islam — but the Nour Party counseled patience, stating:
"It is a matter of managing losses and choosing the least bad option. The reality is that people support this new government — or at least giving Sisi enough legitimacy to maneuver. It is the will of the people and the will of the military. You only make gains if you stay in the struggle." (Alterman & McCants, 2015, p. 133)
Among Sisi's supporters are many conservative Gulf state governments that are supporting Egypt's economy with billions of dollars. These governments view the Muslim Brotherhood as a threat to their own rule and are increasingly acting to weaken the organization (Alterman & McCants, 2015).
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