Book Review: Goldman's The Crucial Decade and After, 1945–1960

Introduction and Overview

The Crucial Decade and After: America 1945–1960 by Eric Goldman, published in 1966, chronicles the transformation of post-World War II peace into the globalization of the Cold War. The book was first written in 1956 and then revised and expanded in 1966. Much of the material written in 1956 seems incomplete or unfinished, and the 1966 additions attempted to fill in some of the gaps and clarify earlier thoughts. It is mainly a historical anthology, and Goldman provides a greatly detailed account of McCarthyism. Goldman blames McCarthy for inflaming the Cold War through protectionist politics and defensive trade positions within the United States. While Eric Goldman is valuable as a source of detail about the era, his work holds little value as a formal piece of historical scholarship.

Eric Goldman was a professor at Princeton University who served President Johnson as a special consultant in the White House. Goldman's relationship with Johnson was often stormy, and the two frequently disagreed on policy. Nevertheless, Professor Goldman was measured in his criticism of Johnson and made an effort to acknowledge views other than his own, taking a compassionate retrospective view of the president.

The history was written soon after — and in some cases as — the events were taking place. For this reason, it cannot be considered a true historical account in the traditional sense. Writing in proximity to events can skew the author's perspective, and this is clearly the case here. Goldman is unable to step outside his own opinions, which were often a source of controversy among his contemporaries. In this respect, the work functions more as a commentary written during the events than as a history composed with the benefit of distance and reflection.

Goldman's Background and Perspective

A history written well after events have concluded is very different from one written as they are unfolding. A participant in the events is often not the best source of historical perspective. Many have attempted to set aside their own opinions and offer an objective account, but few have succeeded, and their works tend to become weakly supported arguments for their existing views. This is the case here. One example is Goldman's description of Lattimore as "a non-Communist liberal who had been called into consultation infrequently by the State Department and whose suggestions had been almost totally ignored" (Goldman, 119). This is just one instance of how Goldman interjects personal opinions throughout the book. It becomes quite clear with whom Goldman sides and whom he considers his adversary. A true history requires greater objectivity.

Goldman's intent, it should be said, was not to weakly promote his controversial views — his true aim was to offer a broad overview of McCarthyism and the events that led to the Cold War. However, he does not achieve an objective view, and therefore his work cannot be considered a true history of the period. This can be compared to the works of Leon Trotsky on the Russian Revolution, where many of the same problems with objectivity are apparent. Histories written soon after or during events tend to contain more immediate facts and figures unavailable to later scholars, but they also tend to lack the detachment that rigorous historical analysis requires.

Problems of Objectivity and Historical Distance

Goldman's criticism of others is often colored by unsupported argument and must therefore be regarded as opinion rather than established fact, as in the following example:

"Late in the war, the University of Chicago Press published The Road to Serfdom by an Austrian-born economist, Friedrich A. Von Hayek. [He] had set his scholarship within a general proposition that caught perfectly the mood of American conservatism. Nazism, he contended, had not grown up in opposition to New Deal-type liberalism; such liberalism and Nazism came from the same roots. All Western civilization had been relying increasingly on ideas of national economic planning, and these ideas, whether called liberalism, Nazism, socialism, or communism, led inevitably to totalitarian serfdom." (Goldman, 7–8)

This view was not shared by Goldman's colleagues and was often a source of heated debate among his contemporaries. When called upon to defend his ideas, Goldman was frequently at a loss to do so.

As far as relevance to his subject matter is concerned, it is difficult to find serious fault in Goldman's work. He does not wander from the topic, and his coverage is focused and thorough. His intent was to provide an overview of the events that shaped the Cold War. He had access to many first-person accounts, conversations, and letters written at the time — sources that other historians could only dream about — and he records little-known facts and stories, some of which he witnessed firsthand.

Relevance, Firsthand Access, and Factual Value

Even though Goldman's work is full of personal opinions and interpretive slants, valuable and little-known historical gems are presented throughout. As a source of historical detail, Goldman is an excellent and generally reliable guide. One example of this type of factual account is the following:

"One of the least serious charges ever made against the New Deal Democrats was that they had stolen the gold in Fort Knox. Only a few crackpots believed the accusation. But in 1953 the Daughters of the American Revolution forced Dwight Eisenhower, the first Republican president in twenty years, to have the gold counted. Investigators found that the fort contained $30,442,415,581.70 worth of the precious metal. That was ten dollars less than it should have been. Mrs. Georgia Clark, treasurer of the United States under the Democrats, sent the government a check to cover the loss." (Goldman, 239)

Had it not been for this work, many little-known facts such as this one might have remained hidden from the public. This is where the true historical value of the book lies. Another passage illustrates Goldman's factual style equally well:

"Although the most visible progress on civil rights would not take place until the 1950s and 1960s, there was a strong reaction against segregation in the late 1940s. As one newspaper editorial stated, 'It is high time we ended this business. We can't do it as decent human beings and we can't do it as a nation trying to sell democracy to a world full of non-white peoples.' The civil rights movement received a big boost in 1948 when President Truman ordered the armed forces to end segregation in the military 'as rapidly as possible.'" (Goldman, 278)

Had Goldman adhered consistently to this factual style of reporting, his book would hold considerably more substance as a work of history. The book is full of wonderful and interesting little-known facts and stories, but unfortunately the reader must wade through pages of what resembles editorial opinion in order to find them.

Conclusion: Historical Value and Limitations

The intention of Eric Goldman was to give a highly detailed account of the processes that gave rise to the Cold War. He accomplished this in part through historical facts and little-known anecdotes of the era, but then undermined this hard historical record by interjecting his own opinion. It would be possible to read between the lines and extract the valuable information while setting aside the opinions — if the distinction between the two were made more explicit. This work would be considerably more valuable as a historical reference had the factual claims been more easily verifiable. For these two main reasons, Eric Goldman's work makes for interesting reading, but it is weak as a work of formal history.