Economic Inequality and Democracy in America: Bartels Reviewed

Introduction: Democracy and the Representation Gap

The fundamental aim of democracy in political governance is to ensure that elected officials represent the interests of their constituents in the legislature. This means that the votes taken by members of Congress should reflect the policy preferences of those they represent. In reality, however, there is often a significant disconnect between what legislators vote for and what their constituents prefer. In his book Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age, Larry Bartels argues that the increasing economic inequality in the United States is evidence that legislators do not in practice represent the interests of ordinary citizens — instead, they serve the interests of more powerful groups and entities. With reference to matters of economic inequality, this paper discusses the discrepancy between the choices of legislators and the policy preferences of their constituents.

Who actually governs in the American political system remains a contentious question in political discourse, particularly given inequality in the distribution of wealth, resources, knowledge, and social status. Contrary to the assertions of democratic theory, policy-making on key issues is in reality governed by alliances comprising both elected and unelected individuals and groups (Bartels 1). These individuals and groups possess immense power and resources, which they use to influence policies and the conduct of elected officials. In other words, elected leaders vote to fulfill the interests of certain individuals and groups rather than those of the average citizen.

Economic Inequality and Political Power in the U.S.

A disconnect between the wishes of the electorate and the policies that legislators actually push or vote for has been clearly observed in the United States. America has become enormously richer over the last five decades, but significantly more unequal at the same time. Economic data indicate that the income share of the top 1% more than doubled — from 10.2% to 21.8% — between 1950 and 2005 (Bartels 1). The top 0.1% accumulated even greater wealth, with their income share tripling during the same period. In essence, resources have become increasingly concentrated in the hands of the affluent.

Remarkable changes in the political arena have also occurred during this period, creating further advantages for the wealthy. As Bartels explains, the cost of political campaigns has increased dramatically since the 1950s, making it extremely difficult for individuals without substantial resources to finance their election or re-election bids (p. 2). These candidates turn to wealthy individuals, corporations, and business and professional organizations to fund their campaigns. Indeed, lobbying activities by firms, business organizations, and professional associations have expanded rapidly over the last several decades, outpacing the growth of public interest groups and other mechanisms of organized representation such as labor unions. The implication is that elected officials ultimately respond to the voice of their funders and sponsors rather than their constituents. Increased economic inequality has therefore reinforced enduring disparities in political representation and influence in modern America.

Does this mean that economic inequality and democracy are fundamentally incompatible? Can democracy be genuinely achieved in the presence of substantial economic inequality? Bartels' evidence shows that elected leaders are "utterly unresponsive to the policy preferences of millions of low-income citizens, leaving their political interests to be served or ignored as the ideological whims of incumbent elites may dictate" (p. 2). At its core, democracy is about the continuous responsiveness of elected officials to the preferences of their constituents — about representing all citizens equally. A closer look, however, reveals that America falls far short of this ideal.

Economic inequality profoundly affects democracy. Yet, as Bartels explains, democratic politics also shape economics in powerful ways (Bartels 2). Whereas socioeconomic forces such as globalization, technological advancement, and demographic shifts have significantly influenced inequality over the years, politics can substantially amplify or constrain that inequality depending on the motives of elected officials. Citing the association between public policies and economic equality in the United States since the 1950s, Bartels establishes that partisan politics and the ideological commitments of elected officials have substantially affected the economic fortunes of ordinary Americans. This leads him to conclude that economic inequality is, in large part, a political outcome.

Partisan Politics and Income Growth

Theoretically, public preferences in a democracy constrain the actions and ideological convictions of elected officials. In practice, however, legislators command considerable political latitude (Bartels 3). Republican and Democratic legislators from the same state frequently display divergent policy positions, which illustrates how elected officials do not consistently act in the interests of their shared constituents. Why would two legislators representing the same people pursue such different policy objectives? The most logical explanation is that each is driven by the interests of particular individuals or groups. A similar pattern emerges when administrations change at the national level: when Republicans replace Democrats in the White House, and vice versa, observable shifts in public policy priorities follow — a further sign that elected officials do not genuinely represent the ordinary citizen.

Bartels' comparative study of Republican and Democratic presidents since the 1950s reveals significant differences in the economic outcomes each party tends to produce. On average, the real incomes of middle-income households "have grown twice as fast under Democrats as they have under Republicans, while the real incomes of working poor families have grown six times as fast under Democrats as they have under Republicans" (p. 3). The rate of income growth for poor and middle-income households is, in significant part, a function of which party holds the presidency. More strikingly, these partisan differences persist even after accounting for variations in historical trends that lie beyond individual presidents' control. This suggests that economic disparities are not simply an unavoidable economic phenomenon.

Work Cited

Bartels, Larry M. Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008.