Eisenhower vs. Kennedy: Comparing Cold War Foreign Policy

Introduction

The military experience that President Dwight D. Eisenhower brought to the White House was largely without precedent. In sharp contrast to President Harry S. Truman's years, some White House functions and structures were reorganized — with new positions introduced in an attempt to promote the efficient running of government business. President John F. Kennedy, on the other hand, sought to ease the bureaucratic structure left by his predecessor. Just as we can compare and contrast the domestic policies of both presidents and their approaches to government administration, we can also evaluate their foreign policy perspectives with the intention of comparing and contrasting their outlooks.

Eisenhower's Foreign Policy Framework and the NSC

Like Kennedy, Eisenhower had a keen interest in foreign affairs. His preference for organization and staff work was largely rooted in his role as a military commander. Towards this end, he sought to ensure that the integrated policy review system of the National Security Council incorporated the Department of State. As Rakove (2013) points out, it was during Eisenhower's administration that the National Security Council experienced significant renewal. In seeking to ensure that foreign policy decision-making was efficient, Eisenhower embraced a formal organizational structure. The National Security Council was expanded and formalized, with its mandate broadened and responsibilities such as the preparation and coordination of policy papers added among the relevant government agencies (Kinnard, 2012). As Kinnard (2012) notes, "originally the NSC was created by Congress as a small advisory body over which the President was to preside" (p. 154).

It is important to note that, unlike Kennedy, Eisenhower sought to implement a heavily formalized machinery. Before making decisions on appropriate policies, he was inclined to consult widely — with key advisers including George Kistiakowsky (science adviser), Henry Cabot Lodge (UN Ambassador), and Lewis Strauss (Atomic Energy Commission Chairman). Some of the changes Eisenhower implemented to the system inherited from President Truman include "wider representation at meetings to include the Secretary of the Treasury and the Budget Director; a Planning Board which prepared papers for Council consideration; and an Operations Coordinating Board which" effectively concerned itself with follow-up of decisions originating from the President (Kinnard, 2012, p. 154). While many believe there was some degree of rigidity in Eisenhower's foreign policy as a consequence of this heavily formal machinery, the fact that he relied on the counsel of an expanded team of advisers means the seemingly rigid organizational structure was not as inflexible as it appeared. Indeed, it was during Eisenhower's administration that a number of notable innovations emerged on the foreign affairs front — among the most relevant being the "Open Skies" proposal and Atoms for Peace (Olivia, 2018).

It would therefore be accurate to say that Eisenhower ushered in a new national security and foreign policy outlook for the United States. The key considerations of that outlook were diverse. In addition to promoting the domestic economy while gathering the energy to execute the Cold War, the U.S. also sought to keep communist aggression in check using its nuclear weapons arsenal (Kinnard, 2012). Furthermore, Eisenhower's new national security outlook inclined toward the active use of the CIA to conduct covert operations. The Eisenhower administration was also more focused on establishing, promoting, and sustaining good relations with governments deemed to be nonaligned (Kinnard, 2012).

In his inaugural address, Kennedy sought to clearly define his foreign policy with the words: "let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty" (Dobbs, 2010). The Kennedy years saw the adoption of a more informal and modest approach to foreign policy, in contrast to the more elaborate Eisenhower national security formation described above. Most of Kennedy's closest advisers held the view that, in addition to being complacent, the foreign policy establishment of his predecessor was suppressed, ineffective, and slow-moving (Hook and Scott, 2011). In their view, the State Department as then constituted was largely incapable of implementing and furthering their global vision.

Kennedy's Informal Approach to Foreign Policy

Unlike Eisenhower, Kennedy was inclined to initiate direct contact with the State Department's desk officers handling various foreign policy concerns at the operational level. In doing so, he eliminated the Operations Coordinating Board that Eisenhower had established to oversee National Security Council decisions and coordinate their execution. Essentially, "under Kennedy, informal, ad hoc interagency task forces replaced the formal NSC system as the primary decision-making unit for dealing with international problems" (Hook and Scott, 2011, p. 24). More specifically, Kennedy chose to rely on McGeorge Bundy in his role as special assistant for national security affairs. Bundy gathered several individuals with academic backgrounds and brought them together under a significantly scaled-down NSC. These individuals were tasked with interpreting the recommendations on foreign policy coming from the State Department and the Pentagon (Dobbs, 2010), and they operated out of the White House basement.

Upon assuming power, Kennedy appeared focused on having foreign policy issues coordinated by a new breed of NSC and White House staffers — most of whom were young and energetic. These foreign policy staffers had little appetite for the bureaucracy and formality that had characterized the Eisenhower years, and they largely championed informal channels. Later, "Johnson adapted Kennedy's informal system to his personal style while also resuscitating NSC formalities for non-urgent business" (Hammond, 1992, p. 180).

Some of the two presidents' foreign policy initiatives overlapped. For instance, the Cuban Bay of Pigs invasion — initiated under Eisenhower — was continued by Kennedy. The operation was, however, largely a failure: it lacked critical air support and was founded on faulty intelligence. Kennedy also sought to build on the Soviet Union negotiations that Eisenhower had initiated. In his final term, Eisenhower focused on easing hostile relations between the United States and the Soviet Union in order to set the stage for a mutual agreement to ban the testing of nuclear weapons in both the ocean and the atmosphere. In 1959, Soviet Premier Khrushchev paid a visit to the U.S., bringing hope of a substantive treaty. The visit produced no concrete progress on arms control, but was regarded as a step in the right direction. As Rakove (2013) points out, there was mutual understanding between the two leaders that further consultations would follow, with Britain and France involved. Nothing of substance emerged from the planned summit, however, as a result of what became known as the U-2 incident. In the words of Beschloss (2016), "the so-called 'Spirit of Camp David' reached an abrupt end when an American U-2 was shot down during a reconnaissance flight over Soviet territory in May 1960" (p. 117). Relations deteriorated after the downing of the U.S. plane by Soviet missiles, and when the two leaders met in Paris, a fallout was inevitable after Khrushchev's attempts to extract an apology from Eisenhower failed.

The Kennedy administration, however, pursued a deal on limiting nuclear testing, and just before his assassination Kennedy secured an agreement limiting nuclear weapons testing in the earth's atmosphere, underwater, and in space. "On August 5, 1963, after more than eight years of difficult negotiations, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union signed the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty" (JFK Presidential Library and Museum, 2018). In that regard, Kennedy succeeded where Eisenhower had fallen short in placing limits on nuclear testing and reducing hazardous nuclear material. Kennedy also succeeded in easing Cold War tensions to a greater degree than his predecessor. As Hammond (1992) points out, this remains Kennedy's most significant presidential accomplishment. Kennedy also inherited and advanced the covert plan to overthrow Fidel Castro from the Eisenhower administration — a plan that ultimately failed.

Conclusion

It is clear from the discussion above that both President Kennedy and President Eisenhower approached foreign policy in ways that were at once similar and meaningfully different. The key foreign policy issue shared across both administrations was opposition to the spread of communism. Although both presidents sought to defend democracy abroad, Kennedy's record on this front is more prominent than Eisenhower's. It should be noted, however, that because both presidents governed during different time periods and under different circumstances, a direct side-by-side comparison of their foreign policies has inherent limitations. The perspectives presented here offer an informed, if generalist, account of each leader's approach to foreign policy.