Operation Ajax: The 1953 CIA Coup That Reshaped Iran

Introduction: The Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis

The events that led to Operation Ajax were triggered by the Anglo-Iranian crisis of 1951 to 1953. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was largely viewed as a colonial influence bent on controlling the host government and exploiting the benefits that arose from a deeply divided society. In 1951, however, campaigns championed by Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq led Iran to nationalize its oil resources. Slightly over two years after nationalization, the Iranian Premier was deposed (De Seve, 2020).

When foreign powers failed to destabilize and remove him through other means, the British attempted to dislodge the Premier once more. Following mass protests and a three-day uprising — the Siyer-Tir on July 21 — Mohammad Mossadeq was granted powers to appoint the chiefs of staff and the minister of war. The British identified an opportunity to depose the Premier in the growing differences between the Shah and the government. Nevertheless, Mossadeq was already suspicious of the British and closed their embassy in October 1952. All British agents and MI6 employees operating under diplomatic cover were forced to leave the country. Sensing that a coup could not succeed as planned without American assistance, the British changed tactics and turned to the CIA (De Seve, 2020).

Accountability of Preparations, Equipment, Logistics, and Contingency

The British Prime Minister and his American counterpart, President Eisenhower, signed the final coup plans on July 1 and July 11, respectively. The coup conspirators chose General Fazlollah Zahedi, who had served as Interior Minister, to replace Mohammad Mossadeq. Although the British could not practically carry out the coup on their own, they played a major role in shaping its execution by the United States. Their contribution included a network of Iranian experts embedded within the Iranian armed forces, a long-standing civilian network, and sustained influence meetings with several prominent Iranian politicians (Levin, 2018).

The American contribution was more concrete and overt. The CIA provided the compound of its embassy in Tehran, its intelligence operatives, and its diplomats. Kermit Roosevelt Jr., grandson of President Theodore Roosevelt and Chief of CIA operations for the Middle East, was appointed field commander and coup director. The primary operational planner was Dr. Donald Wilber, a CIA officer experienced in clandestine travel across the Middle East under various disguises. Other key figures included Loy Henderson, the U.S. Ambassador to Iran, and Richard Cottam, a CIA agent. The CIA had also cultivated four local operatives: Colonel Farzanegan, who had lived in Washington but maintained close contacts with Iranian field officers; an agent provocateur named Ehsam Lankarani; a daring operative referred to as Tudeh; and the "Boscoe Brothers," who had important links with the Iranian press as well as strong connections to street gangs and mobs (Levin, 2018).

In the months before the coup, propaganda against Mossadeq intensified. Weapons were secretly supplied to tribes and groups loyal to the Shah. As planning progressed, however, Mohammad Reza Shah began to waver. He was indecisive and hesitant at first but was eventually persuaded, through sustained efforts, to accept the scheme. It remains unclear whether the Shah willingly signed the royal decree dismissing Mossadeq and appointing General Zahedi. According to Abraham, citing a 1969 personal account by Dr. Wilber, the royal signature was forged — meaning the coup lacked any legitimate legal cover. The MI6 and CIA worked together to secure the Shah's commitment, repeatedly reassuring him that the coup would be sustainable and was backed by two powerful foreign governments (Levin, 2018).

Plan Execution and Recovery Measures

The coup plan relied on the support of several key royalists in Tehran. As described by Abraham, the plan was straightforward in design. On the chosen night, Colonel Nehmatollah Nasiri, Commander of the Imperial Guards, was to use an armored car, six army personnel, and two truckloads of soldiers to arrest the Army Chief of Staff and key cabinet ministers in a single sweep. Colonel Nasiri would then proceed to Mossadeq's residence and deliver the royal decree of dismissal. If Mossadeq refused to comply, Nasiri was to arrest him as well. Simultaneously, another contingent of Imperial Guards would sever communication lines to the Bazaar, seize the central communications hub, and take control of the Chiefs of Staff headquarters. General Zahedi was then to lead a convoy to the national radio broadcaster and read the royal decree announcing his appointment as Prime Minister (Roosevelt, 1979).

To generate popular support, the Boscoe Brothers and affiliated gangs were tasked with mobilizing civilians to accompany them to radio stations, loot the residences of officers and cabinet secretaries loyal to Mossadeq, and create an impression of spontaneous public uprising. When the coup was carried out late on the night of August 15, it was expected to succeed with little or no resistance. It was quickly derailed, however, when a member of the Imperial Guard — suspected of being a secret Tudeh informant — warned party leaders, who in turn alerted Mossadeq. Rather than Nasiri arresting Mossadeq, Nasiri himself was arrested. The decree was declared invalid on the grounds that the Shah had no constitutional authority to dismiss the Prime Minister. The Shah fled by airplane to Baghdad. The operation appeared to have failed catastrophically (Roosevelt, 1979).

Kermit Roosevelt, however, rapidly devised a recovery plan. Four brigades still loyal to the royalists would carry out the arrests and occupy key strategic positions. To allow royalist forces to draw ammunition from carefully guarded secret armories without arousing suspicion, Roosevelt engineered a clever trap: Mossadeq would be maneuvered into calling those very brigades into the streets himself. The U.S. Ambassador tactfully emphasized to Iranian officials how law enforcement had failed to protect American lives amid enraged crowds who were destroying statues of the royal family and publicly denouncing the Shah and Western influence. Although some of the public reaction was a spontaneous response to the failed coup attempt, coup agents strategically fanned the unrest from behind the scenes and encouraged the demonstrations (Lee, 2013).

On August 19, the Premier himself began calling non-law enforcement units into the streets to help restore order, starting with the Imperial Guards. His core supporters from Tudeh and the National Front held back and did not mobilize. The royalist guards then executed the coup. They seized communications centers, released detained royalists, and proceeded with the arrest of key ministers and the Chief of Staff. Twenty-seven tanks surrounded the Premier's residence. Mossadeq was arrested within a few hours. The coup was declared a success.

References

Contini, C. (2013). A Realistic View on Iran: International Relations and Global Politics. GRIN Verlag.

De Seve, M. (2020). Operation Ajax: The Story of the CIA Coup that Remade the Middle East. Verso Books.

Fowler, R. (2018). More Than a Doctrine: The Eisenhower Era in the Middle East. University of Nebraska Press.

Lee, C. T. (2013). A Cold War narrative: The covert coup of Mohammad Mossadeq, role of the U.S. press and its haunting legacies. Senior Theses, Trinity College, Hartford, CT.

Levin, Y. A. (2018). Operation Ajax in the CIA analytics: Colonial knowledge in postcolonial age. Samara Journal of Science, 7(2), 200–203.

Luce, D. D. (2017, September 20). The specter of Operation Ajax. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2003/aug/20/foreignpolicy.iran

Merica, D., & Hanna, J. (2013). In declassified document, CIA acknowledges role in '53 Iran coup. CNN News. Retrieved June 15, 2020.

Roosevelt, K. (1979). Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran. McGraw-Hill.