F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: Cost, Development, and Variants

Introduction and Program Overview

The F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is being developed by Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company for the U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps, as well as the UK Royal Navy. The fighter is described as a "stealthy, supersonic, multirole fighter" built in three variants: (1) a conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) aircraft for the U.S. Air Force; (2) a carrier variant (CV) for the U.S. Navy; and (3) a short takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL) aircraft for the U.S. Marine Corps and the Royal Navy (American Federation of Scientists, 2010). The concept demonstration phase is reported to have begun in November 1996, when contracts were awarded to Boeing and Lockheed Martin for the construction of demonstrator aircraft in each of the three configurations.

The research questions guiding this study are as follows:

(1) Is this aircraft worth the money?

Research Questions

(2) Will the F-35 be able to replace the current combat aircraft in the existing inventory?

(3) Is it necessary to replace the current proven inventory?

Program Costs and Congressional Scrutiny

(4) Will the defense budget be able to support the 13 planes currently in production?

(5) Will the F-35 be a good fit for all branches of the military?

On November 22, 2010, the Department of Defense reported that it had reviewed the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, described as the DOD's most expensive weapon system. A Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) met at the Pentagon to examine a program that had experienced continuous changes in an effort to meet deadlines and cost estimates. Estimates place the total cost of the F-35 program in excess of $380 billion (Keyes, 2010). Despite "newly discovered issues of concern," officials stated that the program "will be the backbone of… TACAIR (tactical air) for decades to come," while acknowledging that "more software code" needed to be written than was originally anticipated (Keyes, 2010).

According to Wolf (2010), the Pentagon announced that Lockheed Martin would produce 10 F-35A conventional takeoff and landing models for the U.S. Air Force, 16 F-35B short takeoff/vertical landing variants for the U.S. Marine Corps, four F-35C aircraft-carrier variants for the U.S. Navy, and one F-35B for the British Navy. Lockheed Martin is the Pentagon's top supplier by sales, and previous production contracts had been awarded on a cost-plus basis, which allows a contractor to shift certain cost overruns to the government (Wolf, 2010). The Pentagon's top arms buyer, Ashton Carter, was preparing to review the F-35 program as part of determining the fiscal year 2012 budget. The program was projected at a cost of $382 billion for 2,443 aircraft over two decades (Wolf, 2010). Secretary of Defense Robert Gates added 13 months to the program's development phase, withheld $614 million in potential award fees to Lockheed Martin, and dismissed the Marine Corps major general who had been running the program (Wolf, 2010).

Gertler (2010), in F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, notes that the Senate Appropriations Committee funded 32 F-35s on September 16, 2010, which was 10 fewer aircraft than the administration had requested. The F-35 was "conceived as a relatively affordable fifth-generation strike fighter that could be procured in three highly common versions for the Air Force, the Marine Corps, and the Navy, so that the three services could avoid the higher costs of developing, procuring, and operating and supporting three separate tactical aircraft designs to meet their similar but not identical operational needs" (Gertler, 2010).

A key concern for Congress regarding the F-35 program involves affordability, particularly in the context of projected shortfalls in both Air Force fighters and Navy and Marine Corps strike fighters. As the annual production rate increases, "the program will require more than $10 billion per year in acquisition funding at the same time that DOD will face other budgetary challenges" (Gertler, 2010). The issue of F-35 affordability is part of a larger and longstanding concern about the overall affordability of DOD's tactical aircraft modernization effort, which also includes procurement of F/A-18E/Fs through at least FY2012. Some observers concerned about affordability have suggested procuring upgraded F-16s as complements or substitutes for F-35As for the Air Force, and F/A-18E/Fs as complements or substitutes for F-35Cs for the Navy. F-35 supporters counter that F-16s and F/A-18E/Fs are less capable than the F-35 and that the F-35 is designed to have reduced life-cycle costs (Gertler, 2010).

The House, under Items of Special Interest in Aircraft Procurement, reported that the budget request included $94.2 million for modifications to the F-35, of which $86.6 million was designated for "the procurement of 25 kits to retrofit 25 low-rate initial production (LRIP) F-35A aircraft to the block three configuration." However, because the F-35 schedule had been revised and completion of block three hardware and software components was not expected until 2015, the committee held that the request to procure retrofit kits was premature (Gertler, 2010). The committee recommended a reduction to $7.6 million — a cut of $86.6 million — for funding modifications to the F-35A JSF.

The budget request also included $1,887.0 million in Aircraft Procurement, Navy (APN) to purchase six JSF aircraft for the Navy; $2,576.1 million in APN for 13 JSF aircraft for the Marine Corps; and $3,896.2 million in Aircraft Procurement, Air Force (APAF) for 22 JSF aircraft for the Air Force. The budget request for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) included $204.9 million in APAF for one F-35A to replace a legacy aircraft lost in combat operations (Gertler, 2010). Tiron (2010) further reports that the F-35 "has undergone significant reshaping as a result of ballooning costs and development delays," and that "the cost of the program has risen to $382.4 billion, a 65% increase from the projected costs in 2002."