How Superpowers Used Korea as a Cold War Chessboard

Introduction

The closing decade of the 20th century witnessed the end of the Cold War as the Soviet Union collapsed and its former Warsaw Pact allies flocked to join their former enemies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The end of the Cold War also resulted in the United States emerging as the world's only remaining superpower, but the 21st century promises to truly be the "Century of Asia," with China taking the lead. The Russian bear that played such a crucial role in the Cold War is down, but it is certainly not out and stands to play an important role as an emerging superpower in the future as well.

These outcomes were the result, at least in part, of how these three countries prosecuted their respective Cold War strategies during the 20th century, beginning most notably on the Korean peninsula during the early 1950s following the division of Korea into the north and south constituents that remain in place today. In fact, the stalemate that was reached in the form of an armistice after three years of bloody warfare placed the belligerents essentially back where they were before the Korean War began, causing many observers to wonder what the struggle was all about in the first place. To gain some additional insights into the rationale used to support military intervention in Korea, this study reviews the relevant peer-reviewed and scholarly literature to examine how the two Koreas were used essentially as pawns on the larger Cold War chessboard by the United States, China, and the Soviet Union to further their own political and military agendas. A summary of the research and important findings are presented in the conclusion.

Background and Overview of the Korean War

According to Sandler, "The Korean War (25 June 1950 to 27 July 1953) emphatically marked the end of the post-Second World War era" (1999, p. 3). The end of this era also marked the end of the allied powers that had brought about a successful conclusion to the greatest war the world had ever known, which consisted primarily of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, with China playing a more strategic, regionalized role during the conflict (Sandler 1999). The events that unfolded following the end of World War II, though, would soon have these former allies facing each other on the field of battle, albeit in a proxy fashion. For instance, Jasper reports that "On June 25, 1950, Communist North Korean forces backed by the Soviet Union and Red China swept across the 38th Parallel in a massive invasion of South Korea. The lightly armed South Korean defenders and their American advisers quickly fell back before the much larger, better equipped Red Army. All of the Korean Peninsula would soon have fallen to Stalin's Korean troops, except for the intervention of U.S.-led Allied forces. Americans, the majority of whom probably could not locate Korea on a world map, were soon to pay a terrible price in blood, treasure, national sovereignty, and world standing for this Asian venture" (2003, p. 19).

Few observers at the time could have predicted the long-term consequences of this military action. In this regard, Guo and Ren emphasize that "this seemingly local dispute quickly developed into the biggest international conflict since the Second World War" (2003, p. 274). The international nature of the Korean War was amplified further when the United States succeeded in gaining United Nations (UN) assistance to repel the North Korean forces from south of the 38th parallel (Sandler 1999). Patterson, Schamel, and Potter report that:

"On June 25, 1950, the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) invaded South Korea. NKPA troops launched a coordinated attack at several strategic points along the 38th parallel and headed south toward Seoul. In the absence of the Soviet representative, who had walked out of the United Nations Security Council earlier in the year, the Council condemned the invasion and called for UN member nations to assist South Korea. Fearing that Communist China, and possibly the Soviet Union, had encouraged the attack (Kim had, in fact, persuaded both Stalin and Mao Zedong to support the invasion), President Harry S. Truman quickly committed American forces to the combined United Nations effort and named General Douglas MacArthur to be Commander in Chief of UN Forces. Although fifteen other UN nations contributed to the war effort, the United States took the lead both in strategy and firepower" (2000, p. 441).

Notwithstanding the conflicting reports concerning which side was primarily responsible for the outbreak of hostilities, most observers in the West blamed North Korea and, to a lesser extent, the Soviet Union for approving the action. As Casey emphasizes, "In Korea, the pretext for war seemed clear cut, at least in the early stages, for the United States was responding to a brazen case of Communist aggression and was fully supported by the United Nations" (2005, p. 691).

Even before the United States and its UN allies were lining up to go to war once again, the North Korean leadership had been soliciting approval and support from the Soviet Union to prosecute such a military action. Although the "official" accounts of the Korean War place the blame squarely on the North Koreans, documentary evidence indicates that there had been a series of military incursions by both North Korea and South Korea — the latter supported by the United States — for several months prior to the outbreak of full-scale hostilities (Sandler 1999). Roe reports that "Since the founding of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in September 1948, Kim Il Sung had sought support from his Soviet sponsors for the reunification of Korea by force. In China, Mao Zedong concurrently sought Joseph Stalin's support for the invasion of Taiwan" (2000, p. 25). Fritz further notes that "recent releases of Soviet documents on their involvement in the Korean War have brought a sea change in our knowledge of these activities. Kim Il Sung, North Korea's leader, made several pleas to Stalin to support a North Korean invasion of South Korea to reunite the country" (2004, p. 63). Initially, Stalin was worried that such a unilateral military action would prompt a response by the United States; however, by the end of 1949, after the U.S. had withdrawn all of its military forces from the Korean peninsula, Stalin felt assured that the United States would regard a military action by North Korea as a localized matter and remain out of the conflict (Fritz 2004). Despite these initial misgivings and his reluctant approval thereafter, Stalin continued to insist that China support Kim during the conflict (Fritz 2004).

The veracity of these claims is further supported by documents confirming that Stalin was hesitant to approve either the North Korean plans or the Chinese plans to invade Taiwan for much the same reason: the potential for U.S. response and involvement. According to Roe, "Stalin was reluctant to assist either effort. Both ventures would improve his strategic position and further isolate China and Korea from the United States, but Stalin feared provoking an American declaration of war" (1999, p. 192). Following his trips to Moscow in late 1949 and early 1950, the North Korean leader succeeded in persuading Stalin that his military forces were capable of overwhelming the South Korean forces so quickly that the United States would be unable to mount a defense (Roe 1999). Consequently, Stalin approved of North Korea's plans, providing the North Korean leadership could also gain the support of China (Roe 1999). From a tactical perspective, Roe suggests that Stalin had never been more mistaken: "It has to be considered one of Stalin's most interesting missteps — approving an attack at the one place in the world where the United States had significant troop strength close at hand. Just across the Tsushima Strait in Japan were four U.S. infantry divisions — far from ready, but available nevertheless" (2000, p. 25).

Not only did the U.S. have more than 40,000 troops and the materiel to support them positioned strategically nearby, Stalin also failed to consider the potential for a response by United Nations forces. Despite the multinational force deployed under the UN flag, the lion's share of the military forces was drawn from the United States. As Prince emphasizes, "Although the Korean War was fought under the banner of the United Nations, the ostensibly overwhelming predominance of American decision-makers has led most standard American history texts to treat the conflict as a purely American one. Even if one rejects this oversimplified American view, the central importance of U.S. forces in nearly all aspects of the UN Korean effort is undeniable" (1999, p. 129).

The Cold War began as a struggle for hegemony between former World War II allies, but the Korean War once again introduced an international quality to the scenario. According to Sandler, "With American, British, French, Dutch, Canadian, Australian, New Zealand, South African, Greek, Turkish, Filipino and Thai troops actually engaged in combat with Communist forces, the Cold War seemed obviously to have taken on a new and far more bitter dimension, and indeed might no longer even merit the term 'Cold War'" (1999, p. 3). Despite the active involvement of U.S. military forces, and subsequently the Communist Chinese as well, the conflict was regarded as a proxy war in which the Cold War was replaced with a shooting war for its duration. This is supported by Sandler's observation that "despite the fact that a small segment of the Soviet Union actually bordered North Korea and although the Korean War was a reflection of the global Soviet-U.S. confrontation, both superpowers punctiliously avoided direct combat with each other. The only shooting between military forces of the U.S. and the Soviet Union were the one-sided downings of about one dozen American military aircraft around the periphery of the U.S.S.R." (1999, p. 3). As a matter of fact, the United States and the Soviet Union managed to avoid escalating the conflict beyond the confines of the Korean peninsula in an apparently mutually agreeable fashion. Sandler adds that "so far as is known, no Soviet aircraft were ever shot down by the U.S. Air Force outside of Korea itself and its surrounding waters; intruders were merely 'shouldered aside' even though they regularly violated the airspace of the United States and its allies" (1999, p. 3).

For the combatants on the ground, the story was slightly different. The United Nations Command, the North Korean People's Army (NKPA), and the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) were all vitally concerned about the logistics involved in waging such a war, and the events that immediately followed the official outbreak of hostilities confirmed their worst fears (Shrader 1995). According to Shrader, "The North Korean People's Army (NKPA) forces that invaded the Republic of Korea (ROK) on 25 June 1950 were well trained and well equipped but unprepared for an extended campaign or the intensive interdiction effort mounted against them by United Nations Command forces" (1995, p. 3).

The Role of the Soviet Union in the Korean War

At first, the North Korean forces enjoyed victory after victory against the Republic of Korea and American forces and succeeded in driving them to the Pusan perimeter (Shrader 1995). Following the rapid mobilization of additional forces by the U.S. and UN, the situation on the peninsula changed dramatically, and South Korean and UN Command forces succeeded in driving the North Koreans — whose supply lines had been stretched razor thin by the incursion so far south — back past the 38th parallel and beyond (Shrader 1995). These UN-led victories continued until the Chinese Communist forces intervened in October–November 1950 (Shrader 1995). The events that would transpire over the next two years confirmed the analogy of Korea as a chessboard on which these international players sought to achieve their respective political and military goals.

The overwhelming — and not entirely inaccurate — perception that existed at the outbreak of the Korean War in the West, and which largely remains in place today, was that it was a unilateral act of aggression on the part of North Korea against South Korea, an action believed to have the full support and approval of the Soviet Union (Sandler 1999). What appears to have been almost entirely inaccurate, though, was the perception among Western leaders concerning what the military action by the North Koreans actually meant on the global stage. According to Sandler, "Western leaders remained convinced throughout the war that Korea was a mere diversion, a 'side-show' to distract attention from the real target of Soviet ambition: Western Europe" (1999, p. 4). To their credit, policymakers in the West were correct about the North Koreans' hostile intentions with regard to invading and conquering South Korea to reunify the country under Communist rule; however, the rest of the perceptions concerning the military action were misguided and misplaced. Sandler also points out that "there is no evidence whatsoever that this aggression was plotted with the object of diverting the democracies from the defense of Western Europe, which is not to say that Stalin, for one, did not welcome the diversion of men and weapons to Korea that might have gone to Western Europe" (1999, p. 4). Although the role of the Soviet Union was not as large as that played by China and the United States, it is apparent that it had a great deal at stake in the Korean War as well.

Although the United States, together with the two Koreas and China, were the primary combatants during the Korean War, the Soviet Union was not idle during the conflict. According to Pierpaoli (2001), newly discovered documentary evidence from the former Soviet archives, as well as Chinese and American sources, has further illuminated the role and motivations behind Soviet involvement in the war. In this regard, Weathersby notes that "as long as the Soviet Union existed, Moscow and its allies in the war effort, North Korea and China, maintained a united front of secrecy about the conflict, closely adhering to their early declarations about its causes and origins" (2005, p. 173). Although the Korean War was the focus of a great deal of scholarship even during and after its stalemated conclusion, a number of questions remained unanswered concerning the Soviet Union's role. According to Weathersby, "Over the years, historians learned much about the South Korean-United Nations side of the war, but some of the most basic questions about the conflict remained unanswerable. Now, with the post-Cold War opening of important archives in the former Soviet Union and China, scholars are dramatically rewriting the history of the war" (1999, p. 91).

The net effect of these newly discovered and released documents was to confirm that the Soviet Union played a pivotal role in the Korean War — first by giving its permission for the invasion by North Korea and then by allowing its erstwhile ally, China, to bear much of the brunt of the conflict. This may not be all that surprising given Stalin's experiences during World War II, when the German offensive sapped Soviet manpower and resources while the Allied forces coordinated a D-Day invasion. What is known is that "Chinese and Russian sources verify that Mao and Stalin formed their Sino-Soviet alliance of friendship and security during Mao's visit to Moscow from December 1949 to February 1950" (Brune 2005, p. 173). Beyond this, few facts were certain until several decades after the official cessation of armed hostilities, when the Soviet role became clearer. According to Jian, "One of the most mysterious aspects of Mao's visit to the Soviet Union has been its connection with the Korean question. Did Mao and Stalin discuss the Korean problem during Mao's visit? Was the coming of the Korean War in any way related to the Sino-Soviet alliance?" (Brune 2005, p. 173). One of the few sources available prior to the release of new documentary evidence was the testimony of former Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev, who confirmed that Mao and Stalin discussed North Korea's plans to conquer South Korea and thereby unify the peninsula in late 1949 or early 1950 (Brune 2005). In his personal account of the visit, Khrushchev related that:

"At the end of 1949, Kim Il Sung arrived with his delegation to hold consultation with Stalin. The North Koreans wanted to prod South Korea with the point of a bayonet. Kim Il Sung said that the first thrust would touch off an internal explosion in South Korea and that the power of the people would prevail…. Stalin persuaded Kim Il Sung to think it over again, make some calculations, and then come back with a concrete plan. Kim went home and then returned to Moscow when he had worked everything out. He told Stalin he was absolutely certain of success. I remember Stalin had his doubts. He feared that the Americans would jump in, but we were inclined to think that if the war were fought swiftly — and Kim Il Sung was sure that it could be won swiftly — then intervention by the U.S.A. could be avoided. Nevertheless, Stalin decided to ask Mao Zedong's opinion about Kim Il Sung's suggestion…. Mao Zedong also answered affirmatively. He approved Kim Il Sung's suggestion and put forward the opinion that the U.S.A. would not interfere since the war would be an internal matter which the Korean people would decide for themselves." (quoted in Jian 1994, p. 86)

The release of additional documentary evidence in recent years has largely confirmed Khrushchev's version of these events. Documents from Russia, China, and various Korean sources support his account of the events that led up to the Korean War. According to Jian, "Khrushchev's description of Zhou Enlai's secret visit to the Soviet Union after the UN landing at Inchon, for example, is compatible with new Chinese sources even in small details" (1994, p. 86). One of the fundamental questions that remained unanswered following the signing of the Armistice in 1953 was Stalin's reluctance to proceed with the war given his doubts about the anticipated American response. As Weathersby points out, "Until the Russian documents were released, it was not known just how far Stalin was willing to go to avoid a direct military confrontation with the United States" (1999, p. 92). The newly released documentary evidence clearly indicates that Stalin was more than satisfied to allow his Chinese and North Korean proxies to bleed the Americans and their UN allies unless and until the confrontation escalated to the point where Soviet and American troops would become directly involved. As Weathersby emphasizes, "The documents reveal that at the end of two weeks of hard bargaining in early October 1950, when it appeared that Beijing would not send its troops to North Korea to stop MacArthur's rapid advance, the Soviet leader ordered the North Korean army to evacuate the country and withdraw to Chinese and Soviet territory. He was not going to pit Soviet forces against the Americans" (1999, p. 92).

The implications of this order by Stalin were not significant in terms of its overall effect on the prosecution of the war; however, Stalin's reluctance to commit Soviet troops directly had a profound effect on the North Korean leadership. According to Weathersby, "Stalin rescinded his order as soon as he received word of Mao's final decision to intervene, but its impact on Kim Il Sung could not be so easily erased. Nor could the effects of Stalin's insistence that North Korea continue to meet its export quotas for minerals and other items to the Soviet Union during the war. The subsequent evolution of Kim Il Sung's aggressively xenophobic worldview was also shaped by Stalin's approach to the armistice negotiations" (1999, p. 92). Clearly, the actions taken by the various leaders had far-reaching consequences, even if those long-term implications were not fully discernible at the time.

After the hostilities reached a stalemate in 1951, Stalin issued orders to both the North Korean and Chinese leadership to closely reevaluate their respective positions, noting that the United States was in a disadvantageous position compared to the Communist forces and might be amenable to a negotiated settlement. These orders were based on Stalin's view that the Korean War was benefiting the Soviet Union so long as it did not escalate further. Weathersby notes that "as long as the danger of an American advance toward the Soviet border could be avoided, Stalin apparently reasoned, the advantages the war brought the Soviet Union — keeping the American military bogged down in Asia while yielding valuable intelligence about its capabilities — outweighed the disadvantages" (1999, p. 92). The callous disregard for human life demonstrated by this position was made abundantly clear when Stalin rebuked the Chinese foreign minister concerning their lack of aggressiveness in prosecuting the war. Weathersby adds that "even though the North Koreans, enduring heavy bombing by the U.S. Air Force, were willing in early 1952 to conclude an armistice, and the Chinese were likewise inclined by that fall, Stalin continued until his death in March 1953 to insist on a hard line. As he explained to Chinese foreign minister Zhou Enlai, 'the North Koreans have lost nothing, except for casualties that they suffered during the war'" (1999, p. 92).

Documents released from the former Soviet archives also demonstrate that President Dwight D. Eisenhower's threats in May 1953 to use nuclear weapons against North Korea were not the prevailing reason for the Communist forces ultimately reaching a negotiated settlement; rather, it was the death of the primary instigator that provided this opportunity. According to Weathersby, "Immediately after Stalin's death, his uncertain successors, concerned about the precariousness of their own rule (before Nikita Khrushchev's emergence), decided to bring the war to an end. When the armistice was signed, on July 27, 1953, more than 33,000 Americans and millions of North and South Korean soldiers and civilians lay dead" (1999, p. 92).

Following the signing of the Armistice, the North Korean leadership used the episode to reinforce the need for militarization for self-defense purposes, citing the hostile actions of the American-led UN coalition. Importantly, Weathersby also emphasizes that "North Korea also suffered at the hands of its closest allies. Indeed, the malign effects of Stalin's policies toward Pyongyang must be rated an important legacy of the war" (1999, p. 92). Newly discovered documentary evidence also indicates that this legacy had far-reaching effects. When the North Korean leadership determined that they could not depend on the Soviet Union for direct support, their doctrinal views shifted from reliance on Russia and China to one of self-reliance, an approach known as "Juche" (Weathersby 1999). The impact of this self-reliance approach has caused the so-called "Hermit Kingdom" to retreat further into isolation from the international community — only now it possesses nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles in its arsenal. As Weathersby sums it up, "When the Soviet Union finally collapsed, North Korea was left not only without an important source of support but without an understanding of normal relations with other states — or even an understanding that such relations can exist. That impossible legacy is an important reason why North Korea retains a prominent place near the top of American security concerns" (1999, p. 92).

Conclusion

The research showed that although it was ostensibly a civil war between two rival factions, the Korean War was in reality an extension of the Cold War that involved the United States, China, and the Soviet Union. Newly released and discovered documentation from the belligerents involved has provided clear evidence of the complicity of the Soviet Union, China, and the United States in orchestrating the conflict in Korea to satisfy their own political and military agendas — both regionally and in the larger global context in which the Cold War was being waged. While there was plenty of blame to go around in the prosecution of the Korean War, there was enough intrigue and behind-the-scenes maneuvering to make the precise placement of blame difficult. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to conclude that the respective versions of the events that led to the Korean War and its prosecution for three bloody years are all flawed in some respects, and that the truth lies somewhere between the lines.