FBI Counterproliferation and WMD Nonproliferation Strategy

Introduction: WMD Policy in the Post-9/11 Era

The United States government significantly increased activities in programs aimed at protecting the nation and the world against weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in 2009 and 2010. The Obama Administration, in December 2009, issued a presidential policy directive aimed at countering biological threats, with a focus on infectious illnesses whether such threats were man-made or natural. It was the second such directive the Administration had issued. The Quadrennial Defense Review in 2010 emphasized how WMD proliferation posed a threat to global security. In April of that same year, the Administration declassified the Nuclear Posture Review for the first time and released it alongside the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. The treaty was aimed at lowering the number of deployable U.S. and Russian weapons. Representatives from across the world met in May with the goal of renewing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty — a treaty whose purpose is the progressive reduction and eventual elimination of the number of states possessing nuclear weapons (Mauroni 2010, 58).

The race for nonproliferation began during the Cold War. During that era, conflict theory was relatively rational and enemies were well-defined. After 9/11, concerns about nuclear weapons began shifting from the aggressive acts of nation-states to the possibility that terrorist actors could seize control of existing stockpiles in order to cause harm. Nevertheless, even though the push for nonproliferation began during the Cold War, the regime has not modernized at a rate fast enough to keep pace with growing threats. Counterterrorism and nonproliferation have not yet converged into a single integrated field, and this disconnect has slowed efforts to eliminate the chances of terrorist attacks using WMD (Jennings 2013, 1).

Preventative actions by nations have predominantly focused on nuclear threats. Biological and chemical threats did not receive comparable attention until after the first Gulf War in the 1980s, which pitted Iran against the Iraqi Kurds (Pilat 2009, 15). The threat from non-state actors is real: it is primarily these actors, rather than nation-states, who have carried out biological and chemical attacks. In 2006–2007, Iraqi insurgents combined chlorine with traditional explosive devices in an attempt to maximize casualties. While the attack injured hundreds of people and caused fatalities, it was not as lethal as the insurgents had hoped, largely due to suboptimal delivery systems.

A few days after 9/11, an anthrax attack in Washington, D.C. killed five people and infected 17 others. According to the FBI's account, the investigation was one of the most complex operations the bureau had ever faced. The investigation ultimately concluded that the perpetrator acted alone and was a government scientist employed at a biodefense laboratory. Experts who reviewed images from the attack and conducted subsequent testing concluded that the anthrax powders had not been weaponized.

Nations of the world have established policies as well as legal and political networks to regulate the production of WMDs and related materials at both national and international levels. They have also put in place frameworks to control the spread of such weapons through trade measures designed to regulate the exchange of related items by both state and non-state parties (Busch & Joyner 2009, 1). Generally, the nonproliferation regime is built as a network of security commitments, assurances, agreements, norms, voluntary controls, treaties, multilateral alliances, and bilateral alliances — networks developed over the past sixty years (Reiss 2009, ix).

Evolving Threats and the Limits of Nonproliferation

As threats grow, new categories such as agroterrorism are capturing the attention of the general public and defense experts alike. Agroterrorism involves attacking agricultural targets using biological agents. These attacks can produce tremendous health and economic effects, as demonstrated by the outbreaks of "mad cow" and foot-and-mouth diseases in Europe — even in scenarios where the spread of such diseases is organic rather than deliberately engineered. Attacks of this nature carry the potential to cause significant social and economic disruption and to infect humans with diseases that may be extremely difficult to contain. The current consensus is that it is not possible to guarantee total protection against agroterrorism, given how widespread the opportunities and targets for such attacks are. Therefore, the most effective remedy is a detection system capable of identifying attacks quickly and containing them before they cause widespread harm (Cameron, Pate & Vogel 2001, 38).

It may be easier to develop biological and chemical weapons than nuclear weapons. This point is illustrated by the concept of latency, as articulated by Ambassador Ronald Lehman of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories. He explained that it is easier to attain the latent capability to produce chemical or biological weapons than to attain the equivalent capability to produce nuclear weapons.

There appears to be a gap between the theory surrounding the nonproliferation regime and its real-world application in the prevention of WMD terrorism. Experts in terrorist activities and scholars focusing on nonproliferation have operated within two distinct paradigms when assessing the same threats. One group examined the threat through a nation-state paradigm while the other approached it through a criminality and security paradigm. While nonproliferation and WMD discussions are essentially two sides of the same coin, they have historically been treated as though they have little relationship to one another. Even at the policy level, the two are still run as separate missions, creating a disconnect in strategy and implementation that can be readily exploited by terrorist actors.

Research Questions and Significance

This paper examines the ways in which the nonproliferation regime can be improved to collaborate more effectively with homeland security, both as a means of improving counterterrorism strategy and policy, and as a way of revising domestic and international protocols to account for new threats from non-state actors.

Primary Research Question: In what ways can the nonproliferation regime connect and collaborate with homeland security in order to improve counterterrorism strategy?

Secondary Questions:

First, in what ways can revisions be made to domestic and international protocols so that they reflect the magnitude of threats posed by non-state actors? Second, is there a place for traditional tools of diplomacy in sound counterterrorism strategy, and in what ways can the United States use diplomatic strategy to prevent domestic terrorism? Third, how can investments be optimally directed toward counterproliferation programs to improve homeland security?

The significance of these questions lies in the evident gap between nonproliferation theory and real-world counterterrorism application. Without integrating the two fields, critical vulnerabilities will remain.

References

Busch, Nathan, and Joyner, Daniel (eds.). 2009. "Introduction: Nonproliferation at a Crossroads." In Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Future of Nonproliferation Policy. Athens, GA: The University of Georgia Press.

Cameron, Gavin, Pate, Jason, and Vogel, Kathleen. 2001. "Planting Fear: How Real Is the Threat of Agricultural Terrorism?" Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 57(5), 38–44.

Jennings, Elain. 2013. U.S. Proliferation Policy and the Campaign Against Transnational Terror: Linking the U.S. Non-Proliferation Regime to Homeland Security Efforts. Master's Thesis. Naval Postgraduate School.

Levi, Michael. 2009. On Nuclear Terrorism. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Mauroni, Albert J. 2010. "A Counter-WMD Strategy for the Future." Parameters, 58–73.

Ogilvie-White, Tanya. 2008. "Facilitating Implementation of Resolution 1540 in South-East Asia and the South Pacific." In Implementing Resolution 1540: The Role of Regional Organizations, edited by Lawrence Scheinman. New York: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.

Pilat, Joseph F. 2009. "Dealing with Proliferation and Terrorism." In Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Future of International Nonproliferation Policy, edited by Nathan E. Busch and Daniel H. Joyner. Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press.

Reiss, Mitchell. 2009. "Foreword." In Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Future of Nonproliferation Policy, edited by Nathan Busch and Daniel Joyner. Athens, GA: The University of Georgia Press.