Free Will, Divine Foreknowledge, and Determinism
This paper explores the philosophical and theological tension between human free will and divine foreknowledge within the Christian tradition, with additional attention to secular determinism. Drawing on Augustine's and Anselm's accounts—as explained by Christine Murray and Katherin A. Rogers—alongside Norman Swartz's modern compatibilist perspective, the paper argues that the apparent paradox dissolves when the scale of divine foreknowledge is not reduced to the level of individual human choice. Swartz's analogy between cosmic determinism and everyday human decision-making provides a framework for reconciling free will with both an all-knowing God and the predetermined laws of nature.
- Introduction: The Paradox of Free Will and Divine Foreknowledge: Frames the tension between foreknowledge and free choice
- Augustine and the Nature of the Human Will: Augustine's distinction between good and lesser good
- Anselm's Expanded View on Free Will and Grace: Anselm's compatibilism and human choice for salvation
- Swartz on Free Will, Determinism, and Scale: Swartz compares cosmic determinism with human freedom
- Problems with Individualizing Divine Foreknowledge: Critique of arbitrariness in individualized predestination
- Reconciling Free Will with Divine Foreknowledge: Swartz's scale argument resolves the paradox
- Conclusion: Free will and foreknowledge are compatible at proper scale
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What makes this paper effective
- The paper clearly frames its central paradox in the opening paragraph and returns to it consistently throughout, giving the argument a tight, unified structure.
- It balances theological sources (Augustine, Anselm) against a modern secular-compatible framework (Swartz), showing awareness of how historical context shapes philosophical argument.
- The critique of individualizing divine foreknowledge is original and pointed, demonstrating genuine evaluative thinking rather than mere summary.
Key academic technique demonstrated
The paper uses comparative analysis across multiple thinkers to build toward a synthesized position. Rather than simply reporting what each theorist says, the writer identifies points of agreement and tension among Augustine, Anselm, and Swartz, then uses those comparisons to justify a preferred conclusion. This move—surveying the literature to reveal a gap and then filling it—is a core technique in philosophical and theological writing.
Structure breakdown
The paper opens with the theological paradox, then unpacks Augustine's and Anselm's positions through secondary commentators (Murray and Rogers). Swartz's compatibilist framework is introduced as a counterweight. The essay then turns critical, identifying weaknesses in the older accounts before building toward a resolution grounded in Swartz's scale argument. A brief conclusion restates the thesis and its implications for contemporary faith.
Introduction: The Paradox of Free Will and Divine Foreknowledge
The issue of free will and divine foreknowledge creates a somewhat problematic paradox for Christians. At the basis of the dilemma is the question: if God knows beforehand the outcomes of everything on earth, can free will even be said to exist? Human beings would appear to have no real choice if everything has been preordained. No matter what choices they seem to make, preordination appears to reduce human beings to little more than automatons carrying out the divine will. Augustine, however, disagrees with this conclusion, as do several modern authors. Indeed, specific denominations of the Christian faith, such as Catholicism, have very specific interpretations of free will and preordination. What makes the argument for free will even more interesting today is the addition of the secular concept of determinism, which also apparently excludes the idea of free will.
While the argument against free will therefore appears very strong on both the religious and the secular level, authors such as Augustine believe that free will does exist. Human beings make choices of their own volition, without being controlled by any forces other than themselves, their personalities, and possibly their circumstances. No universal or divine force appears to be at the heart of such choice. Augustine holds that, while God provides grace on the basis of foreknowledge, he provides human beings with free will to choose — not so much between good and evil as between good and "less good" (Murray).
After considering Augustine's argument for free will on the basis of explanatory writings such as those of Christine Murray and Katherin A. Rogers, Norman Swartz's work on the topic is examined to provide a balance of modern thinking regarding free will and divine foreknowledge. Swartz also includes a consideration of the secular manifestation of free will and how it relates to universal determinism. All the authors examined appear to agree that, in whatever form, free will does indeed exist — or at least appears to do so.
Augustine and the Nature of the Human Will
According to Murray, Augustine's view of free will begins with his observation that human beings indeed make choices of their own accord. He distinguishes between the "good will," which searches for God's truth and wisdom, and the will that clings to material things. According to Murray, the latter is "evil." Rogers appears to disagree with this term, stating that Augustine distinguishes between those who choose different degrees of "good." As such, choosing the material over the spiritual is not necessarily "evil," but it is not the greatest possible "good." Both choices are made out of free will, but the consequences differ.
Murray mentions, for example, that those choosing an attachment to the material rather than the spiritual are in danger of losing all that is important to them, while those choosing the higher good of the spiritual have the assurance that their most important treasure remains regardless of any earthly loss. While human beings therefore have the freedom to choose the most appealing path, a knowledge of the consequences may influence those choices.
Anselm's Expanded View on Free Will and Grace
Anselm of Canterbury expanded upon Augustine's views, and Katherin A. Rogers considers both thinkers' positions on the existence of free will and its compatibility with divine foreknowledge. Anselm also believes in the existence of free will and holds that it is the faculty ultimately responsible for choosing the earthly or heavenly good. According to Rogers, human beings choose to be saved; God knows which choices will be made but does not enforce them. Human beings are not aware in advance of which choices they will make, and therefore choose according to their will, the conditions surrounding the choice, and the consequences they view as being in their best interest.
Swartz on Free Will, Determinism, and Scale
This is also the premise for Norman Swartz's view on the existence of free will and its compatibility with divine foreknowledge. Swartz approaches the issue from a purely pragmatic viewpoint. In examining free will, he identifies two conditions necessary for it to operate: there must be two or more possibilities to choose from, and the choice must not be forced by any element or person outside of the person making it. If these two conditions are met, free will is in operation, and the human being is free to choose as he or she wishes.
Many have argued that the rules of law and morality, as well as the physical laws of nature and the many possible consequences of human choice, influence the will to such a degree that it is not truly free. Swartz offers the counterargument that being morally and legally responsible for making wise choices does not mean that free will is absent. It simply means that there are many influencing factors in the matter of choice, but certainly not that such choice is forced by any of them. Influencing factors simply help the human being to make the wisest possible choice.
The same holds true when considering the divine factor within free will. Human beings have the free will to choose between degrees of good, and this does not negate the fact of foreknowledge. Nor does divine foreknowledge mean that there is no real choice. Swartz refutes both the idea that foreknowledge precludes free will and the idea that free will means there is no all-knowing God. He appears to view both positions as limited, and notes the unfortunate influence these views can have over individual lives.
Swartz compares the religious view of free will in relation to an all-knowing God with that of free will and determinism in nature. The course and laws of the natural world are predetermined — science has demonstrated this. However, the fact that the universe will end millions of years from now does not mean that human beings lack the freedom to make choices. The scales are vastly different and do not undermine each other. This is Swartz's central point: divine foreknowledge simply does not compare in scale to individual human free will in choosing what to believe. God does not decide what human beings should believe; he offers the choice and provides free will. The responsibility for making the choice is human.
Conclusion
When the scale of divine foreknowledge is reduced to the human scale, this creates a paradox that cannot be solved. Instead, divine foreknowledge should be seen for what it is — a force on a universal scale that can only be understood partially by the human mind. It is compatible with human free will because human beings are not forced by any means to make the choice for or against Christian salvation. For the contemporary religious environment, free will is more important than ever, and can be affirmed with greater confidence than the older, more paradox-laden frameworks allowed.
Bibliography
Murray, Christine. "St. Augustine and Free Will." Catholic Online, 27 Aug. 2004. http://www.catholic.org/featured/headline.php?ID=1282
Rogers, Katherin A. "Anselm on Grace and Free Will." The Saint Anselm Journal 2.2, Spring 2005. http://www.anselm.edu/library/SAJ/pdf/22Rogers.pdf
Swartz, Norman. "Notes on Free Will and Determinism." 7 Oct. 2004. http://www.sfu.ca/philosophy/swartz/freewill1.htm
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