This paper examines why a true world government is considered both infeasible and undesirable, drawing on scholarship by Anne-Marie Slaughter, Thomas G. Weiss, Gideon Rachman, and Gillian Tett. It distinguishes between world government — a state-like entity backed by enforceable law — and global governance, which provides government-like services in the absence of a single overarching authority. The paper also explores how globalization, the rise of the BRIC economies, and the shift toward new international actors complicate any one-size-fits-all approach to world order. Key themes include the limits of international compliance mechanisms, the lessons of history, and why global governance frameworks are more realistic than formal world government.
According to Anne-Marie Slaughter, "world government is both infeasible and undesirable," an assertion supported by the historical record as well as contemporary experience. This paper reviews the relevant literature to determine why a world government is unviable and to clarify the differences between a world government and global governance. A discussion of how these concepts relate to world order, globalization, international integration, and the rise of new actors is followed by a summary of key findings in the conclusion.
On the one hand, people need global institutions in an increasingly globalized marketplace. According to Slaughter, "Peoples and their governments around the world need global institutions to solve collective problems that can only be addressed on a global scale. They must be able to make and enforce global rules on a variety of subjects and through a variety of means" (2005, 292). On the other hand, global institutions such as the United Nations and various economic forums are markedly different from a true world government.
In this regard, Rachman reports that a world government would require far more than mere cooperation among countries. Rather, "It would be an entity with state-like characteristics, backed by a body of laws" (Rachman 2008, 1). The "United States of Europe" that has emerged in the form of the European Union could serve as a model for a world government, Rachman suggests, for several reasons:
First, the EU has a supreme court, a currency, thousands of pages of law, a large civil service, and the ability to deploy military force. Second, it is increasingly clear that the most difficult issues facing national governments are international in nature — including global warming, a global financial crisis, and a global war on terror. Third, it could, in principle, be done: the transport and communications revolutions have shrunk the world so that, for the first time in human history, world government of some sort is now technically possible.
The simple fact that something is possible, however, does not make it desirable. Rachman (2008, 1) adds that a change in the political atmosphere suggests that a "global governance" framework could emerge in the near future — a prospect that is discussed further below.
From a strictly pragmatic perspective, it is reasonable to suggest that most people do not want an overarching governmental framework that erodes their civil liberties and directs their day-to-day behavior. Indeed, some of the world's problems can be attributed to the manner in which arbitrary geopolitical lines have been drawn. In response, according to Weiss, mainstream thinking about international cooperation has "shifted decidedly away from beefing up the United Nations and other intergovernmental organizations and toward what many of us now call 'global governance'" (2009, 3).
When it comes to distinguishing between a one-world order as represented by a world government and the mechanisms required to sustain international commerce, the semantics become complex. Weiss points out that the term "governance" not only "represents the range of both informal and formal values, norms, practices, and institutions," but that "It is most useful to think of global governance at any moment as reflecting the capacity of the international system to provide government-like services in the absence of a world government" (2009, 3). From a modern perspective, it is unrealistic to suggest that it is possible to create the types of global frameworks needed to administer and sustain progress at the local level. The same tensions that underlie this problem caused one of the bloodiest conflicts in American history — the Civil War — and it would be similarly misguided to assume that a one-size-fits-all governance solution is available in today's increasingly globalized setting.
Weiss also notes that applying the notion of "governance" to the entire planet is "fundamentally misleading. It captures the gamut of interdependent relations in the absence of any overarching political authority and with institutions that exert little or no effective control. Quite a distinction exists, then, between the national and international species of governance" (2009, 3). This absence of a universal solution to humankind's needs is not new, but it does reflect changing views about which paradigms are best suited to the dynamic environment in which countries seek to advance their own interests — a process that frequently involves attenuating the interests of their neighbors.
Weiss emphasizes the core asymmetry: "Within a country, we have governance plus government which, whatever its shortcomings in Mexico or the United States, usually and predictably ensures effective authority and control. At the international level, governance is the whole story. We have governance minus government, which means virtually no capacity to ensure compliance with collective decisions" (2009, 3).
"Emerging economies complicate global governance models"
Fully 80 years after the Great Depression, some economists are pointing out that no one truly understands what fuels the global economy, and it may well be that Adam Smith was right all along. As globalization improves living standards for consumers in the developing world, it has become increasingly apparent that the "invisible hand" described by Smith will be the overriding factor in how and when innovations in global governance structures take place. As Tett notes, the BRIC nations are not alone in their push for greater participation in global prosperity, but they are at the vanguard of nations that will inevitably shape future governance structures. Tett estimates that "two billion people could join the global middle class by 2030, mainly from BRICs" (2010, 5).
It is reasonable to suggest that these increasingly affluent consumers in the BRIC nations will play a major role in determining what types of governance structures best suit their needs. This trend also highlights the dangers associated with any attempt to impose a uniform global government — reinforcing the conclusion that a one-size-fits-all approach is not only misguided but potentially destabilizing.
The research reviewed here makes clear that a true world government remains both infeasible and undesirable. The distinction between world government and global governance is critical: while the latter offers flexible, institution-based mechanisms for addressing collective international problems, the former would require a degree of legal authority and political compliance that no realistic international framework can currently provide. As globalization deepens and emerging economies such as the BRIC nations grow in influence, the need for adaptive, inclusive governance frameworks becomes more pressing — but the solution lies in strengthening global governance, not in pursuing the chimera of a single world government.
Rachman, Gideon. 2008, December 8. "And Now for a World Government." Financial Times.
Slaughter, Anne-Marie. 2005. "Government Networks, World Order and the L20." In Reforming from the Top: A Leaders' 20 Summit, edited by John English, Ramesh Thakur, and Andrew F. Cooper. Tokyo: United Nations University Press.
Tett, Gillian. 2010, January 15. "The Story of the Brics." Financial Times.
Weiss, Thomas G. 2009. "What Happened to the Idea of World Government?" Presidential Address, 50th Convention of the International Studies Association, New York, NY, February 16, 2009.
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