Cold War on the Periphery: U.S. Policy in South Asia

Introduction: The Cold War Beyond the Superpowers

When hearing the words "Cold War," what normally comes to mind are the events between the U.S.S.R. and the United States following World War II, including the arms race. Competition for the Third World was also part of this period, but it receives little attention by comparison. In his book Cold War on the Periphery, Robert McMahon explores in detail how the United States' alliance with Pakistan increased tensions between India and Pakistan and encouraged the Soviet Union to establish closer ties with India.

Truman Era: India, Pakistan, and Initial U.S. Calculations

In the 1940s, almost all of the Central Intelligence Agency's strategic studies concluded that the Indian subcontinent — including Pakistan — was of considerable importance to the United States. It comprised one-fifth of the world's population, had a land mass as large as Europe, and occupied a strategically significant geographical position. The CIA also noted the region's abundant resources: "It ranks first or second in world production of such critical materials of war as cotton, mica, manganese, monazite (a source of thorium), and beryl, and is a major source of raw materials, investment income, and carrying charges for the UK, thus strengthening the UK's and Western Europe's efforts toward the economic recovery essential to U.S. security" (13).

In 1947, when India and Pakistan were formed from former British colonies in South Asia, Pakistan took the majority-Muslim portion of British territory and India the predominantly Hindu portion. Jammu-Kashmir, with a majority Muslim population but a Hindu ruler, chose to join India. Many Muslims, as well as Pakistan, considered this decision illegal. Almost immediately, a war broke out between the two new nations. In 1949, the countries signed the Karachi Agreement, establishing a ceasefire line supervised by U.N. observers, though many questions remained unresolved.

Jawaharlal Nehru, prime minister of India and an advocate of the Socialistic Pattern of Society, visited the United States in 1949. President Truman and his administration had considered both India and Pakistan as possible partners. Not surprisingly, they concluded that India offered far more strategic clout than Pakistan. Special Adviser Philip C. Jessup judged India "the most solid associate in the Asian area" and called Nehru "outstandingly the most vital and influential person for the accomplishment of U.S. objectives in Asia" (35).

However, India made this potential partnership difficult. Nehru made clear that India needed help but not at a political cost. In 1948, he had bluntly conveyed his disdain for Pakistani claims when he told Secretary of State George C. Marshall that India's position on Kashmir was morally, legally, and practically correct. He denounced the so-called "gangsters from Pakistan" who had aided the tribal invasion of Kashmir and contrasted "the backward and theocratic nature of Pakistan" with the secular, democratic orientation of India. "India wished to develop a country wherein all elements of the population could share," he said, "whereas in Pakistan the underlying idea was the advancement of the most bigoted group of Moslems" (29).

Meanwhile, in other parts of the world, events heightened American anxieties about communist expansion. The Soviet Union conducted its first nuclear test, and the Communist Party seized control of the Chinese government.

Pakistani Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan sought to counter Nehru's Washington visit by accepting an invitation from Josef Stalin to visit the Soviet Union. U.S. Assistant Secretary McGhee, deeply concerned about a potential Pakistan-USSR alignment, suggested that Pakistan be invited to visit the United States instead. Unlike India, Pakistan was openly appreciative of American plans for South Asia. Given India's refusal to align with the West and Pakistan's advantageous geographical position, America began to seriously consider Pakistan as a second-best partner — though it was reluctant to sever ties with India or supply arms to Pakistan.