Intelligence Producers and Users: Lessons from Pearl Harbor

Introduction

The intelligence failure at Pearl Harbor is a compelling example of the need for those who produce intelligence to find new ways to make intelligence more accessible and user-friendly without sacrificing its accuracy, integrity, or usefulness. In the days before the attack, intelligence was arriving from a variety of sources, including intercepted Japanese diplomatic cables, radio intercepts, and reports from informants in Japan. However, this information was not properly disseminated to key decision-makers, resulting in a tragic misuse of resources and ultimately the loss of many lives.

In the years since Pearl Harbor, significant strides have been made in improving intelligence analysis and dissemination. Nevertheless, there is always room for improvement, and it is incumbent upon those who produce intelligence to find new ways to make their products more accessible and user-friendly without sacrificing accuracy or usefulness. The aim of this white paper is to demonstrate that those who produce intelligence must find new ways to make intelligence more accessible and user-friendly without sacrificing its accuracy, integrity, or usefulness — and that the Pearl Harbor failure stands as a clear illustration of that need.

The Interaction Between Intelligence Producers and Users

There is an important and dynamic interaction between those who produce intelligence and those who use it. Producers of intelligence — such as analysts and researchers — develop a deep understanding of the subject matter and of the methods used to collect and process information. Users of intelligence — such as policymakers and military commanders — rely on that understanding to make decisions. This interaction is essential to the development and effective application of intelligence.

Intelligence producers must have a thorough understanding of the subject matter. They use this understanding to develop hypotheses about how an adversary will act, and to build collection plans to gather information needed to test those hypotheses. Intelligence users, in turn, must have a clear understanding of the capabilities and limitations of intelligence, as well as the methods used to produce it. Without this understanding, they are unable to effectively use intelligence in decision-making.

There is a fundamental need for intelligence analysts to interact with those who are using the intelligence. Analysts must know what the users' requirements and needs are in order to provide relevant and timely intelligence. In addition, analysts must be able to explain the products they produce so that users can understand and act on them effectively. Users also need to trust analysts and feel confident that the intelligence they receive is accurate and reliable. Without this interaction, it is difficult for either party to succeed. The aim of this white paper is to show that without such interaction, both intelligence producers and intelligence users are likely to fall short of their respective goals.

The Problem: Complexity and Communication Gaps

The process of producing and disseminating intelligence is often complex and technical, making it difficult for non-experts to understand and use. This is particularly true of national security intelligence, which is often used by policymakers to make life-or-death decisions. The challenge is to find ways to make intelligence more accessible and user-friendly without sacrificing its accuracy or usefulness. One way to accomplish this is to provide decision-makers with clear and concise summaries of complex intelligence reports. Another possible solution is to develop better visualization tools that can help explain complicated concepts more clearly.

What compounds the problem is that intelligence gathering is fundamentally an art, and rendering that information to an audience is likely to generate different interpretations — just as any work of art is perceived differently by those who encounter it (Pillar, 2018). Those who use intelligence are likely to bring the same prior experiences, knowledge, and biases that any other person would bring when interacting with a message (Kretz, 2018). Intelligence can also be politicized in the way it is used (Betts, 2009).

The significance of this problem extends to all stakeholders of national security. If intelligence information is not properly shared with policymakers, it can lead to policy decisions based on incomplete or inaccurate information — potentially producing dangerous outcomes, such as a military conflict that could have been avoided with better-shared intelligence. Similarly, if intelligence is not properly used, it can lead to wasted resources, missed opportunities, and, at worst, lost lives, as happened at Pearl Harbor.

Intelligence reports are often technical and dense, containing a great deal of information that can be difficult to process and understand. This presents real challenges for intelligence users who may lack the expertise to interpret the data. The use of jargon and abbreviations can further obscure intelligence reports, making them difficult to read and comprehend. This can lead to misinterpretation and misuse of the information they contain. It is therefore essential that intelligence users familiarize themselves with the content of intelligence reports before using them for decision-making purposes. The intelligence gathered ahead of the Pearl Harbor attack stands as a real-world example of how complex intelligence can be mishandled by end users — with deadly consequences for Americans at Hawaii (Piacine, 1997).

The Pearl Harbor attack was one that could have been prevented, or at least anticipated in time, had intelligence been communicated and received more effectively (Dahl, 2011; Piacine, 1997; Tagg, 2017). It was not a case in which the intelligence itself was faulty, but rather a case in which intelligence producers and intelligence users were not on the same page (Tagg, 2017). The Signal Intelligence Service (SIS) had obtained and analyzed intelligence pertaining to Japan's plans of attack — but the SIS had no formal place in the command structure of the US military at that time. As a result, its information was not considered relevant by military leaders, even though it absolutely was (Tagg, 2017). Those leaders with whom the intelligence was shared failed to recognize its significance (Dahl, 2011; Piacine, 1997). There was no alignment between the producers of intelligence and the users of intelligence — and a communication gap left Pearl Harbor unaware of an impending strike.

The complexity of the intelligence obtained by the SIS — or rather, its meaning — was lost in the bridge across that communication gap. The intelligence users did not register the meaning, and the SIS had no other means of conveying it. The complexity of intelligence must never exceed the gap in understanding between intelligence producers and intelligence users. If it does, the significance, meaning, and purpose of intelligence is lost in the chasm that divides the two.