Ireland's World War II Neutrality: Policy, Pride, and Ports

Introduction: The Question of Irish Neutrality

The subject of Ireland's neutrality during the Second World War is a multifaceted one. In an attempt to prove its independence from Great Britain, Ireland officially took a neutral position in the face of the war. Was this solely to demonstrate its independence, or were there other reasons for this supposed state of non-involvement? For that matter, can it be said that Ireland was indeed neutral in light of its actions during the course of the war and the events leading up to it — mainly the discourse regarding use of its ports and the number of Irish soldiers who enlisted on the side of Britain? A number of texts and papers from that period in Ireland's and England's history shed light on the matter. This discussion explores the facts and situations that both led to Ireland's decisions during the Second World War and the effects those decisions had on the nation and its allies.

One cannot discount the natural fear in the face of aggression on the part of the Axis nations, predominantly Germany, in the years leading up to and during the war. An air raid on Dublin in 1941 did not coax Ireland to officially join the fight, though it may be speculated that this was due to a fear of further retribution on the part of Germany (Cavendish 610). Though the nation remained neutral from a political standpoint, this did not stop Irish soldiers from enlisting to aid Britain against the German threat (Althoz 130).

The Port Treaty and Its Withdrawal

The larger action — or perhaps inaction — came by way of the removal of a treaty that had granted Britain use of Ireland's ports. "The Irish government, which protested vigorously but impotently against Allied military activity in Northern Ireland […] denied the British government its treaty rights to the use of Irish ports which were badly needed…" (Cavendish 609). In so doing, Ireland not only prevented Britain from making use of those ports — which, as Cavendish suggests, may have greatly aided the Allied effort against both the German and Japanese threats — but its open opposition to Northern Ireland may have greatly hindered England's ability to defend itself against Axis nations during the course of the war.

Such opposition can hardly be thought of as neutral. Perhaps, had the treaty not existed in the first place and Ireland had simply refused to agree to it, the nation could have maintained some form of neutrality. However, by rescinding a treaty that already existed, Ireland was actively affecting the course of the war and Great Britain's position in the conflict.

Churchill, de Valera, and the Battle of Words

Was it national pride that led Ireland to repeal the treaty? Two primary sources take different stands. The first is a letter from British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, in which he writes, "That bad man may as you say try Ireland and the mad policy of de Valera makes it difficult to ward off the first lodgement" (Churchill, Gilbert 73). Churchill references "that bad man," clearly meaning Adolf Hitler. The other name mentioned, "de Valera," was at the time both the Prime Minister and the Minister for External Affairs of Ireland. Churchill is speaking of de Valera's decision to rescind the Treaty of 1921, which would have granted Great Britain the use of Ireland's ports. Written to the Earl of Selborne in 1941, Churchill's letter condemns de Valera's repeal as "mad," and goes on to assure the Earl that despite de Valera's actions, Britain was doing all it could to prevent invasion via Ireland.

According to Éamon de Valera, his refusal to grant Britain use of Ireland's ports was a measure of maintaining independence. Despite his insistence that Ireland should appear neutral, his own words in reply to Churchill's repeated attempts to secure port access suggest that, if the time came for it, Ireland would fight in its own right against any invading threat. As de Valera is quoted in Josef Althoz's Selected Documents in Irish History, "certainly, as long as this Government remains in office, we shall defend our rights in regard to these ports against whoever shall attack them, as we shall defend our rights in regard to every other part of our territory" (133).

De Valera seems to have been addressing more than one threat in this response to Churchill's persistence. On the surface, he is saying that Ireland will fight against invading forces — in other words, if Japan or Germany invaded Ireland in earnest, de Valera intended England to have no doubt that Ireland would defend itself. But a more careful reading of his words paints England, and Churchill, as just as much of a threat. While not suggesting that either posed a physical danger, de Valera implies that both were endangering Ireland's rights and autonomy. Granting access to Ireland's ports would, in his view, be nothing short of abandoning the independence that had been won only twenty years earlier.

Conclusion: Was Ireland Truly Neutral?

Given that so many Irish soldiers enlisted in British forces, it can hardly be presumed that the people of Ireland wished to remain neutral in the war. Whether Ireland's official position of neutrality accurately reflected the will of its citizens, or whether it reflected only de Valera's determination to guard a recently won independence at any cost, remains open to debate. What is clear is that Ireland's actions — withdrawing port access, allowing its citizens to enlist with Britain, and enduring a German air raid without entering the conflict — place it far outside any simple definition of neutrality.

Each of these factors suggests that Ireland's relationship to the Second World War was shaped by a complicated web of political calculation, national pride, and genuine security concerns. The question of whether a different leader, or a different treaty arrangement, might have led to a more decisive and cooperative Irish role in the Allied effort is ultimately speculative. What history records is that Ireland occupied an uneasy middle ground — one that satisfied neither its own ideals of independence nor the urgent demands of its neighbors in the most destructive conflict the world had yet seen.

Works Cited

Althoz, Josef L. Selected Documents in Irish History. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2000. Print.

Churchill, Winston, and Martin Gilbert. The Churchill War Papers. New York: W.W. Norton, 1995. Print.

History of World War II. New York: Marshall Cavendish Corp., 2004. Print.