Jimmy Carter's Foreign Policy and Public Opinion Failures

Introduction

Throughout the initial analysis of Jimmy Carter's foreign policy in the United States, many scholars have arrived at negative assessments and highlighted similar weaknesses in his policy and administration — namely, his misconceptions regarding public relations and his inept political and management skills (Smith 1986; Hargrove 1988; Jones 1988).

Kaufman (1993, 3) praised Carter for his genuine ideas, intentions, and achievements, while also agreeing with the negative judgments that have been made about his tenure as President. Brinkley (1996, 552), for his part, commended Carter's ability to improvise and develop a suitable policy for the Cold War before it ended, yet still blamed his inefficient management of public opinion and polls as the reason for the downfall and ineffectiveness of his foreign policy.

However, what all these analyses have ignored is the fact that it was neither Carter personally nor his administration's general attitude toward public opinion that led to the discouraging and futile foreign policy. Put simply, it was the inefficient and somewhat weak polling systems employed by the Carter administration that never provided him with a clear view of what the public actually believed and how he should reflect those beliefs in his foreign policy. This in turn created the appearance, from the outside, of an indifferent attitude toward public relations — which ultimately damaged the foreign policy the Carter government produced.

Overview of Carter's Foreign Policy

Carter's overall intentions and accomplishments were worthy of praise, but his foreign policy failed to achieve a lasting and strong effect because of his poor leadership and management skills, as well as his poor use of public opinion polls. His plan was sound; his implementation was weak (Rosati 1993).

Carter made several significant leadership mistakes. His inability to follow through on plans and produce results was a direct consequence of poor management. His emphasis on human rights over lawful policies and techniques, combined with his discouraging attitude toward political marketing, were leadership choices that contributed to an unpopular foreign policy. As a result, his ambition for a democratic foreign policy was ultimately left unfulfilled (Rosati 1993; Melanson 1996; Rozell 1990; Jones 1988; Hargrove 1988).

The period following the 1980 election required Carter's foreign policy to shift its focus toward anti-Soviet containment, in contrast to his earlier priorities of public polling, human rights, and arms control (Carter: America will meet 1980, 171). Whether this shift occurred because of a change in the enemy's posture or a change among foreign policy makers, it was still insufficient to satisfy those who believed that, under the circumstances, military control was the most appropriate course of action.

One accomplishment in Carter's foreign policy deserves special mention: he developed an effective framework that served as a clear interpretation of the lessons — both mistakes and achievements — of the Vietnam War. Yet here too there was a setback. Carter was still unable to construct a foreign policy that bridged public opinion polls and actual foreign policy objectives, owing to rigid policy approaches that neither translated into accessible terms nor became politically advantageous for the president and his campaign (Katz 2000).

In addition, Carter tended to overlook the many Americans who believed that some form of military action would not only generate international support but also produce tangible results. In the Iranian hostage crisis, for example, a more assertive military posture might have lent his policy greater international credibility and encouragement (Katz 2000).

The polling data gathered during the SALT negotiations was similarly imbalanced, failing to emphasize the damage control required in the aftermath of the Vietnam War (Katz 2000). Ultimately, it again comes back to Carter's poor public polling system and its ineffective connection to foreign policy. Had the public opinion administrators offered efficient and logical arguments to support a tougher foreign policy approach, Carter's foreign policy would have carried considerably more weight (Katz 2000).

Leadership Failures and Internal Contradictions

Beyond the weak relationship between foreign policy and public opinion polls, Carter's policy also conflicted with itself on numerous occasions. Even though his overall foreign policy position was ineffective and unpopular, certain individual components were extremely well received and formed the basis for his most notable accomplishments. Another contradiction in his leadership was that, despite being a genuine advocate of democratic foreign policy — and eventually becoming a guardian of that approach — he still sought validation for his policies in polling results (Katz 2000).

Carter admired great American thinkers and idealists and appreciated their provocative ideas, yet he appeared to do very little to translate those ideas into policies that benefited the people. His administration failed to regard the views and opinions of ordinary Americans as useful inputs for the formulation, interpretation, and implementation of foreign policy — even though Carter himself claimed to champion those very people (Katz 2000).

Perhaps the greatest contradiction in the Carter administration was its reluctance to allow public polls to define the needs and desires of the citizenry (Katz 2000). With so many other pressures on his leadership, his inability to forge a strong link between polling data and foreign policy might be attributed to difficult circumstances. One must keep in mind that the research and analysis produced by officials within an administration profoundly influence the decisions a leader makes. Had Carter's administrative team obtained accurate data and identified the real obstacles to a productive relationship between public opinion and foreign policy, outcomes would likely have been very different. Had this been achieved early in his term, Carter would have been better positioned to capitalize on polling insights and project a stronger image in the international arena. His human rights policies would also have been more effective and better protected had research into democratic peace been accelerated (Katz 2000).

Even so, it was ultimately Carter's decision as a leader to manage polls, foreign policy, and human rights policy as he saw fit (Katz 2000).

Conclusion

Carter as a leader had been unable to surround himself with a team of efficient and intelligent administrative officials, which in turn led to weak data analysis of the polls, a restricted interpretation of public opinion, and no common ground between his foreign policy and public relations. Although his ideas and aims were admirable and his accomplishments significant, what future governments, officials, and presidents must learn from his experience is that developing an effective and reliable mechanism for gathering public opinion and building public relations is the only way to configure a truly successful foreign policy.