This paper examines the evolving relationship between Egypt and the United States within the broader context of Middle Eastern and Arab world politics. Beginning with the landmark 1979 Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty and its geopolitical consequences, the paper surveys Egypt's role in the Arab League, its diplomatic ties with the EU, neighboring Arab states, Israel, African nations, and the United States. It also traces the historical arc of the Suez Canal dispute and related military conflicts of the 1950s. The paper argues that Egypt occupies a uniquely influential position among Arab nations, and that the strategic partnership with the United States — anchored by substantial foreign aid — remains central to regional stability, counter-terrorism efforts, and the Middle East peace process.
The paper demonstrates effective use of historical contextualization to support a contemporary policy argument. By tracing events from the 1948 armistice through the 1956 Suez crisis and on to post-9/11 aid policy, the writer builds a causal chain showing how past decisions created present-day constraints — a strong model for students writing historically grounded policy analysis essays.
The paper opens with a global hotspot framing device before narrowing to Egypt. It then proceeds roughly chronologically: the 1979 peace treaty, Egypt's Arab League membership history, and a survey of current bilateral relationships (EU, Arab neighbors, Israel, U.S., Africa). A substantial historical section covers the Suez Canal dispute and 1956 war before the conclusion synthesizes the strategic importance of the Egypt–U.S. relationship going forward. This chronological-then-thematic structure is well suited to a foreign policy survey paper.
1979 saw the signing of perhaps the most significant treaty of the modern era. After more than a year of intense negotiations following Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's famed visit to Israel, the Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty was signed in Washington. There was a genuine fear that no peace treaty would be signed, and Egypt was under enormous pressure from other Arab nations not to reach an agreement.
In fact, Israeli Prime Minister Begin refused to budge on the Palestinian state issue, so many experts believed a treaty was unlikely. However, the United States stepped in to pressure Israel into dealing with Egypt in separate accords, noting that aid and other concessions would depend on Israel's cooperation.
As a result of this multilateral effort, a treaty was finally signed. The main provisions of the treaty addressed the legitimate rights and just claims of the Palestinians and the return of all Israeli-held territories.
The treaty ended thirty years of war and marked a historic event. Public interest was high, and the United States invested considerable effort in selling it to the public: the signing was broadcast live on television from the White House lawn. A smiling President Jimmy Carter looked on as Sadat and Begin signed the historic document.
Sadat praised President Carter as "the man who performed the miracle." "Without exaggeration," he said, "what he did constitutes one of the greatest achievements of our time." Carter, however, was more cautious, saying the treaty was "a first step on a long and difficult road." "We must not minimize the obstacles that lie ahead," he added.
The Egypt–Israel peace treaty was a direct result of the Camp David Peace Accords, signed in September 1978. President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin were jointly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize later that year. Under the accords, Israel agreed to withdraw its troops from the Sinai Peninsula in return for Egypt's formal recognition of the state of Israel. Palestinians were also granted a degree of self-determination.
President Sadat ultimately paid with his life for his decision to negotiate with Israel; he was assassinated in 1981 by extremists in the Egyptian army who opposed the treaty. The last Israeli troops finally left the Sinai Peninsula in 1982. Less than two months later, however, Israel invaded Lebanon, and there was little further notable progress toward peace in the Middle East until the Oslo Peace Process began in 1993.
Although Palestinians gained some degree of self-determination, the central issues remained as intractable as ever — especially for Egypt. Egypt was expelled from the Arab League for negotiating with Israel, and very few Arab states supported the efforts of Carter, Sadat, and Begin.
In longer retrospect, the terms of the Egypt–Israel treaty can be seen to have set an unfortunate precedent. Egypt had been an actual aggressor against Israel four times and had lost all four times. Israel was the nation that had been attacked four times and had prevailed each time. Yet under the peace treaty, Israel returned to Egypt everything the aggressor had lost. This had never been done before in the long and violent history of warfare between nations, and it is widely regarded as poor policy because it makes aggression a no-lose proposition for the aggressor. The agreement set expectations for all subsequent peace negotiations between Israel and the Arab countries that had repeatedly tried to destroy it — negotiations in which all parties sought the same style of one-sided outcome, which is, of course, not a practical basis for bargaining.
Egypt has long been a leader in the Middle East, especially among Arab states. However, its dealings with Israel in 1979 placed its position of leadership in serious doubt.
The Arab League was founded in Cairo in 1945 by Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Transjordan (Jordan, as of 1950), and Yemen. Countries that later joined include Algeria (1962), Bahrain (1971), Comoros (1993), Djibouti (1977), Kuwait (1961), Libya (1953), Mauritania (1973), Morocco (1958), Oman (1971), Qatar (1971), Somalia (1974), Southern Yemen (1967), Sudan (1956), Tunisia (1958), and the United Arab Emirates (1971). The Palestine Liberation Organization was admitted in 1976. Egypt's membership was suspended in 1979 after it signed the peace treaty with Israel; the League's headquarters was moved from Cairo to Tunis, Tunisia. In 1987, Arab leaders decided to renew diplomatic ties with Egypt. Egypt was readmitted to the League in 1989, and the headquarters was moved back to Cairo.
The Arab League is involved in political, economic, cultural, and social programs designed to promote the interests of member Arab states. It has served as a forum for member states to coordinate policy positions and deliberate on matters of common concern, settling some Arab disputes and limiting potentially devastating conflicts, such as the Lebanese civil war of 1958. The Arab League has also served as a platform for drafting and concluding landmark documents promoting economic integration among member states, including the Joint Arab Economic Action Charter, which established the principles for economic activities within the League. It has played an important role in shaping school curricula and preserving manuscripts and Arab cultural heritage.
The Arab League has launched literacy campaigns, reproduced intellectual works, and translated modern technical terminology for use by member states. It encourages measures against crime and drug abuse and addresses labor issues, particularly among the emigrant Arab workforce. It has also fostered cultural exchanges between member states, encouraged youth and sports programs, helped advance the role of women in Arab societies, and promoted child welfare activities.
The Egyptian government first proposed the Arab League in 1943. Egypt and some of the other Arab states wanted closer cooperation without the loss of self-rule that would result from total union. The original charter created a regional organization of sovereign states that was neither a union nor a federation. Among the goals the League set for itself were winning independence for all Arabs still under alien rule and preventing the Jewish minority in Palestine (then governed by the British) from establishing a Jewish state. The members eventually formed a joint defense council, an economic council, and a permanent military command.
Even following the death of Yasser Arafat, all Arab states looked again to Egypt for guidance on how to react. The events demonstrated Egypt's continuing power as a force in the Arab world — one that cannot be set aside even by a temporary expulsion from the Arab League. Egypt's President, Hosni Mubarak, called Arafat a "historic leader," while King Fahd of Saudi Arabia said he shared the pain of the Palestinian people. King Abdullah of Jordan called his death a tragedy.
Egypt's role in the Middle East and the West is unparalleled among Arab nations. Both a war-monger and a peace-seeker, Egypt's positions have been anything but consistent through the last several decades, but it has emerged as a powerful force against terrorism.
This comes in light of the fact that Egypt was responsible for sending the first wave of terrorists — the fedayeen — into Israel to create havoc and force the Israelis to bend. With the emergence of large U.S. aid packages, Egypt simply must remain in America's good standing, given its own precarious economic conditions. Egypt, therefore — though not in favor of the U.S. attack on Iraq — was not nearly so forthcoming with anti-American rhetoric as some of its neighbors.
This trend is likely to continue as the U.S. recognizes that it must cultivate friends in the Arab world, and that doing so requires significant economic investment. In fact, the U.S. is beginning to use its relatively successful relationship with Egypt as a template for relations with other Arab countries. The upshot is that both parties — Egypt and America — must examine their diplomatic successes and failures to determine the future course of their relationship. They must not repeat the same mistakes.
Most particularly, the mistakes of the British and French occupation era must not be repeated — when the United States changed its policy out of fear that Europe was proceeding without it. Egypt is one of America's most valuable allies, and America one of Egypt's most valuable strategic and economic lifelines. Both countries must work hard to maintain their partnership in these times fraught with difficulty.
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