JLTV Acquisition: T&E Process for the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle
This paper examines the Test and Evaluation (T&E) acquisition process for the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV), a program developed jointly by the U.S. Army and Marine Corps to replace the aging High Mobility Multi-Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV). The paper traces the program through its key acquisition phases: the Technology Development phase, in which three competing contractors built and tested prototypes; the Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase, which refined designs and addressed deficiencies; and Operational Test and Evaluation, which assessed reliability, mobility, transportability, and crew survivability. The paper highlights how competitive prototyping drove performance improvements and ultimately led to Oshkosh Corporation's selection for Low Rate Initial Production in 2015 and full-rate production approval in 2019.
- Introduction to the JLTV Program: Program background, variants, and acquisition category
- Developmental Test and Evaluation: Technology Development Phase: Three contractors build and test prototypes
- Engineering and Manufacturing Development Phase: EMD contract, refined designs, reliability retesting
- Operational Test and Evaluation: LRIP qualification, mobility, and suitability testing
- Comparison with the HMMWV and Full-Rate Production: JLTV versus HMMWV metrics and production approval
- Conclusion: Competitive prototyping strategy assessed as successful
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What makes this paper effective
- The paper follows the actual acquisition lifecycle in chronological order, making the argument easy to track from program approval through full-rate production.
- It integrates specific program data — such as the 2,400 mean miles between operational mission failures threshold and the $250,000 unit cost target — which grounds the analysis in concrete requirements rather than vague claims.
- The paper identifies and tracks recurring deficiencies (soft-soil mobility, reliability shortfalls) across phases, showing how each stage of T&E was designed to address problems uncovered in the prior phase.
Key academic technique demonstrated
The paper demonstrates the use of government and defense policy sources (Congressional Research Service reports, DTIC technical documents) to reconstruct and analyze a complex multi-phase acquisition program. This sourcing strategy is appropriate for defense acquisition topics where primary program documentation is the authoritative evidence base.
Structure breakdown
The paper opens with program background and rationale, then divides the body into two main phases aligned with the formal T&E framework: Developmental T&E (covering Technology Development and EMD sub-phases) and Operational T&E (covering LRIP qualification testing and field assessment). A brief comparative section weighs the JLTV against its predecessor before the conclusion synthesizes the competitive prototyping strategy's overall success.
Introduction to the JLTV Program
The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) is being developed by the Marine Corps and the Army to succeed the High Mobility Multi-Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), which has been in service since 1985. The aim is to develop a family of future light tactical vehicles that can replace most of the HMMWVs currently in use. The HMMWV was developed during the Cold War, a period in which attacks on vehicles were not a significant threat and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were never a concern during military planning. Attempts have been made to up-armor the HMMWV, but they have been less successful, and vehicle survivability has since become a key emphasis of the military.
There was a requirement to configure the JLTV with a variable ride-height suspension — defined as the ability to raise and lower the suspension to meet certain mission requirements (Osborn & John, 2010). The JLTV will comprise two variants: a four-passenger Combat Tactical Vehicle (CTV) and a two-passenger Combat Support Vehicle. The concept behind the JLTV is to produce a more reliable, maintainable, all-terrain mobile platform with links to current and future tactical data networks. This program is an Acquisition Category (ACAT) 1D program, and the Army bears full responsibility for developing the JLTV. JLTVs are designed to operate with high reliability across a wide variety of climates and terrain, making the vehicle both versatile and essential for the military.
Developmental Test and Evaluation: Technology Development Phase
The developmental test and evaluation stage comprises the materiel solutions analysis phase, the technology maturation and risk reduction phase, and the engineering, manufacturing, and development phase. For the JLTV, the analysis had already been completed, and a need had been identified for a vehicle capable of transporting soldiers safely. The existing vehicle was deemed vulnerable to IED attacks, jeopardizing the safety of personnel being transported. The JLTV therefore had to be hardened to withstand such attacks. The JLTV program was approved in November 2006, and the Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) directing the program to move from the concept refinement phase to technology development was signed in December 2007. The ADM enabled the program office to issue a Request for Proposal (RFP) inviting bidders to compete. Having already determined the technology and risk reduction requirements, the military had sufficient information to incorporate into the RFP, including the requirement for the vehicle to operate across all terrain types — eliminating the need to develop separate vehicles for different environments, as had been the case in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Three technology development awards were issued for the JLTV Technology Development (TD) phase. The contractors selected were: BAE Systems Land and Armaments, Ground Systems Division, Santa Clara, CA, and NAVISTAR Defense, Warrenville, IL; General Tactical Vehicles, Sterling Heights, MI — a joint venture between General Dynamics Land Systems and AM General; and Lockheed Martin Systems Integration, Oswego, NY, BAE Systems, Alcoa Defense, Pittsburgh, PA, and JWF Defense Systems, Johnstown, PA (Feickert, 2020). The TD phase lasted 27 months. Contractors were required to build four test sub-configurations within the first 15 months, with testing to take place during the following 12 months. The TD phase was designed to determine and mature the appropriate technologies to be integrated into the full system, reduce technology risk, and demonstrate the integration of critical technology elements on prototypes. The three contractors would develop prototypes based on the RFP, and an assessment of technology viability and a refinement of user requirements would follow. By using three contractors, the military received three competitive prototypes aimed at accomplishing the key TD tasks (Grgurich, 2013).
The three contractors delivered prototypes with unique characteristics, all of which were suitable for testing and delivered in accordance with contract schedule terms. Tests were conducted to confirm usability and verify whether program processes were met by each prototype (Feickert, 2020). Soldiers, Marines, and the Australian Army participated in the actual performance evaluation of the prototypes, ensuring they were tested across different climates and terrain to verify required capabilities (Osborn & John, 2010). The operational performance of the program was improved through this testing and evaluation process. All three vendor prototypes, however, experienced problems with mobility in soft soil and with integrating government-furnished mission equipment. Another shared deficiency was reliability, which fell well short of the threshold of 2,400 mean miles between operational mission failures (Werner et al., 2018).
Operational Test and Evaluation
The RFP for final production indicated the winning contractor would build approximately 17,000 JLTVs for the Marines and Army over three years during LRIP (Werner et al., 2018), to be followed by five years of full-rate production. Oshkosh was awarded the LRIP contract in August 2015 (Feickert, 2020). Even after production was approved, the Army was required to conduct testing to ensure the vehicles met the required test qualifications. The Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) performed the majority of the Production and Reliability Qualification Testing, with the primary objective of confirming that JLTV performance, weapons integration, reliability, and transportability met the requirements outlined in the JLTV Capabilities Production Document.
The Reliability Qualification Test was performed at Aberdeen Proving Ground and Yuma Proving Ground, where a combined total of 32,000 miles was accumulated in vehicle assessment. All JLTVs demonstrated sufficient protection for tactical mobility. The vehicles were able to negotiate complex terrain and demonstrated the agility needed to react to changing tactical situations. To support tactical decision-making, the vehicles were equipped with the necessary command, control, and communication capabilities (Werner et al., 2018). Test results for JLTV towing were less favorable, as the trailer demonstrated reduced mobility. It was also noted that the JLTV increased its detectability due to its loud aural signature and large visual profile.
Transportability of the JLTV was assessed at Aberdeen Proving Ground and the Airborne Operational Test Directorate. Due to the vehicle's size, fewer JLTVs can be fitted on Maritime Prepositioned Force ships compared to HMMWVs, necessitating load reconfiguration to store the required number of vehicles. Overall, testing confirmed the JLTV was not yet operationally suitable, as deficiencies were identified in maintainability, reliability, manuals, training, crew situational awareness, and safety. Notable defects included engine wiring problems, brake system faults, and damaged tires. The absence of adequate training and manuals limited crews' ability to address these issues in the field. The vehicle is intended to be light, yet there remains a need to increase its operational capability — a challenging balance, since adding armor increases weight and thereby reduces trafficability and transportability (Osborn & John, 2010).
Conclusion
The T&E acquisition process for the JLTV was successful. The Army gained the competitive advantage of having different contractors manufacture prototypes and selecting the best among the three. Knowledge of system capabilities and limitations was acquired throughout the process, necessitating requirement changes and modifications along the way. Using this strategy, the Army was able to develop and manufacture a vehicle capable of guaranteeing the safety of soldiers when deployed. Overall risk reduction was achieved, as the vehicle was deemed safe and identified areas where it could be improved in the future to meet all operational and reliability requirements.
The JLTV program demonstrated that competitive prototyping can work effectively within the defense acquisition framework. Using three contractors across two distinct phases enabled competition driven by actual hardware and real performance data, producing a result that was superior to the vehicle it is designed to replace.
References
Feickert, A. (2020). Joint light tactical vehicle (JLTV): Background and issues for Congress (CRS Report No. RS22942). Retrieved from https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RS22942.pdf
Grgurich, J. M. (2013). Conducting a competitive prototype acquisition program: An account of the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) Technology Development phase. Retrieved from https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a580230.pdf
Osborn, K., & John, A. (2010). Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) prototype builds underway. Army AL & T, 18.
Werner, K., Raymond, C., Kumar, S., Aukerman, A., Ryan, M. T., & Valerdi, R. (2018). Application and refinement of the early lifecycle cost estimation model: A case study of the JLTV. Paper presented at the 2018 Annual IEEE International Systems Conference (SysCon).
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