Kennedy's Wars by Lawrence Freedman: A Book Review

Overview and Thesis

In Kennedy's Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam, Lawrence Freedman examines John F. Kennedy's role in foreign policy with focused, scholarly depth. The book covers in detail the major global emergencies of the Kennedy presidency, including crises in Berlin, Cuba, and Vietnam. Freedman's central thesis is a compelling attempt to answer the "what if?" question surrounding Kennedy's administration — including the possibility of reestablishing cordial relations with Castro and whether Kennedy would have pursued the same course in Vietnam as President Johnson ultimately did.

The author states plainly: "Questions of what might have been still dominate considerations of Kennedy's presidency, and they are addressed in this book" (Freedman xii). Because Kennedy was assassinated in 1963 before he had the opportunity to continue or prove out his foreign policy, these remain valid questions about an administration left unfinished. Throughout the book, Freedman returns consistently to this thesis as he examines each crisis the administration faced and analyzes its response. He draws on numerous primary source documents as well as personal interviews to advance his argument — an approach that lends his work credibility and draws the reader into Kennedy's thoughts and reactions to what seemed like a relentless succession of international crises.

The 'What If' Question and Cold War Crises

Freedman's thesis is both compelling and clear. Kennedy and his advisors confronted numerous foreign crises during his presidency and were required to be flexible, since each situation demanded a new solution. Each crisis was demanding in its own right, and at the height of the Cold War, each had to be handled with great delicacy, as nuclear war remained a serious and constant threat. As each new threat emerges in the narrative, Freedman carefully defines it, provides historical background, and then speculates on what Kennedy might have done differently — and what others might have done in the same circumstances.

These speculations are often subtle. In discussing the Berlin crisis, for instance, Freedman writes that "Kennedy might also have pondered why Cuba and 'thermonuclear' weapons twice appeared in the same sentence" (Freedman 120). Freedman's deep research clearly gave him insight into Kennedy's thinking, though he is candid that the actual thought processes involved are, at best, informed speculation — a candor that fits neatly into his "what if" thesis. In hindsight, it is often tempting to second-guess decisions and ideas, but the question of "what if" continues to demand reflection.

Escalation as a Central Theme

In addition to his central thesis, Freedman develops several minor arguments throughout the book, one of the most significant being the concept of "escalation." This theme appears frequently across the pages and ties closely to the main thesis. Freedman demonstrates how the Cold War produced a pervasive fear of escalation — military, nuclear, and otherwise — on both sides of the Atlantic, and how the unchecked escalation of any given situation risked triggering a wider nuclear conflict.

Part of Freedman's escalation thesis concerns the very etymology and emergence of the term. He writes, "First used in its contemporary context in Britain in 1959, escalation soon appeared in the mainstream American literature" (Freedman 24). This argument is introduced early and Freedman returns to the fear of escalation repeatedly as he develops and defends his "what if" thesis throughout the book. Arguably the most significant of these speculative questions concerns what might have happened in Vietnam had Kennedy lived and won a second term. Freedman is measured in his conclusions, stating: "This is not to say that he was determined to withdraw. This may have been his preference, but as likely he would have persevered with established policy, possibly providing more military and economic support just so long as he could claim that this was still a Vietnamese war" (Freedman 517). The implication is thought-provoking: American history — and American involvement in Vietnam — might have looked very different had Kennedy survived, and relations with Cuba might even have been renewed.

References

Freedman, Lawrence. Kennedy's Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.