The Cold War: Origins, Arms Race, and American Society

Introduction: From Isolationism to Global Commitment

Prior to World War II, American foreign policy had been predicated upon isolationism. Afterward, determined to avoid the mistakes of the pre-war period, American leaders embarked upon an unprecedented era of worldwide commitments. This included entry into a number of alliances with foreign nations, interventions in foreign conflicts (either covertly or overtly), and an unlimited commitment to maintaining the nation's military readiness. In doing so, they irrevocably changed this nation forever.

For most Americans, one effect of the Cold War was that any illusion that the Atlantic Ocean provided a natural shield of safety was shattered. The United States had chosen to end World War II in the Pacific through the use of two atomic bombs. At the same time atomic energy was being harnessed for weapons, both the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) were developing rocket-propelled delivery systems capable of carrying these weapons over long distances. This arms race dominated not only both governments but the lives of ordinary Americans as well, who were encouraged to build bomb shelters and stockpile food and water. Children were taught to hide under their school desks in the event of a nuclear attack, though most children understood that a school desk could offer no real protection from an atomic bomb. While people often decried the enormous expense of maintaining and constantly upgrading military readiness, most Americans believed that only by maintaining nuclear superiority could they prevent a war that might kill enormous portions of both nations' populations (White, 2000). This fear of nuclear war persists to this day. Images of Nagasaki and Hiroshima remain seared in memory, and the emergence of potentially unstable governments—such as North Korea—claiming nuclear capability, combined with the possibility of a portable atomic device being used by terrorists, ensures that such fears have never fully receded.

The Start of the Cold War

The world heard the term "cold war" for the first time in 1947, used to describe the rapidly deteriorating ability of the United States and the U.S.S.R. to see themselves as allies (Roberts, 2000). It denoted a sharp and unexpected breakdown in postwar relations between the two superpowers. The alliance between these two countries had begun to decay even before the end of World War II. At various wartime conferences—Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam—the United States, Great Britain, and the U.S.S.R. made plans to cooperate in maintaining the peace that would follow the war (Roberts, 2000). However, it soon became apparent that deep ideological differences between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. would make any continued alliance extremely difficult (Roberts, 2000).

Some historians blame the U.S.S.R. for the breakdown, pointing to Stalin's deep suspicion, his repression within his own country, and his desire to expand the Soviet sphere of influence (White, 2000). The Soviets, in turn, pointed to what they regarded as American economic imperialism, and also felt that the Americans had been untrustworthy toward the end of World War II (White, 2000). Later scholars blamed neither side exclusively, instead citing mutual misperceptions as the primary cause (White, 2000). Another contributing factor was that both the U.S.S.R. and the United States had adopted rigid ideological positions and believed they could not afford any flexibility (White, 2000). Parts of each of these interpretations likely contain valid points.

Many in the United States believed that Soviet actions after World War II amounted to empire-building. American officials feared that the U.S.S.R. intended to export communism to neighboring countries, and viewed any spread of communism as a direct threat to democracy. One key agreement among the major Allied powers at the end of the war had been that Eastern European countries would be allowed to form their governments through free elections; American officials, however, believed Stalin intended to prevent this from happening (White, 2000). The Soviets' stated desire to create a "sphere of influence" was simply not acceptable to postwar America.

Prevailing political thought in the United States emphasized the necessity of containing Soviet expansion while simultaneously promoting pro-American, democratic, and capitalist governments wherever possible (White, 2000). Meanwhile, the U.S.S.R. interpreted the American use of atomic bombs against Japan not as a measure to prevent further American casualties, but as a deliberate warning of U.S. military superiority—an intimidation tactic (White, 2000). The more the U.S.S.R. bristled at what it perceived as American dominance, the more suspicious American politicians became, and soon the two countries were locked in a pattern of deteriorating relations and escalating arms production. Moscow grew ever more determined to consolidate its influence over Eastern Europe, which America and its allies viewed as unacceptably aggressive (Roberts, 2000). Eventually, the American government developed a range of contingency models for potential crises with the U.S.S.R., each of which included the use of nuclear weapons at some stage (Nash, 1994).

In 1947, the U.S.S.R. still harbored some hope of reaching an accommodation with the West, when Winston Churchill delivered what became a landmark speech. He declared:

"From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of central and eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia, all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in the Soviet sphere and all are subject… not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and increasing measure of control from Moscow." (Roberts, 2000)

By itself, the speech might not have been too alarming, since Churchill no longer held any official position in the British government. However, President Truman was on the stage beside him that day, and his presence strongly implied American endorsement of Churchill's sentiments. The U.S.S.R. interpreted the speech as an expression of Western policy (Roberts, 2000). Furthermore, in July 1947, at a meeting among the major powers, the British, French, and Americans agreed that all of Europe—including Eastern Europe—should be incorporated into the Marshall Plan to aid in postwar reconstruction. The U.S.S.R. viewed this as intolerable interference in its sphere of influence (Roberts, 2000).

The Arms Race and Nuclear Anxiety

In April 1949, the formation of formal military alliances accelerated with the founding of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Roberts, 2000). Then, in August 1949, the U.S.S.R. successfully tested its first atomic bomb. The lines had been drawn, and neither side would step back. America, increasingly convinced that the U.S.S.R. sought to dominate not only its defined sphere of influence but potentially other countries as well, began to worry about how many "card-carrying Communists" lived within U.S. borders. This concern quickly extended to "fellow travelers"—Communist sympathizers who might not have formally joined the Communist Party but were seen as ideologically aligned with it.

By 1961, the arms race between the United States and the U.S.S.R. had reached a fever pitch. President Kennedy worked to reduce American dependence on nuclear armaments and to broaden the military's options so that, in a crisis, he and his advisers would not be forced into an all-or-nothing nuclear response. He estimated that in any nuclear exchange, as many as 300 million people could die across the U.S.S.R., the United States, and Europe (Nash, 1994). To counter total reliance on nuclear deterrence, Kennedy developed the doctrine of "Flexible Response," which explored a range of non-nuclear solutions to military conflicts. His resolve was severely tested during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, when the U.S.S.R. attempted to install nuclear warheads in Cuba (Nash, 1994).

Conclusion: The Cold War's Lasting Legacy

The effects of the Cold War, especially in its earlier phases, had a profound impact on American culture. It brought McCarthyite witch hunts for Communism, a pervading fear of nuclear holocaust, and led to devastating U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. The conflict cast suspicion on people who were legitimately fighting for their rights as citizens, and bred distrust of almost anyone working toward what they saw as improvements in American society. Ironically, the backlash against heightened militarism—and the eventual popular opposition to the Vietnam War—turned public scorn toward military personnel, the very people who had been universally celebrated a generation earlier for helping to liberate Europe from Nazism.

Eventually, the excesses of McCarthy and others who sought to silence dissenters produced court rulings that clarified and strengthened Americans' constitutional rights. Yet it would be many years before the Cold War was widely recognized as over, and its cultural and political consequences continue to shape American society in ways both visible and subtle.

Bibliography

Nash, Philip. 1994. "Nuclear Weapons in Kennedy's Foreign Policy." The Historian, 56:2.

Roberts, Geoffrey. 2000. "Starting the Cold War: Historians and the Cold War." History Review.

Schrecker, Ellen. The Age of McCarthyism. Boston: Bedford Books of St. Martin's Press, 1994. (pp. 92–94).

White, Timothy J. 2000. "Cold War Historiography: New Evidence Behind Traditional Typologies." International Social Science Review.