This paper examines the justifiability of military intervention in other countries, with particular focus on U.S. foreign policy and international humanitarian law. It begins by tracing the long history of American military interventions from 1890 onward, then applies Vincent Ferraro's seven principles of just war theory as an evaluative framework. The paper surveys major criticisms of U.S. interventions — including civilian collateral damage, support for dictatorships, and counterproductive outcomes — before analyzing humanitarian intervention as a distinct category. It concludes by weighing official justifications against Michael Parenti's critique that most interventions serve hidden political and economic goals, while acknowledging that intervention remains legally permissible under international law when grave human rights violations occur.
The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms defines military intervention as "the deliberate act of a nation or a group of nations to introduce its military forces into the course of an existing controversy." The United States military has been intervening in other countries for a long time. In 1898, it seized the Philippines, Cuba, and Puerto Rico from Spain, and in 1917–18 became embroiled in World War I in Europe. In the first half of the twentieth century, it repeatedly sent Marines to protectorates such as Nicaragua, Honduras, Panama, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic. In 1941, following the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, the U.S. entered World War II.
The second half of the twentieth century included military interventions in Korea, several countries in the Middle East, the Dominican Republic, Chile, Guatemala, Indonesia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Nicaragua, Grenada, Libya, Panama, Bosnia, and Somalia. The first decade of the twenty-first century, sparked by the September 11 attacks, saw military interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other nations. According to Zoltan Grossman, there have been over 140 military interventions by the United States since 1890.
Vincent Ferraro identifies seven principles that must be met in order for a war to be considered just.
First, a just war can only be waged as a last resort. All non-violent options must be exhausted before the use of force can be justified. Second, a war is just only if it is waged by a legitimate authority. Even just causes cannot be served by actions taken by individuals or groups who do not constitute an authority sanctioned by whatever the society — and outsiders to the society — deem legitimate. Third, a just war can only be fought to redress a wrong suffered. Self-defense against an armed attack is always considered a just cause. Furthermore, a just war can only be fought with "right" intentions: the only permissible objective is to redress the injury.
Fourth, a war can only be just if it is fought with a reasonable chance of success. Deaths and injuries incurred in a hopeless cause are not morally justifiable. Fifth, the ultimate goal of a just war is to re-establish peace — specifically, a peace preferable to whatever peace would have prevailed had the war not been fought. Sixth, the violence used in the war must be proportional to the injury suffered; states are prohibited from using force beyond what is necessary to address that injury. Seventh, the weapons used in war must discriminate between combatants and non-combatants. Civilians are never permissible targets of war, and every effort must be taken to avoid killing them. The deaths of civilians are justified only when they are unavoidable victims of a deliberate attack on a legitimate military target (Ferraro).
These seven principles form the foundation of just war theory, a framework with roots in classical philosophy and Christian theology that continues to shape international law and military ethics.
Grossman articulates several criticisms that question the motives and wisdom of many U.S. military interventions. First, such interventions are typically explained to the public as defending the lives and rights of civilian populations. Nevertheless, the military tactics employed often leave behind massive civilian "collateral damage." War planners frequently made little distinction between rebels and the civilians who lived in rebel-controlled zones, or between military assets and civilian infrastructure such as rail lines, water treatment plants, agricultural facilities, and medicine supplies. The public is led to believe that modern military technologies will avoid civilian casualties; when the inevitable civilian deaths occur, they are explained away as "accidental" or "unavoidable."
Second, although most post–World War II interventions were carried out in the name of freedom and democracy, nearly all of them defended dictatorships. In Vietnam, Central America, and the Persian Gulf, the interventions were not about defending freedom but about advancing an ideological agenda — such as defending capitalism — or an economic agenda, such as protecting oil company investments. In the rare cases when force did topple a dictatorship, such as in Grenada or Panama, it was done in a way that prevented the country's own people from installing a new democratic government more to their liking.
Third, violence by opponents is characterized as terrorism, atrocities against civilians, or ethnic cleansing, while the same acts committed by the U.S. or its allies are minimized or defended. This double standard holds that U.S. and allied actions are by definition defensive, while an enemy's equivalent actions are by definition offensive.
Fourth, military intervention is often counterproductive even when one accepts U.S. goals and rationales at face value. Rather than resolving the political or economic causes of a conflict, intervention tends to polarize factions and further destabilize the country. This is reflected in the fact that the same countries appear repeatedly on the list of twentieth-century U.S. interventions.
Finally, U.S. demonization of enemy leaders — or military action against them — tends to strengthen rather than weaken their hold on power. These leaders may face greater internal criticism if they were unable to portray themselves as Davids standing up to the American Goliath, and to blame many of their countries' internal problems on the United States (Grossman).
"Definition and contested legitimacy of humanitarian force"
"Post-Cold War trends and major power dynamics"
U.S. foreign policy officials claim they have intervened in other countries for worthy causes, such as carrying out humanitarian missions, defending weaker peoples from aggression, and bolstering democratic governments. However, Michael Parenti points out that, contrary to popular belief, the U.S. — like most other nations — does not have a particularly impressive humanitarian record. While many nations, including the U.S., have sent relief abroad in response to particular crises, these actions represent no essential foreign policy commitment. They occur sporadically, have limited scope, and obscure the many occasions when governments do absolutely nothing for countries in desperate straits.
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