Napoleon's Military Success: Ability or Enemy Mistakes Before 1807

The Battle of Lodi: Recklessness and Enemy Mistakes

During the Italian campaign, Napoleon managed to rise to the rank of general and became famous in France for his achievements. However, the battle of Lodi presents a complex case in which both recklessness and enemy error contributed to French success. Robert Harvey has suggested that "the attack had been reckless in the extreme and was won largely by luck," and he further argues that "the ease of his victories also reflects on the quality of the officers and troops opposing him," suggesting that his enemies made many mistakes and that Napoleon could afford to be reckless and still win this battle. Yet Dennis Richards contradicts Harvey, writing that "by brilliant strategy and marching... within little more than a month after setting foot on Italian soil he had forced the bridge at Lodi," suggesting there was method to what Harvey views as madness.

Although Napoleon later became known as a great commander, during Lodi he was still a young officer and behaved rashly, as Harvey mentioned and as Brent Nosworthy supports: "The Battle of Lodi is chiefly known for the seemingly reckless rush of a massive French infantry column across the Adda river." Corelli Barnett supports both Nosworthy and Harvey's assessment, describing it as "an unnecessary and costly French attack over the narrow bridge at Lodi" and noting that it had "succeeded only because Bonaparte had broken those eighteenth century rules which limited the scope and destructiveness of war." This makes a strong argument that Napoleon was rash when deciding to attack Lodi, but fortunately for him it worked out due to his enemies' mistakes. As Nosworthy correctly notes, "The cause of the Austrian defeat was unthinking application... by their gunners... they should have used round shot to plough holes throughout the entire length of the advancing French column." Instead, the Austrians continued using canister shells, which only killed the tip of the French column until they were overrun and retreated.

This exchange reveals a clear mistake by the Austrians—a lack of improvisation and failure to use round shot down the 200-yard-long bridge. Napoleon's carelessness was overshadowed by victory, though it was not a decisive one, as the Austrian army escaped. The Battle of Lodi thus illustrates how a young commander's recklessness, combined with opponent miscalculation, can produce success that masks underlying weaknesses in judgment.

The Battle of Marengo: Recovery from Unpreparedness

The battle of Marengo demonstrates how Napoleon could recover from strategic error through the resilience of his forces and enemy overconfidence. Brent Nosworthy observes that "Marengo, more than any other battle, shows the French army's newly acquired capability of putting in a second, third, fourth and even fifth effort despite suffering a series of setbacks in succession." Mario Rivoire supports this assessment, noting that the French forces were so worn down that "by 3pm the Austrian commander had defeated the French and gone to rest... at 5pm Desaix and his corps... offered to lead another attack," which shows the doggedness of the Napoleonic army.

The battle began at 6 a.m. when Bonaparte proceeded "on the plain with his troops disposed in fan shaped columns... The Austrian forces, led by general Melas, suddenly sprang upon them." This shows that Napoleon was unprepared for battle. Nosworthy explains: "Napoleon had believed that the Austrians would continue to retreat and took no steps to concentrate his forces for a major engagement." This fundamental miscalculation—a failure to gather intelligence or remain prepared for a major engagement—reveals a significant flaw in Napoleon's command judgment at this stage.

Despite this error, luck intervened for Napoleon. When the battle got properly underway, Napoleon fought using traditional tactics. As Nosworthy writes, "unlike many of the engagements... the French fought in a traditional formation." Given that Napoleon's 22,000 men were surprised by approximately 32,000 Austrian troops, this choice was prudent under the circumstances. Corelli Barnett notes that Napoleon, "realising now the full extent of his error in sending off Desaix, he dispatched an urgent message after him `return in the name of God if you still can.'" This message proved decisive. Barnett continues: "Meanwhile, Bonaparte himself could only hold on and hope... By late afternoon, and despite French counter attacks, the Austrians... had advanced nearly five miles... Bonaparte had lost the battle of Marengo; the first battle of Marengo." Harvey emphasizes the critical moment: "at three o'clock, the French were in retreat and the battle seemed over. At that moment Desaix... arrived in support. At four o'clock Napoleon staged his last throw."

It was not merely Desaix's arrival that won Marengo, but also a fatal mistake by the Austrian army to underestimate the doggedness of Napoleon's forces and assume that he had not called for reinforcements. Harvey notes that "The Austrians in the plain below, pursuing him, were caught by surprise," which led to the Austrian right side fleeing in disarray. Nosworthy describes one of Napoleon's officers, Kellerman, and his cavalry charge: "seldom has there been a more successful cavalry charge." He justifies this by noting that "The Austrians were caught completely off guard. Not only did they not see the French cavalry approach... they were defenceless... having nothing but empty muskets." The battle of Marengo was won mainly because Kellerman's cavalry charge saved the day, but also because the Austrian forces had become overconfident, failing to regroup and resupply, leaving them open to the charge. Harvey sums it up: "Marengo, in spite of the narrow margin and small scale of victory, was hugely inflated as his triumph (it was largely that of the slain Desaix)."

Conclusion: Evolution of Command Ability

Napoleon was an excellent commander, however many of the victories he had won have been hugely exaggerated. At the battle of Marengo it was Desaix and Kellerman who saved the battle from going to the Austrians, yet Napoleon claimed it to be his victory as Desaix died during the battle. Also at the battle of Lodi, Napoleon managed to force the Austrians out of Lodi due to his reckless frontal assault over the bridge. Yet as it was luckily a victory, he managed to overshadow his rash decision with the glory which came from ousting the Austrians.

However, Austerlitz was Napoleon's true masterpiece. He had carefully selected his battleground, tricked the allied army into believing he had fewer troops than he actually did, and determined where he would attack and hold out from—the Pratzen Heights. The enemies' fatal mistakes—marching through marshes, abandoning the high ground, and failing to wait for their full forces to assemble—certainly helped Napoleon win. Therefore, Napoleon progressed into a good commander and, unlike his enemies, he realised and corrected his mistakes before it was too late.