This essay examines the extent to which Napoleon's early military success as a general before 1807 stemmed from his own tactical and strategic ability versus the mistakes and miscalculations of his opponents. Through detailed analysis of three pivotal battles—Lodi, Marengo, and Austerlitz—the paper argues that while Napoleon displayed growing strategic brilliance, particularly at Austerlitz, his earlier victories at Lodi and Marengo relied significantly on opponent errors and fortunate circumstances. The essay concludes that Napoleon evolved from a rash young officer into a masterful commander by recognizing and correcting his mistakes, whereas his enemies often failed to do the same.
During the Italian campaign, Napoleon managed to rise to the rank of general and became famous in France for his achievements. However, the battle of Lodi presents a complex case in which both recklessness and enemy error contributed to French success. Robert Harvey has suggested that "the attack had been reckless in the extreme and was won largely by luck," and he further argues that "the ease of his victories also reflects on the quality of the officers and troops opposing him," suggesting that his enemies made many mistakes and that Napoleon could afford to be reckless and still win this battle. Yet Dennis Richards contradicts Harvey, writing that "by brilliant strategy and marching... within little more than a month after setting foot on Italian soil he had forced the bridge at Lodi," suggesting there was method to what Harvey views as madness.
Although Napoleon later became known as a great commander, during Lodi he was still a young officer and behaved rashly, as Harvey mentioned and as Brent Nosworthy supports: "The Battle of Lodi is chiefly known for the seemingly reckless rush of a massive French infantry column across the Adda river." Corelli Barnett supports both Nosworthy and Harvey's assessment, describing it as "an unnecessary and costly French attack over the narrow bridge at Lodi" and noting that it had "succeeded only because Bonaparte had broken those eighteenth century rules which limited the scope and destructiveness of war." This makes a strong argument that Napoleon was rash when deciding to attack Lodi, but fortunately for him it worked out due to his enemies' mistakes. As Nosworthy correctly notes, "The cause of the Austrian defeat was unthinking application... by their gunners... they should have used round shot to plough holes throughout the entire length of the advancing French column." Instead, the Austrians continued using canister shells, which only killed the tip of the French column until they were overrun and retreated.
This exchange reveals a clear mistake by the Austrians—a lack of improvisation and failure to use round shot down the 200-yard-long bridge. Napoleon's carelessness was overshadowed by victory, though it was not a decisive one, as the Austrian army escaped. The Battle of Lodi thus illustrates how a young commander's recklessness, combined with opponent miscalculation, can produce success that masks underlying weaknesses in judgment.
The battle of Marengo demonstrates how Napoleon could recover from strategic error through the resilience of his forces and enemy overconfidence. Brent Nosworthy observes that "Marengo, more than any other battle, shows the French army's newly acquired capability of putting in a second, third, fourth and even fifth effort despite suffering a series of setbacks in succession." Mario Rivoire supports this assessment, noting that the French forces were so worn down that "by 3pm the Austrian commander had defeated the French and gone to rest... at 5pm Desaix and his corps... offered to lead another attack," which shows the doggedness of the Napoleonic army.
The battle began at 6 a.m. when Bonaparte proceeded "on the plain with his troops disposed in fan shaped columns... The Austrian forces, led by general Melas, suddenly sprang upon them." This shows that Napoleon was unprepared for battle. Nosworthy explains: "Napoleon had believed that the Austrians would continue to retreat and took no steps to concentrate his forces for a major engagement." This fundamental miscalculation—a failure to gather intelligence or remain prepared for a major engagement—reveals a significant flaw in Napoleon's command judgment at this stage.
Despite this error, luck intervened for Napoleon. When the battle got properly underway, Napoleon fought using traditional tactics. As Nosworthy writes, "unlike many of the engagements... the French fought in a traditional formation." Given that Napoleon's 22,000 men were surprised by approximately 32,000 Austrian troops, this choice was prudent under the circumstances. Corelli Barnett notes that Napoleon, "realising now the full extent of his error in sending off Desaix, he dispatched an urgent message after him `return in the name of God if you still can.'" This message proved decisive. Barnett continues: "Meanwhile, Bonaparte himself could only hold on and hope... By late afternoon, and despite French counter attacks, the Austrians... had advanced nearly five miles... Bonaparte had lost the battle of Marengo; the first battle of Marengo." Harvey emphasizes the critical moment: "at three o'clock, the French were in retreat and the battle seemed over. At that moment Desaix... arrived in support. At four o'clock Napoleon staged his last throw."
It was not merely Desaix's arrival that won Marengo, but also a fatal mistake by the Austrian army to underestimate the doggedness of Napoleon's forces and assume that he had not called for reinforcements. Harvey notes that "The Austrians in the plain below, pursuing him, were caught by surprise," which led to the Austrian right side fleeing in disarray. Nosworthy describes one of Napoleon's officers, Kellerman, and his cavalry charge: "seldom has there been a more successful cavalry charge." He justifies this by noting that "The Austrians were caught completely off guard. Not only did they not see the French cavalry approach... they were defenceless... having nothing but empty muskets." The battle of Marengo was won mainly because Kellerman's cavalry charge saved the day, but also because the Austrian forces had become overconfident, failing to regroup and resupply, leaving them open to the charge. Harvey sums it up: "Marengo, in spite of the narrow margin and small scale of victory, was hugely inflated as his triumph (it was largely that of the slain Desaix)."
At the battle of Austerlitz, commonly known as Napoleon's greatest battle, we see a marked shift in his approach and competence. Robert Harvey argues that Napoleon "carefully selected his planned field of battle" and notes "The position was a natural defensive one with woods and small valleys in which his troops could hide." This demonstrates skilled use of topography. Harvey further observes that due to Napoleon's cunning, "the Russians and Austrians, thus lulled by a false sense of security, took the immense risk of moving off the Pratzen Heights in a southerly direction." The allies thereby left minimal resistance for Napoleon to overcome the next day when taking the Pratzen Heights—a severe strategic blunder.
D.G. Wright supports Harvey's view that Napoleon's ability to reduce enemy numbers on Pratzen Heights helped secure victory: "His strategy of tempting the Austrians and Russians to stretch out their forces... then ordering Soult's corps to seize the heights of Pratzen... led to a dramatic victory... emphasised by the divided and confused enemy command." The night before the battle, according to Harvey, "Kutuzov slept ostentatiously, saying that his advice had been ignored." Wright notes that "despite Kutuzov's advice that it would be better to wait until all available Austrian and Russian forces had combined together... the Tsar and Francis II fell for Napoleon's ruse... and moved forwards against him." This suggests that the allied leadership was so driven by the desire to defeat Napoleon that they ignored an experienced commander—a catastrophic mistake.
Once battle commenced, Harvey reports that the Russians and Austrians were "Making steady progress against the French in the south across difficult terrain... bounded by the marsh and the shallow lakes." This consequence of marching south from Pratzen Heights made the allies easy targets as they slowed their own progress through marshes, becoming trapped between the freezing Goldbach river and Satschen pond. Then, shortly after nine o'clock, when "the sun had more or less cleared the mists," Napoleon ordered "Soult's two divisions in waiting to move... against the by now much reduced allied army at its weakest point—the centre." David Gates reveals that "Kutuzov had not yet committed the fourth and last column to the turning movement... As a consequence of this, by 9am the entire left and left centre of the Austro-Russian army was crowding into the irregular triangle," demonstrating how the Battle of Austerlitz unfolded with the allies making critical errors in coordination.
Beyond strategy, luck also favored Napoleon. A thick fog settled on his army's position in the early morning, which helped convince the allies of Napoleon's bluff about troop numbers. Gates explains: "French centre— to ascend the plateau and fall on the flank and rear of the unsuspecting Allied columns. Emerging from the smoke and fog... his troops clashed fiercely with the tail of the allied forces." Harvey confirms: "He also had luck on his side: a thick fog enveloped the lakeside in the early hours of the morning, which helped further to conceal Davout's and Bernadotte's arrival as well as Soult's cavalry." Therefore, the Battle of Austerlitz was won through a combination of cunning deception about enemy troop numbers and positions, superior tactical execution in defeating scattered columns one unit at a time, and fortunate weather that enhanced the deception.
Napoleon was an excellent commander, however many of the victories he had won have been hugely exaggerated. At the battle of Marengo it was Desaix and Kellerman who saved the battle from going to the Austrians, yet Napoleon claimed it to be his victory as Desaix died during the battle. Also at the battle of Lodi, Napoleon managed to force the Austrians out of Lodi due to his reckless frontal assault over the bridge. Yet as it was luckily a victory, he managed to overshadow his rash decision with the glory which came from ousting the Austrians.
You’re 93% through this paper. Sign up to read the full paper.
Sign Up Now — Instant Access Already a member? Log inAlways verify citation format against your institution’s current style guide requirements.