NGO Effectiveness in Somalia: A Historical Analysis

"As the only country in the world totally devoid of a functioning central government, Somalia is particularly vulnerable to humanitarian emergencies. The humanitarian situation in Somalia is marked by chronic food insecurity due to the extended effects of drought, recurrent conflict, and intermittent access to vulnerable populations, particularly in south/central regions." — Forgotten and Neglected Emergencies: Somalia, March 2006

The epigraph above suggests that just when it looked like things could not possibly get any worse in Somalia, they did. The implications of the recent assertions of authority over various regions of Somalia by fundamentalist Muslims have the United States and its Western allies worried at a time when they cannot spare the resources. Indeed, the ongoing violence in the Middle East reinforces just how important agencies such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are in the reconstruction of war-torn areas around the world today. The United Nations (UN) and other international relief organizations, however, are faced with an increasingly complex and dangerous set of challenges in delivering such assistance in many regions of the world. To this end, this paper provides a historical analysis of the varied effectiveness of nongovernmental organizations in general and in Somalia in particular, followed by a summary of the research in the conclusion.

In reality, many types of political and humanitarian enterprises can be strictly considered "nongovernmental." For example, according to Naim (2002), al Qaeda, Amnesty International, and Greenpeace all comprise loose networks of individuals united by a shared commitment to a single cause, and, enabled by cheaper communication and transportation systems, each of these groups is capable of projecting its influence on a global basis. Furthermore, other similarities exist between these strictly "nongovernmental organizations" as well. All of these groups are funded by voluntary donations, and their effectiveness depends on the dedication of their respective cadres (Naim 100). While there are some similarities, Naim emphasizes that the difference between them is that "while al Qaeda's suicidal terrorists want to bring down Western civilization, the members of Amnesty International, Greenpeace, and other such nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) want to make it better. And in many cases, they do" (Naim 101).

Today the United Nations (2003) defines a nongovernmental organization as:

any non-profit, voluntary citizens' group which is organized on a local, national or international level. Task-oriented and driven by people with a common interest, NGOs perform a variety of services and humanitarian functions, bring citizens' concerns to Governments, monitor policies and encourage political participation at the community level. They provide analysis and expertise, serve as early warning mechanisms and help monitor and implement international agreements. Some are organized around specific issues, such as human rights, the environment or health. (cited in Doh, Teegen & Vachani 463)

According to Doh and his colleagues, NGOs provide multinational enterprises (MNEs) with new opportunities to help develop socially responsive non-market strategies without the participation of any governmental agency. Furthermore, NGOs have been able to help developing countries create new networks and business relationships with foreign investors, again without any specific governmental assistance. In fact, in many parts of the world, Doh and his colleagues maintain that NGOs represent one of the most important forces for economic and social development currently at work in the world. "With or without the active input of government," they advise, "NGOs have emerged as major new organizational forms and vehicles to deliver social services such as poverty relief and environmental protection" (463). This point is also made by Evans (2005), who reports that "the United Nations, World Bank, donor states, NATO, OSCE and other regional security bodies — and nongovernmental organizations — have been much more sharply focused in the last fifteen years than ever previously on conflict prevention and management" (6).

Moreover, from a purely business point of view, in many regions of the world where trade is characterized by corrupt practices with potentially dangerous legal consequences, foreign companies that use NGOs to help establish new business relationships have much to gain. In this regard, Doh and his colleagues (2004) conclude that "firms that successfully solicit the input and guidance of NGOs can avoid negative reprisals" (464). It remains to be seen, however, whether even the best nongovernmental agency can successfully effect any meaningful change in parts of the world where there is an insufficient governmental infrastructure in place to provide the protection these NGOs need while delivering their services. It is equally important to have a basic civilian infrastructure in place to provide the developmental resources needed for a successful enterprise. In some cases, it would seem, NGOs do not succeed despite their best efforts, and these issues are discussed further below as they have historically applied to Somalia.

Commonly referred to by the international community as a "failed state," the country of Somalia today is in serious trouble by any measure. According to U.S. government analysts, "Somalia's economic fortunes are driven by its deep political divisions. The northwestern area has declared its independence as the 'Republic of Somaliland'; the northeastern region of Puntland is a semi-autonomous state; and the remaining southern portion is riddled with the struggles of rival factions. Economic life continues, in part because much activity is local and relatively easily protected" (Somalia 5). Some relevant facts about Somalia help illustrate the dire state of affairs confronting the people and those who would seek to help them:

1.7 million people are in urgent need of humanitarian assistance, of whom 1.4 million are situated in southern Somalia. Approximately 400,000 people are scattered across 34 refugee sites throughout Somalia and remain extremely vulnerable. Over 70% of the population is undernourished. Crop production for 2006 is expected to be 50% of the post-war average — the lowest cereal production in over ten years. Life expectancy is a mere 48 years, and one in four children dies before the age of five, with an infant mortality rate of 225 deaths per 1,000 live births (Forgotten and Neglected Emergencies — Somalia 2).

In reality, there has not been a viable government in place for over 15 years in Somalia, with the country having been ruled by various feudal warlords — some with the support of the United States, though this was changing at the time of writing. According to Black's Law Dictionary (1990), Somalia had become a near-perfect example of anarchy in the worst sense: "Anarchy" is defined as the "absence of government; state of society where there is no law or supreme power; lawlessness or political disorder; destructive of and confusion in government. At its best, it pertains to a society made orderly by good manners rather than law.... At its worst, the word pertains to a terroristic resistance of all present government and social order" (84). U.S. government analysts further report that the country maintains ties to global terrorist organizations, an issue that exacerbates the administration and delivery of social services throughout the country (Somalia 3). Even more troublesome for the West — but perhaps beneficial for the people of Somalia in terms of reducing their state of anarchy — is the fact that a central government of sorts was emerging at the time of writing, though the Islamic state apparently being forged from the remnants of Somalia was expected to face profound challenges in the future.

According to the UN's executive summary from its Consolidated Appeal for Somalia (March 21, 2006), Somalia was experiencing the consequences of the worst drought in over ten years, and the impact of ongoing violence had placed tens of thousands of the country's most vulnerable citizens — its women and children — at particular risk. The country's meager economy had been limping along for years, dependent on the remnants of a crumbling infrastructure and an agricultural industry adversely affected by persistent drought. The failed growing season of 2005 resulted in a revision of the UN's consolidated humanitarian appeal for Somalia, and current estimates of need were overwhelmingly focused on food. Other problems included disease and the inability of humanitarian organizations to deliver their services where they were most needed.

According to Feldman and Slattery (2003), however, the most important priority for Somalia is to provide its people with the infrastructure and political framework they desperately need to secure the basic necessities of life, rather than to apportion blame for their predicament:

There is little value in identifying single causal explanations for war and state collapse in Somalia. To focus solely on the contradictions between a foreign-imposed colonial system of government and an indigenous political system would be to overlook the impact of the oppressive, corrupt and violent system of political patronage that marked the 21-year military rule of Mohamed Siad Barre (1969–1991), the influence of Cold War and post-Cold War politics in the region, the impact of structural adjustment and economic liberalization policies in the 1980s, and the character of the armed movements in Somalia. (Feldman and Slattery 201)

In this environment, it is likely that the people of Somalia would welcome virtually any force capable of delivering food and water, and these circumstances have not been lost on those who would exploit them for their own political agendas.

The experiences of the United Nations and other relief agencies in Somalia are proof positive that even the best-intentioned humanitarian efforts cannot succeed if nongovernmental organizations are targeted by political forces that deem their presence counterproductive for their political agendas. According to Boulden (2001), "The UN response to the Somalia crisis ran the gamut from the extreme of total disregard to total involvement then back to total disregard. During the first year of anarchy, the situation within the country became so dangerous that most nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and UN humanitarian agencies left the country" (54). Boulden reports that, with the sole exception of certain UN agencies, most NGOs had transferred their headquarters to Nairobi while continuing to attempt to deliver aid and assistance programs in Somalia. In August 1991, a skeleton staff from various UN agencies returned to Mogadishu, Berbera, and Borama, but departed in November 1991 after the conflict escalated once again (Boulden 54).

Furthermore, Boulden reports that the UN Security Council first included Somalia on its agenda on January 23, 1992, only after being requested to do so by the then-Prime Minister of Somalia and the representative of Somalia at the United Nations. At that time, the Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 733, which called on all states to "immediately implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia until the Security Council decides otherwise" (cited in Boulden 54). In addition, the Security Council resolution declared a cease-fire, mandated action to forge a political settlement, and called on all parties to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance during the process (Boulden 54). According to Boulden, "The Security Council resolution was made possible not only because of the impetus for action from the United States, but also because of a newfound post-Cold War atmosphere of enthusiasm in the Security Council for the possibilities of significant and important Security Council action" (56).

Thereafter, beginning in 1993, a two-year UN humanitarian effort directed mostly in the south of the country was successful in alleviating famine conditions. However, when the UN withdrew in 1995 after suffering significant casualties, civil order in the country had still not been restored (Somalia 2). During 1993, a U.S. Black Hawk helicopter was shot down in the Somali capital, resulting in the deaths of eighteen U.S. soldiers and the capture of one; the event was later memorialized in the popular film Black Hawk Down (De Waal 132).