Opium in Afghanistan: Economy, Culture, and Stability

Introduction: Scale and Geography of Afghan Opium Production

In 2014, an estimated 224,000 hectares of land in Afghanistan — between 200,000 and 250,500 hectares — were utilized for the cultivation of opium poppy, a 7% increase from the previous year. According to 2014 estimates, 98% of all opium farms in the country were found in Eastern (9%), Western (22%), and Southern (67%) Afghanistan. Southern Afghanistan's opium farms were concentrated in the provinces of Kandahar, Day Kundi, Zabul, Helmand, and Uruzgan; Western Afghanistan's farms were concentrated in the provinces of Badghis, Nimroz, Farah, and Herat; and Eastern Afghanistan's opium farms were concentrated in the provinces of Laghman, Kapisa, Nangarhar, and Kunar. These provinces are the most vulnerable, carrying high to extreme security risk according to the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS). Furthermore, they are largely inaccessible to non-governmental organizations and the UN. Day Kundi represents the only Southern province with generally good security, aside from the district of Kejran (UNODC, 2014).

More recent estimates reveal that 183,000 hectares of land were utilized for opium poppy farming, with yearly production projected at approximately 3,300 metric tons. A poor harvest caused production to fall from the 2014 level of 6,400 metric tons, which had itself been 17% higher than the 5,500 tons produced in 2013 (Buddenberg & Ruttig, 2016). The average yield of opium in 2014 was 28.7 kg/hectare — a 9% increase from the 2013 yield of 26.3 kg/hectare. Increased production was chiefly attributable to expanded opium farming and higher yields. In particular, a 27% growth in yield witnessed in Southern Afghanistan drove an overall production increase. However, as in the previous year, unfavorable climatic conditions in parts of Southern and Western Afghanistan negatively impacted poppy plants, reducing yield compared to the relatively unaffected yield of 2011 (44.5 kg/hectare). In Southern Afghanistan specifically, a survey revealed a reduction of more than 39% from the 2011 yield (UNODC, 2014).

In poppy-rich Southwestern and Southern Afghanistan, known links exist between drug traffickers operating along the Pakistani border and Taliban insurgents. Academic research, U.S. government statements, and media reports frequently note that the Taliban benefits from opium revenues. Nevertheless, scant concrete details are available to lawmakers and the general public regarding how insurgents and drug dealers interact and how they profit from this trade. As long as NATO forces, aid organizations, and civilian officials operating in these areas lack reliable data on this issue, they are functioning in a relative vacuum. A better understanding of how the Taliban benefits from the opium trade can help in developing strategies to extend governance by weakening the insurgency (Peters, 2009).

The involvement of corrupt Afghan government officials, members of the Afghan National Police (ANP), and various provincial administrations in opium trafficking has been widely suspected, with media reports suggesting that some senior officials are themselves engaged in this illegal business. Many citizens of Southern Afghanistan believe that government officials earn more from the illicit drug trade than insurgents do. Corruption is an equally important concern, as it and insurgency perhaps contribute equally to the region's continued insecurity by generating perverse incentives for those holding high-ranking positions to obstruct good governance (Peters, 2009). On the whole, despite sustained reductions in opium production — driven largely by agronomic and economic factors — opium continues to represent a structuring and structural factor embedded in every dimension of the nation's society, politics, and economy.

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