Opium in Afghanistan: Economy, Culture, and Stability

Introduction: Scale and Geography of Afghan Opium Production

In 2014, an estimated 224,000 hectares of land in Afghanistan — between 200,000 and 250,500 hectares — were utilized for the cultivation of opium poppy, a 7% increase from the previous year. According to 2014 estimates, 98% of all opium farms in the country were found in Eastern (9%), Western (22%), and Southern (67%) Afghanistan. Southern Afghanistan's opium farms were concentrated in the provinces of Kandahar, Day Kundi, Zabul, Helmand, and Uruzgan; Western Afghanistan's farms were concentrated in the provinces of Badghis, Nimroz, Farah, and Herat; and Eastern Afghanistan's opium farms were concentrated in the provinces of Laghman, Kapisa, Nangarhar, and Kunar. These provinces are the most vulnerable, carrying high to extreme security risk according to the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS). Furthermore, they are largely inaccessible to non-governmental organizations and the UN. Day Kundi represents the only Southern province with generally good security, aside from the district of Kejran (UNODC, 2014).

More recent estimates reveal that 183,000 hectares of land were utilized for opium poppy farming, with yearly production projected at approximately 3,300 metric tons. A poor harvest caused production to fall from the 2014 level of 6,400 metric tons, which had itself been 17% higher than the 5,500 tons produced in 2013 (Buddenberg & Ruttig, 2016). The average yield of opium in 2014 was 28.7 kg/hectare — a 9% increase from the 2013 yield of 26.3 kg/hectare. Increased production was chiefly attributable to expanded opium farming and higher yields. In particular, a 27% growth in yield witnessed in Southern Afghanistan drove an overall production increase. However, as in the previous year, unfavorable climatic conditions in parts of Southern and Western Afghanistan negatively impacted poppy plants, reducing yield compared to the relatively unaffected yield of 2011 (44.5 kg/hectare). In Southern Afghanistan specifically, a survey revealed a reduction of more than 39% from the 2011 yield (UNODC, 2014).

In poppy-rich Southwestern and Southern Afghanistan, known links exist between drug traffickers operating along the Pakistani border and Taliban insurgents. Academic research, U.S. government statements, and media reports frequently note that the Taliban benefits from opium revenues. Nevertheless, scant concrete details are available to lawmakers and the general public regarding how insurgents and drug dealers interact and how they profit from this trade. As long as NATO forces, aid organizations, and civilian officials operating in these areas lack reliable data on this issue, they are functioning in a relative vacuum. A better understanding of how the Taliban benefits from the opium trade can help in developing strategies to extend governance by weakening the insurgency (Peters, 2009).

The involvement of corrupt Afghan government officials, members of the Afghan National Police (ANP), and various provincial administrations in opium trafficking has been widely suspected, with media reports suggesting that some senior officials are themselves engaged in this illegal business. Many citizens of Southern Afghanistan believe that government officials earn more from the illicit drug trade than insurgents do. Corruption is an equally important concern, as it and insurgency perhaps contribute equally to the region's continued insecurity by generating perverse incentives for those holding high-ranking positions to obstruct good governance (Peters, 2009). On the whole, despite sustained reductions in opium production — driven largely by agronomic and economic factors — opium continues to represent a structuring and structural factor embedded in every dimension of the nation's society, politics, and economy.

Effects on Economy

A vast majority — approximately 92% — of global illicit opium production occurs in Afghanistan, amounting to roughly 800 tons of heroin, nearly twice the reported worldwide demand. Much of opium farming is concentrated in Helmand and six other southwestern provinces. Helmand alone produces approximately half of the nation's total opium yield (Felbab-Brown, 2009). The export value of opium is roughly equivalent to half the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP), approximately 3 billion U.S. dollars. By comparison, Colombian cocaine's export value represents less than 1% of Colombia's GDP, yet remains a serious economic and security challenge to Latin American stability — a comparison that illustrates the true scale of Afghanistan's illicit drug problem. Opium is an immense illicit economy that sustains legal ones by driving a growing construction sector and generating capital for Afghanistan's rural, informal credit system. Despite earning comparatively more than from lawful crops, the country's three million rural poppy cultivators live in dire poverty, shackled to the traditional opium credit system. Experts at the World Bank have warned that an abrupt collapse of the poppy economy would cause economic devastation throughout Afghanistan. Beyond the approximately 15% of the population directly affected, a similar proportion benefits indirectly from opium-related activities and cash flows (Felbab-Brown, 2009).

Opium also pervades the nation's institutions at every level, from district to provincial to national organizations. Opium-related corruption is omnipresent in Afghanistan and poses a genuine threat to the creation of fair, functional institutions. Press reports suggest that government involvement in opium trafficking reaches approximately 70%, with around 25% of the 249-member Parliament implicated directly or indirectly in the illicit trade. Police officers appear to act as facilitators, consumers, and protectors within this system. One British report claimed that nearly 60% of Helmand's police force depended on heroin, opium, or both (Mansfield, 2008; Azami, 2013). Intense competition among local power-holders — including members of local police forces and government institutions — also shapes what might be called "poppy politics," with these actors manipulating opium eradication operations to serve personal interests, including securing international funds and extracting bribes from local farmers.

Opium also generates fresh revenue for the Taliban insurgency in Southern Afghanistan; a 10% levy or tax is reportedly imposed on both opium cultivation and smuggling. Perhaps more significantly, by extending protection to opium farmers and facilitators, the Taliban has gained substantial political leverage over local populations against both international and national governments. However, if the Taliban's relationship with the opium trade is ultimately opportunistic in nature, there is little evidence that restricting drug flows would significantly weaken an insurgency guided by political aims and drawing on multiple revenue sources (Felbab-Brown, 2009; Mansfield, 2008).

The engine of this industry — which generates annual revenues amounting to several billion dollars — is a fundamental conflict-economics dynamic against which conventional tools of order have little effect. Opium is the most economically viable crop for many rural communities; although most farmers receive less than 20% of its market value, opium still outperforms all other crops. It is the principal asset underpinning rural Afghanistan's credit system, requires no market access, and can be easily stockpiled. Opium traders typically collect the harvest directly from farms. In the high-risk environment of rural Afghanistan, where transport and financial infrastructure are nearly absent, opium is clearly the most practical and competitive crop available. The most recent UN opium survey and numerous supporting reports demonstrate that when farmers gain access to more resources — such as alternative food and cash crops, water, credit security, and market access — their reliance on opium decreases, as has been observed in northern Afghanistan. Conversely, high-risk settings with fewer resources make opium an increasingly attractive option (Felbab-Brown, 2009; Mansfield, 2008).

Effects on Culture

Opium cultivation and use has contributed to the development of a distinctive material culture in Afghanistan. The task of opium harvesting is highly labor-intensive; individual poppy pods must be incised multiple times over several days. During the poppy harvesting season, an estimated 300,000 seasonal workers are employed across the country's vast opium fields. Because family labor alone is insufficient, seasonal workers follow the harvest season from the warmer southern provinces where it begins, northward to the poppy-cultivating northern provinces. It is remarkable that such a large group of people — requiring food, accommodation, and transport — is able to traverse vast portions of the country with relatively little disruption (Buddenberg & Ruttig, 2016).

The tools used by these laborers must be inexpensive, simple, and easily replaceable. The instrument used to cut the surface of poppy pods — allowing the white, morphine-containing latex to seep out overnight — consists of a small wooden handle fitted with strips of razor blade, fixed with glue. These lancets or scratchers, known as neshtar or nishtar in Pashto and Dari, vary in shape from province to province and region to region, indicating that cultural differentiation persists even in the simplest of tools (Buddenberg & Ruttig, 2016; Azami, 2013).

Opium production has caused severe damage to Afghan society, with the rate of opiate addiction tripling over the past five years. Currently, around 800,000 individuals — approximately 2.65% of the population — consume opiates, a challenge well beyond the government's current capacity to address. Very few rehabilitation centers exist in the country, and demand for them is growing. The situation is worsened by a near-total absence of health education, which is contributing to rising HIV transmission. The UNAIDS, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and the World Bank have all emphasized the lack of preventive education for people who inject drugs and are therefore at the greatest risk of contracting HIV through contaminated needles. While opiates are far more expensive outside Afghanistan, they are significantly cheaper within the country. Combined with poor educational standards and limited addiction support, this dynamic will likely cause Afghanistan's drug addiction crisis to worsen in the coming years (Buddenberg & Ruttig, 2016).

A local study found considerable evidence of drug exposure among children — some barely over a year old — in a quarter of households with adult opium addicts. These children displayed withdrawal behavior typical of heroin and opium addiction following drug removal. Some estimates suggest that in the city where the research was conducted, between 35,000 and 50,000 children are coerced by their parents or guardians into working for meager wages in factories or begging on the streets. These children are exposed to all forms of abuse, with many ending up in the sex trade. Drug users face the added risk of HIV infection through the sharing of contaminated syringes. Together, HIV/AIDS and drug addiction constitute what has been described as a "silent tsunami" for Afghanistan (Chelala, 2013).

Conclusion

Afghanistan's illegal narcotics industry dominates its economy, pervading every segment of the global heroin marketplace. In a nation with few significant natural resources, this economic opportunity sustains a triangular relationship among insurgents, organized criminals, and the Taliban, all of whom aim collectively to undermine the Afghan state while profiting from drug farming, processing, and trade. Significant correlation exists between government complacency, terrorist violence, and opium production. The toxic effects of the opiate economy can only be addressed through long-term, sustained multinational counter-narcotics action.

Initially, the Taliban criticized opium production and went so far as to ban it. Poppy fields were destroyed and a communiqué was issued in which group leaders committed to eradication. However, the Taliban quickly recognized that alternative non-drug-related prospects for Afghanistan's subsistence farmers were scarce, and began to appreciate the political potential of sponsoring the illicit economy, making it a key source of legitimacy. The Taliban accordingly adopted a more religiously pragmatic and opportunistic approach: poppy farming was deemed religiously forbidden yet justified under conditions of war. Taliban edicts stated that opiate consumption and heroin manufacture were forbidden, but that opium production and marketing were permissible. Over time, however, a more financially sophisticated "neo-Taliban" recognized the additional benefits of adopting a permissive stance toward heroin manufacture as well.

References

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