This paper examines the Roadmap for Peace as a framework intended to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with particular focus on its critical shortcomings in human rights protection and enforcement. Beginning with historical context from the Oslo Accords and their implementation under Israeli leadership, the paper traces how inadequate human rights provisions undermined earlier peace efforts. It then analyzes the Roadmap's structure, including its security mechanisms, Palestinian institutional reforms, and monitoring procedures, arguing that without robust human rights standards and independent oversight, the agreement risks repeating the failures of Oslo. The paper concludes that the U.S. role as both negotiator and military supporter of Israel creates a fundamental contradiction that perpetuates violations and Palestinian grievances.
The Roadmap for Peace may be an important step taken by the United States, Russia, the European Union, and the United Nations to ensure safety and end the conflict between Israel and Palestine. However, as explained below, the Roadmap does not adequately encompass recognized laws for the protection of human rights. While this limitation may not seem paramount in isolation, it is significant when the overall performance of the agreement is considered.
There is an extensive assumption that the disagreement between Israelis and Palestinians is multifaceted and that the U.S. has been and remains the greatest hope for peace. The reality, however, is quite different. For nearly thirty years, international agreements for peace in the Middle East have centered on the withdrawal of Israeli forces to internationally recognized boundaries in exchange for security assurances from Israel's neighbors, the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, a special status for a shared Jerusalem, and recognition of Palestinian refugee rights.
Throughout this period, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), under the leadership of Yasir Arafat, transitioned from engaging in terrorist actions and calling for Israel's destruction to sustaining international consensus for a two-state solution. Israeli public opinion evolved partly in this direction as well. Washington, however, has traditionally rejected international consensus, insisted on a significantly expanded Jerusalem under Israeli control, and opposed the right of Palestinian refugees to return home. The U.S. supports only partial Israeli withdrawal from occupied Palestinian territories and refuses to support Palestinian self-determination beyond limits Israel is willing to accept, nor will it pressure Israel to end its unlawful settlements and construction of Jewish-only roads.
The Palestinians fundamentally accepted Israeli control over 78 percent of Palestine—the territory within Israel's internationally recognized borders—in the 1993 Oslo Accords. Israelis, however, now inhabit over 60 percent of the remaining Palestinian territory in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, seized by Israel in the 1967 war. The remaining territory operates under the repressive control of the Palestinian National Authority, existing as a fragmented collection of limited autonomy that resembles American Indian reservations or the infamous Bantustans of apartheid-era South Africa more than a viable state.
During U.S.-mediated discussions at Camp David, Israelis offered to return most occupied territories to Palestinians. However, this fell far short of the complete withdrawal required under international law, which prohibits the expansion of any nation's territory by military force—a principle reaffirmed in UN Security Council Resolution 242, long considered the foundation for peace. The Israeli proposal also permitted continued Israeli control over unlawful Jewish settlements, military positions, and a system of elite highways throughout the West Bank and Gaza, fragmenting Palestinian territory into small, noncontiguous units and rendering a viable, economically feasible state nearly impossible.
Although the American public appears to robustly support Israel's right to exist and wants the U.S. to protect that right, there is rising concern about the excessive and unrestricted nature of U.S. assistance to Israel. Few elected officials, however, call for reduced aid, largely because U.S. support proceeds either through American weapons purchases or as interest payments to U.S. banks for prior loans. Despite Israel never being more militarily secure in its history, U.S. military support remains at unprecedented levels. Israel comprises only one one-thousandth of the world's population, and Israeli Jews enjoy the world's sixteenth-highest per capita income, yet Israel receives 40 percent of all U.S. overseas aid. Direct annual aid to Israel has exceeded $3.5 billion in recent years.
In its early years, Arafat's PLO was explicitly maximalist, insisting on the total "liberation" of Palestine, meaning Israel's destruction. However, as early as the late 1960s, this rejectionist stance began to soften—albeit hesitantly and conflictingly—toward a willingness to pursue a two-state solution with Israel. Nothing came of this, however, because Israel showed no interest in recognizing signs of Palestinian pragmatism, dismissed all proposals, and refused even to speak with the PLO, let alone cooperate with it.
More significantly, Israeli Labor governments of the 1960s and 1970s, led by Golda Meir, Yitzhak Rabin, and Shimon Peres, initiated the process of establishing Jewish communities in the West Bank and Gaza. These settlements were deliberately placed in areas designed to divide Palestinian cities and villages and to make the formation of a viable, territorially contiguous Palestinian state impossible.
The PLO's stance continued to evolve until November 1988, when it formally adopted a two-state solution. Under the PLO's proposal, a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza with East Jerusalem as its capital would be largely demilitarized, would allow international peacekeeping forces along its borders with Israel, would end terrorism and all assaults on Israel from its territory, would avoid alliances with Arab rejectionist states, and would accept a limited refugee return to Israel combined with international compensation and resettlement of refugees in the Arab world.
The first significant accord between Israel and the PLO was the Oslo Accords of September 1993, negotiated by Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. The accords provided for mutual recognition of Israel and the PLO, and included a five-year transitional period during which Israel would gradually withdraw its troops and administrative presence from major Palestinian population centers in exchange for Palestinian Authority (PA) governance. The accords stipulated that a permanent agreement based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338—which required Israeli withdrawal from 1967-occupied territories—would be negotiated by May 1999. Arafat pledged to end anti-Israeli violence in the occupied territories and even to assist Israeli security forces.
Although the Oslo Accords did not explicitly require an independent Palestinian state, there was no doubt that this was the international expectation and the understanding of both the Israeli government and public opinion. The critical weakness of Oslo was that it delayed the most difficult issues—Palestinian state boundaries, Israeli settlements, Jerusalem's status, West Bank water rights, and refugee questions—until a final agreement due in May 1999. Consequently, Israelis were not required to dismantle existing settlements or cease construction of new ones. However, it became clear that continued settlement expansion would contradict the spirit of Oslo and undermine Palestinian autonomy.
Many Palestinians sharply criticized Arafat for accepting these gaps, and retrospectively, the critics were right. Yet because Israel held all the leverage and Rabin refused to go further, it is difficult to see what alternatives were available to Arafat beyond hoping that Israeli positions would evolve over time, provided he maintained peace in Palestinian-controlled areas. What could not be predicted was the degree to which Rabin would maintain a hard-line stance that would prevent any genuinely viable Palestinian state from forming. In subsequent years, Rabin and his successor Shimon Peres undermined both the spirit and letter of several Oslo provisions.
Two years after signing the Oslo Accords, Rabin announced his comprehensive strategy for a permanent agreement: there would be no return to pre-1967 borders; Jerusalem, including Jewish communities in East Jerusalem, would remain under Israeli control; the majority of West Bank and Gaza settlements would remain under Israeli dominion; free access to settlements would be guaranteed by new roads throughout the territories; and Israel's security border—defined as "the broadest meaning of that term"—would be the Jordan River, meaning Israel would retain settlements and military bases deep within Palestinian territory. Palestinians would receive only disconnected enclaves housing most Palestinian residents, on less than 50 percent of the West Bank and Gaza.
In the following year, Rabin implemented this plan, resulting in Palestinians receiving a series of remote enclaves on fragmented territory. Jewish settlement in an expanding Jerusalem continued, and massive road-building began, frequently requiring the demolition of Palestinian homes and orchards. Remarkably, under Rabin, Jewish settlement expansion exceeded the rate under the previous hard-line Likud government of Yitzhak Shamir. Even settlements in heavily Palestinian areas, presumably intended for removal in a final accord, were reinforced. Rabin rejected his own cabinet's proposal to remove the small settlement in the Palestinian city of Hebron, even after a Jewish extremist murdered twenty-seven Palestinians praying in a mosque.
Rabin's government frequently violated even the letter of the Oslo Accords: Palestinian prisoners committed to release remained imprisoned; the promised Palestinian airport in Gaza was delayed; guaranteed free Palestinian movement between Gaza and the West Bank was repeatedly disrupted by Israeli closures causing severe economic hardship; Palestinians outside Jerusalem were often barred from Muslim prayer services at the Temple Mount; scheduled Israeli troop withdrawals did not occur; and tax and customs revenues owed to the Palestinian Authority were regularly withheld.
Throughout the Rabin period, the PA largely fulfilled its obligation to combat terrorism, though with mixed results. Palestinian security forces under Arafat worked alongside Israeli forces, often in joint patrols, to identify and arrest suspected militants, frequently using Israeli-provided lists. Following Rabin's assassination and Shimon Peres's ascension, Israeli strategy became even more hardline. Some evidence suggests that near the end of his life, Rabin's position was softening, with his statements showing greater understanding of Palestinian concerns and apparent acceptance of some form of Palestinian statehood. Peres, however, accelerated settlement expansion and road construction while remaining opposed to Palestinian sovereignty.
In spring 1996, Peres authorized the killing of a Palestinian activist accused of terrorism; in retaliation, Palestinian militants killed dozens of Israelis in urban bombings. After these attacks and a major Israeli military operation in southern Lebanon, Israeli voters turned against Peres and elected Benjamin Netanyahu. Under Netanyahu, the Oslo process effectively ended: by May 1999, when the transition was supposed to be complete, Israeli control over most of the West Bank and Gaza remained, Netanyahu refused further troop withdrawals, settlement expansion continued, Israel tightened its grip on East Jerusalem, the road network expanded, economic closures became more severe and frequent, and Netanyahu declined to negotiate a permanent settlement as required by Oslo.
The Roadmap is a conceptual plan adopted by the Palestinian Authority and the Government of Israel that addresses both national and international issues. It is based on three objectives: to establish a separate sovereign Palestinian state with a Palestinian prime minister, to emphasize confidence-building measures, and to end the long-standing conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. A U.S.-led team would monitor implementation.
The Roadmap comprises four committees that would work with existing resources, focusing on security, humanitarian affairs, PA reform, and other political matters. The agreement references the earlier Oslo Accords, though the extent to which those principles would apply remains unclear. The Roadmap also incorporates elements from the Tenet Work Plan and the Mitchell Report, though it only addresses agreements already reached between the parties.
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been marked by systematic neglect of human rights. In the Oslo Accords, human rights were mentioned but not enforced. The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip contains only three references to human rights protection without any stringent enforcement mechanisms. The Roadmap clearly reveals the critical need for human rights protection and proper implementation.
The Roadmap stresses that had proper human rights implementation existed from the beginning, there would be no urgent need for establishing a comprehensive agenda for this issue. However, the Roadmap itself may reproduce this pattern. Because previous agreements failed to enforce human rights, many parties came to ignore them entirely. Due to the lack of strict enforcement, the Roadmap risks similar failure.
Several key obligations remain unmet in both Oslo and the Roadmap: security obligations requiring governments to prevent attacks on civilians, confiscations of property, and destruction of homes; implementation of accountability measures addressing the immunity of Israeli and Palestinian military forces from human rights prosecution; and proper enforcement of settlement restrictions and the freeze on settlement activity outlined in the Mitchell Report. Without addressing these obligations directly, the Roadmap may create an even more weakened protection system for affected populations.
The security mechanisms in the Roadmap, like those in Oslo, are designed to address immediate threats but fail to incorporate robust human rights protections. The assumption that international security regulations automatically protect human rights overlooks how security measures can actually suppress human rights if not properly constrained. The Roadmap lacks remedies for previous violations and provides no framework for addressing past abuses.
The most promising element is "Palestinian Institution-Building," which aims to address security abuses through reformed Palestinian governance. Without such reforms, political parties risk losing popular support. In the short term, the Roadmap must establish standard legal protections, safeguards against torture and arbitrary detention, the right to be charged with a specific crime, and the right to a fair trial.
Unlike Oslo, the Roadmap includes significant provisions for Palestinian governmental reform, including selection of a new prime minister, a strengthened central authority, a new constitutional framework, and elections. These reforms must be implemented immediately rather than treated as secondary issues. While the government framework has improved with these provisions, implementation has suffered from infrastructure misuse, weak budgets, and other challenges.
Strengthening the legal system is essential. This requires reorganizing the judicial system, eliminating Supreme Security Courts to reduce corruption, and training Palestinian police forces to better control criminal activity and investigate violations. These institutional changes, if properly implemented, could establish a foundation for genuine democratic governance.
Monitoring is a crucial component of any organizational structure. They monitor activities whether documented or practical, and assist members in advancing to the next stage. Regarding the Roadmap, all members would participate in monitoring, but the U.S. would assume primary responsibility for decision-making.
"U.S.-led oversight structures and accountability gaps"
A fundamental contradiction exists between the U.S. position as chief negotiator of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute and its position as the primary economic, diplomatic, and military supporter of Israeli occupation policies. This contradiction is directly responsible for the disillusionment fueling continued Palestinian resistance and human rights violations. Until this contradiction is resolved—until the U.S. places equal pressure on both parties and enforces human rights standards impartially—peace agreements like the Roadmap will continue to fail, perpetuating cycles of violence and abuse that no monitoring framework can adequately address.
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