So Far From God: The U.S.–Mexico War 1846–1848 Review

Introduction to the Book and Its Author

The war between the United States and Mexico holds major significance in the history of both nations. Yet the full weight of this conflict is rarely acknowledged or discussed in mainstream history books. While many accounts focus primarily on blow-by-blow battle descriptions, So Far From God: The U.S. War with Mexico 1846–1848 takes a markedly different approach. Authored by John S.D. Eisenhower, the book brilliantly explores the individuality of the characters and events that escalated the dispute with Mexico and led to the United States' momentous acquisition of South Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California.

John Sheldon Doud Eisenhower was the son of the former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe and 34th President of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower. He was also a distinguished military historian, former ambassador to Belgium, retired Brigadier General of the U.S. Army Reserves, and author of several highly regarded books. His best-known work, The Bitter Woods (1969), is widely considered one of the most authoritative analyses of the Battle of the Bulge during World War II. Among his other works are Strictly Personal (1974); Allies, Pearl Harbor to D-Day (1982); Intervention!: The United States Involvement in the Mexican Revolution, 1913–1917 (1993); Agent of Destiny: The Life and Times of General Winfield Scott (1997); Yanks: The Epic Story of the American Army in World War I (2001); and General Ike: A Personal Reminiscence (2003).

So Far From God: The U.S. War with Mexico 1846–1848 is a 436-page paperback first published on April 2, 1989, by Random House in New York, and later republished by the University of Oklahoma Press in September 2000. Eisenhower took the book's title from the well-known, mournful remark attributed to Mexican President Porfirio Díaz: "Poor Mexico! So far from God, and so close to the United States."

The author's purpose in writing the book was to illuminate the environmental influences that shaped the characters of those involved in the war — not merely the lives of enlisted men who fought in battle, but the nature of command itself. This is reflected in his recurring question of why men would follow certain leaders. Eisenhower does not engage in political history, nor does he pass judgment on the wars that preceded this conflict. At no point does the reader find Eisenhower endorsing the war as an extension of Manifest Destiny, nor condemning it as an act of banditry. He simply presents the facts as they occurred — a restraint that distinguishes his work from more polemical histories.

Historical Context: Manifest Destiny and the Road to War

The book covers events of the mid-nineteenth century, a period during which the United States, under President Polk, was at the height of its territorial expansion. American citizens widely believed that the United States had a God-given right — and was destined — to extend its boundaries from the Atlantic Seaboard to the Pacific Ocean, a conviction known as Manifest Destiny. Although this belief gained strong support among southern Democrats, it became a sharply partisan issue, with the Whigs opposing it.

Following Mexico's independence from the Spanish Empire in 1821, it inherited the provinces of Alta California, Nuevo México, and Texas. Weakened by the hardships of that independence struggle, Mexico found it increasingly difficult to govern its northern territories given their vast distance from the capital, Mexico City. The Mexican government consequently permitted several hundred U.S. families to settle in the region. The number of American settlers grew so rapidly that it became virtually impossible for Mexico to maintain effective governance over Texas. When the United States offered to purchase Texas, Antonio López de Santa Anna — then military ruler of Mexico — flatly opposed selling any Mexican territory. Although Mexico considered Texas a rebellious province, this standoff marked the beginning of open hostilities between the two countries. For the United States, the goal was territorial power; for Mexico, it was a matter of national pride.

Military Leadership on Both Sides

The events described in the book were familiar territory for Eisenhower. As a military man and experienced historian, he brings both personal background and his father's legacy to bear in demonstrating how historical events unfolded. The author places particular emphasis on each of the major commanders — specifically, how they exercised their authority. The principal U.S. commanders were Zachary Taylor, Winfield Scott, and Stephen W. Kearny. On Mexico's side were Antonio López de Santa Anna, Mariano Arista, Pedro de Ampudia, and José María Flores. Each figure is rendered with enough depth to reveal the distinct character behind the uniform.

Zachary Taylor, widely known as "Old Rough and Ready" for his rumpled clothing and wide-brimmed straw hat, was sent by President Polk to the Rio Grande to defend Texas. He won four battles in northern Mexico, including engagements along the Rio Grande — achievements that ultimately propelled him to the presidency as the 12th President of the United States under the Whig banner. Taylor was a man of independent conviction; even with Whig backing, he refused to simply follow the platform prepared for him. Winfield Scott, known as "Old Fuss and Feathers" and "the Grand Old Man of the Army," commanded the southern of the two U.S. armies. He was assisted by his staff of engineering officers, with Robert E. Lee serving as his chief aide during the march from Vera Cruz to Mexico City. Though Taylor and Scott differed markedly in personality, they shared one essential quality of effective command: both were supremely confident in themselves and in their military judgment, and both conveyed that confidence to their men — a decisive advantage the United States held over Mexico.

On Mexico's side, Antonio de Padua María Severino López de Santa Anna y Pérez de Lebrón — a military figure who had fought for Mexico's liberation from Spain — rose through the ranks to become both general and president on eleven non-consecutive occasions. Yet he had little regard for the welfare of his men. Santa Anna fought Taylor at Buena Vista but suffered severe desertions and ultimately withdrew. When Mexico suffered defeats at Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma — despite geographic advantages and numerical strength — Santa Anna cunningly exploited the resulting chaos to advance his own political career. His scheme was particularly cynical: he secretly negotiated a safe passage through the U.S. blockade, promising to work toward a peaceful conclusion of the war and to facilitate the sale of New Mexico and Alta California to the United States at a reasonable price. True to his reputation as an opportunist, he broke his word and resumed fighting against the U.S. invasion.