Sociocognitive Metaphors: Grounded Cognition and Constraints

Introduction: Why Do We Use Physical Terms for Social Concepts?

What prompts people to describe aspects of their interpersonal relationships with terms such as "warm" and "close," and others as "cold" and "distant"? Why are individuals inclined to place "more powerful others higher and less powerful others lower in hierarchical structures?" (IJzerman & Koole, 2011). What is meant when individuals engage in a "heavy" discussion? And why do individuals refer to behavior deemed morally reprehensible as "dirty"? Are these just figures of speech, or is there a greater psychological significance to the connectivity between perceptual dimensions — such as temperature, weight, cleanliness, and verticality — and abstract constructs?

Inquiries regarding the grounding of social cognition in sensorimotor systems have become the focus of increased theoretical and empirical efforts over the past decades in linguistics, psychology, and other scholarly disciplines. Theorists have traditionally assumed that social perceivers rely on disembodied, abstract schemas or categories that structure individuals' interpretation of social information (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000; Wyer & Srull, 1989). Some argue, however, that individuals routinely draw on their concrete bodily experiences in constructing their social reality (Cohen, Leung, & IJzerman, 2009; Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005; Smith & Semin, 2004). Landau, Meier, and Kiefer (2010) posited a metaphor-enriched approach to social cognition that treats metaphors as a significant component of the conceptual system that individuals use not just to express but also to understand abstract concepts like morality, power, and love through their experiences. Conceptual metaphors may then allow people to make sense of the complexities of life by permitting the use of knowledge from a relatively concrete domain in understanding a more abstract concept (IJzerman & Koole, 2011).

There is general concurrence with regard to the work Landau et al. (2010) offered. However, the following will examine whether greater theoretical attention to the origin and nature of metaphorical representations in social cognition is warranted, and whether the focus on top-down knowledge structures has ignored the importance of bottom-up shaping of metaphors (IJzerman & Koole, 2011).

The Functionality of Sociocognitive Metaphors

Traditional literature on schema has devoted a significant amount of attention to the notion that schemas exert a top-down influence on the processing of social information by allowing individuals to "go beyond the information given" in understanding the world (Stapel & Koomen, 2000). Although Landau et al.'s approach differs from traditional schema models in some important respects, their posited metaphor-enriched approach nonetheless retains a clear emphasis on the top-down effects of knowledge structures. In particular, conceptual metaphors are assumed to constitute "a structured framework for reasoning about, interpreting, and evaluating information related to the target concept" (p. 1046). As such, conceptual metaphors are assumed to operate in the same way and use the same representational format as traditional schemas, even if metaphors represent a situation in which the properties of the "schema" are rendered from a domain that is semantically unrelated (IJzerman & Koole, 2011).

Indeed, if sociocognitive metaphors operate like traditional schemas, then traditional sociocognitive theories regarding knowledge structures may plausibly be applied to them, leading to a host of testable hypotheses (Smith, 1998). Conceptual metaphors can vary in chronic versus temporary accessibility and applicability in a particular situation (Higgins, 1996). Conceptual metaphors, like schemas, may also act as energy-conserving devices by allowing individuals to quickly grasp notions that are abstract (Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, & Jetten, 1994). Furthermore, conceptual metaphors may spontaneously influence social cognition in an unintentional, efficient, non-conscious, and uncontrollable way (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). As such, the majority of empirical findings regarding schemas may in principle be applicable to sociocognitive metaphors and could be generative for nascent research in this area.

However, the theoretical implications of sociocognitive metaphors may extend further if consideration is given to metaphors from the perspective of grounded cognition, which "reflects the assumption that cognition is typically grounded in multiple ways including simulations, situated action, and on occasion, bodily states" (Barsalou, 1999, p. 619). Grounded cognition theories can readily accommodate the top-down effects of conceptual metaphors on social cognition without requiring that these metaphors rely on abstract information from the source domain. Barsalou's (1999) perceptual symbol systems theory posits that perceptual simulation involves the partial, top-down running of sensorimotor systems. From this vantage point, the effects of sociocognitive metaphors related to sentiments such as "heavy discussions" and "interpersonal warmth" may be due in part to situated actions or perceptual simulation processes (IJzerman & Koole, 2011). If correct, the term "conceptual metaphors" may be considered a misnomer for sociocognitive metaphors, as the most basic and pervasive of these metaphors may be minimally associated with schematic knowledge or abstract concepts.

Conceptual Metaphors and Bottom-Up Constraints

How then do pervasive sociocognitive metaphors like "dirty tricks," "deep feelings," and "high and mighty" develop? According to Landau et al. (2010), an initial source of sociocognitive metaphors is individual ingenuity — the creative leaps people make in conveying the distinct meanings of their personal experiences. Although there is much scholarly agreement regarding the impressive creative capacity of the human mind, there is also doubt as to whether individual creativity is a sufficient explanation for familiar sociocognitive metaphors (IJzerman & Koole, 2011). If every individual creatively and uniquely invented his or her own set of metaphors, one would expect a far greater degree of idiosyncratic variation across individuals. Accordingly, individual creativity as the sole explanation for common metaphors that influence social cognition seems implausible.

Another posited source of sociocognitive metaphors lies in the domain of scaffolding theories, which suggest that non-metaphoric associations between bodily and social experiences form the foundation of conceptual metaphors in later life (Mandler, 2004; Piaget & Inhelder, 1969; Williams, Huang, & Bargh, 2009). For example, young children are likely to experience states of physical warmth and affection together, and this association may form the foundation for metaphors regarding interpersonal warmth. The idea of scaffolding resonates with Lakoff and Johnson (1999), who maintain that individuals build immediate conceptual mappings unconsciously and inevitably through neural connections. Through processes of conflation (Johnson, 1997), associations between various domains are subsequently mapped onto these conceptual metaphors. Scaffolding processes are likely to be critical to the analysis of sociocognitive metaphors through the constraints this modality imposes on metaphor formation. Nonetheless, Landau et al. (2010) give little credence to scaffolding.

Through its intrinsic relationship with social affection, physical warmth becomes integral to the fabric of individuals' social relationships. The type of relationship in which warmth is most relevant is described by A. P. Fiske (1991, 1992, 2004) as communal sharing relationships — an altruistic relationship most often found among close kin. Communal sharing relationships are marked and created through physical actions that generate a perception of a merged social body. Moreover, communal sharing relationships rely on an individual's sense of oneness formed through body-connecting bonding experiences such as touching, sharing of bodily substances, nursing, and synchronous movement. Fiske (1992) argues that communal sharing relationships are founded on evolved and innate mechanisms — relational models — that offer individuals a basis for coordinated social interaction.

Conclusion: Grounded Cognition and Motivational Significance

What then causes individuals to describe their reality in terms of non-commensurate physical qualities like cleanliness, verticality, weight, or temperature? Landau et al. (2010) have provided a convincing argument that these kinds of sociocognitive metaphors are reflective of general basic processes that allow individuals to make the world make sense. However, when viewed through the contextual framework of grounded cognition, the psychological importance of sociocognitive metaphors exceeds mental representation and even language. Some sociocognitive metaphors appear to possess a greater degree of universality, finding their foundation in bodily constraints and relational schemas rooted in evolutionarily ancient brain structures. Others vary across cultures but nonetheless emerge from very specific "cultural differences in embodiment" (IJzerman & Koole, 2011).

Thus, grounding sociocognitive metaphors may be increasingly useful in elucidating their motivational significance. The most frequently used sociocognitive metaphors tend to concern things people are passionate about and care deeply about — morality, the self, power, and love. From a grounded cognition perspective, this is not coincidental. Sociocognitive metaphors therefore do not exist simply for the sake of mental representation alone; they exist for action as well. What makes metaphors meaningful may be directly correlated with what motivates an individual. Being psychologically and physically close to others may be especially important when individuals conceive of themselves as powerful, and may also be particularly salient as individuals prepare to exercise physical force (Schubert & Koole, 2009). As such, a grounded cognition perspective may offer a plausible explanation for the enduring psychological appeal of sociocognitive metaphors (IJzerman & Koole, 2011).

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