Clausewitz's Theories Applied to the Korean War

Introduction: Clausewitz's Paired Concepts

Clausewitz's contribution to the art of warfare is well established. In his treatise On War (Clausewitz, 1989), he set forth his various views on how modern warfare should be conducted. Although the treatise is not always easy to read or understand, the concepts contained therein remain applicable today. The criticisms of Clausewitz's approach are numerous and his views have been debated vigorously since they were first published. Yet Clausewitz's theories retain their validity nearly two centuries after they were first proposed.

Before examining the validity of Clausewitz's theories, it must be remembered that the era in which his theories were formalized is significantly different from the era in which the Korean War occurred. For example, Clausewitz never envisioned a weapon as powerful as an atomic bomb. The atomic bomb created methods of warfare radically different from those considered by Clausewitz, and any analysis of his theories must be balanced against the possibility of atomic weaponry. Clausewitz also never had to consider the effect of modern air warfare. This factor is less transformative than the atomic bomb but it must still be regarded as significant. Finally, Clausewitz organized his theories in an era when politics and diplomacy were much different. He developed his concept of warfare in a Europe that was still largely monarchical and not governed by the democratic forms prevalent today. The shift to democratic rule resulted in dramatic alterations in how decisions were made both politically and militarily — changes that Clausewitz did not contemplate when formulating his theory.

Clausewitz did not look at war as if it took place in a vacuum. He understood that politics remained a concern even once war started, and that war was simply a tool used by politicians in their attempts to effectuate their diplomatic pursuits. War was, in Clausewitz's view, the politician's ultimate trump card.

Criticisms of Clausewitz's Viewpoints

One of the major criticisms of Clausewitz's theory is what some interpret as his argument that war must be total. Clausewitz does claim that "the fighting force must be destroyed, that is, they must be put in such a condition that they can no longer carry on the fight," but this does not necessarily mean that the enemy's army must be physically annihilated. Rather, the enemy must be placed in a position where it can no longer fight. This is what Clausewitz defines as the culminating point of victory — the point at which the objective is "not to improve the current military position, but to improve one's general prospects in the war and in the peace negotiations." In fact, Clausewitz actually argues that physically destroying one's enemy can damage the political objectives that caused the war in the first place.

Because wars are a function of political policies and goals, the aims of the war should be consistent with those same policies and goals. Clausewitz believed, therefore, that the stronger the relationship between a nation's military leaders and its government, the more effective the military leaders will be in ensuring that military operations achieve the intended political goals. The ability of military and political leaders to exchange their respective views on how the war should be conducted — and what its objectives are — determines how closely their respective goals will be achieved.

The Korean War is an interesting conflict in terms of the application of Clausewitz's theory. The United States' position, both from a political and a military perspective, was never clearly defined (Cohen, 1990: 165–195). This ambiguity brings into question the relevance of Clausewitz's theory. Americans had seen in the waning days of the Second World War that they possessed the means to completely annihilate an enemy through the atomic bomb, yet the old goals of defending and protecting a nation still required the same methods of warfare that had been largely in existence since the days of the Roman Empire.

From the beginning of the Korean War until the armistice was ultimately signed, the United States was never sure what its true mission in Korea was (Brodie, 1973: 57–112). Conflicts existed between the country's military leaders and its political leaders regarding both the goals of the effort and the manner in which the war was to be fought. This discrepancy was in direct conflict with Clausewitz's belief that military and political leaders must agree on how and why a war is being waged. Based on Clausewitz's concept of war, the American effort in Korea was therefore compromised from the very beginning.

The policy of containment was not popular among America's military leaders. Coming off the end of the Second World War, the military wanted to take a much more aggressive approach to the conflict in Korea, even to the extent of using atomic weapons (Memorandum of State, 1953). This was not to be, and this became even clearer once China entered the conflict on behalf of the North Koreans. Once that occurred, there was never a realistic chance that the United States would adopt anything other than a policy of containment — a position that Clausewitz would never have advocated.

Culmination Points in Attack and Victory

Clausewitz's theories of war were developed at a time when wars were not fought over political and ideological principles but were based primarily on territorial and dynastic issues. Victory was determined by bringing one's enemy to his knees. The Korean War, however, represented an entirely new form of warfare in which victory was determined by obtaining a political advantage rather than by achieving a clear military triumph.

This difference in defining victory changes the parameters for considering the culmination points identified by Clausewitz. As the Korean War, with limited exceptions, was not a series of decisive battles like past American engagements, Clausewitz's theories surrounding attack strategies had little direct application. Deciding whether to press forward with an attack was no longer based primarily on military strength, but on the political considerations involved. Military leaders were required to make wartime decisions based on political policy rather than on how best to defeat the enemy militarily. In such types of warfare, establishing and holding defensive positions becomes more important. Forcing the opposition to its culmination point remained significant, however, in that it compelled the enemy to the negotiating table. In Korea, American strategy essentially forced the North Korean regime to the bargaining table for two years of negotiations.

The one glaring exception in the Korean War where Clausewitz's culmination-point-of-attack theory was successfully applied came early in the war, when the North Koreans drove deep into South Korea. General MacArthur, commanding the UN forces and recognizing that the North Korean forces were overextended, conducted a surprise amphibious landing behind enemy lines at Inchon. MacArthur's actions forced the North Koreans to withdraw behind the 38th parallel, where they largely remained for the duration of the war.

Following MacArthur's actions, the United States' culmination point of victory changed substantially. Recognizing how close they had come to a possible total defeat — and acknowledging that China had entered the war — American political leaders adopted a position of containment and never seriously considered pursuing a total military victory. From that point forward, victory was to be determined on a political basis rather than a military one.

Conclusion

In a strange turn of events, Clausewitz's views on warfare may be more relevant today than when he first drafted them in the mid-19th century. During the Korean War there were various moments when a divergence arose between the political policies of the American government and the military's approach to the conflict, but in the end, the political policy makers were able to impress their priorities upon the military leadership. Although the conflict ended in a virtual draw, its outcome complied with the goals established by the nation's policy makers.

In the end, Clausewitz's theory of the culmination of attack and victory had little application in the Korean War due to the containment approach adopted by the United States government. Victory was never a strategic goal of the United States, and once the border had been re-established near the 38th parallel early in the conflict, the United States was content to maintain a defensive position until an acceptable compromise could be negotiated. Although these two aspects of Clausewitz's theory had only minimal direct application in the Korean War, other aspects of his theories were clearly at work in shaping the United States' political policy before, during, and after the war — and contributed substantially to how the United States conducted its affairs throughout the conflict.

References

Brodie, Bernard. (1973). War and Politics. New York: Macmillan.

Clausewitz, Carl von. (1989). On War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Clodfelter, Mark. (1989). The Limits of Airpower. New York: Free Press Publishing.

Cohen, Eliot A., and John Gooch. (1990). Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War. New York: Free Press Publishing.

Crane, Conrad C. (2000). To avert impending disaster: American plans to use atomic weapons during the Korean War. Journal of Strategic Studies: 72–88.

U.S. Department of State. (1953). Memorandum of the substance of discussion at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954: 817–818.

U.S. Department of State. (1976). North Korean offensive, July 1–September 15. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950: 393–395; 449–461; 502–510; 600–603; 712–721; 781–782.