The Tonkin Gulf Crisis: Deception, Congress, and Vietnam

Introduction: A Defining Controversy

The Tonkin Gulf Crisis of 1964 ranks with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the assassination of President John F. Kennedy as one of the events that David Kaiser of the U.S. Naval War College refers to as "controversies in American political history that dwarf all others" (Ford, 1997).

There is evidence that President Lyndon Johnson deliberately misrepresented the incidents leading to the Vietnam War in order to ensure that plans for war were supported. However, many opponents of this claim dispute it. According to Sedgwick Tourison in Secret Army, Secret War and Dr. Edwin Moise's Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War, evidence that Johnson's administration was deceitful has become clearer over time (Ford, 1997).

Today, Tonkin Gulf researchers are still examining the evidence to determine whether the Johnson administration intentionally instigated the first attack on the USS Maddox in the Gulf of Tonkin (Ford, 1997). It is still not entirely clear whether Hanoi actually launched a second attack on Maddox, either. Researchers are investigating the facts to determine whether Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara deliberately lied to the U.S. Congress to gain support for the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, which sealed Johnson's re-election and led the United States into the Vietnam War.

Details regarding the former South Vietnamese special operation forces — part of an American covert intelligence effort known as Operation Plan 34A — are now available, following the release of formerly classified documents and disclosures by former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and military intelligence officials (Ford, 1997).

When Hanoi changed its reunification strategy to one of armed conflict in 1960, the Communists began to develop an organized regular force opposing the Saigon regime in South Vietnam, which was an American ally (Ford, 1997). In 1961, in an attempt to stop the Communist Vietnamese government in Hanoi, the CIA developed a joint sea-land covert special operation with the South Vietnamese government to stop Hanoi from carrying out infiltration activities.

This covert special operation conducted airborne, maritime, and overland agent-insertion operations. The South Vietnamese attempted to gather intelligence, gain support, develop bases of resistance, and perform psychological operations behind enemy lines. The maritime operation started as an infiltration operation but would not remain so for long, as the covert attacks proved unsuccessful. According to McNamara, "It accomplished virtually nothing" (Ford, 1997).

Still, the U.S. was not prepared to back down. According to Tourison, by January 1964, McNamara had assumed responsibility for the operation from the CIA, and it became known as 34 Alpha (Ford, 1997). DeSoto patrols were U.S. naval intelligence collection operations using specially equipped vessels to gather electronic signals intelligence from shore- and island-based non-communications emitters in North Vietnam. By August 2, 1964, the Communist Vietnamese had determined that the DeSoto vessels were offshore support for a 34-Alpha operation that had struck their installations at Hon Me and Hon Ngu some 48 hours earlier. In retaliation, North Vietnam then conducted what was characterized as an "unprovoked attack" on Maddox, which was approximately 30 miles off the coast of North Vietnam. During the battle that ensued, one North Vietnamese patrol boat was severely damaged by Maddox, and two others were attacked and driven off by U.S. air support from the carrier USS Ticonderoga.

On August 4, 1964, Maddox and USS C. Turner Joy supposedly reported a second attack. The National Security Agency (NSA) had already issued a warning that an attack on Maddox might be approaching (Ford, 1997). An hour after that warning, Maddox reported that she had established radar contact with three or four unidentified vessels approaching at high speed. Ticonderoga launched aircraft to assist Maddox and C. Turner Joy.

Low clouds and thunderstorms reportedly made visibility difficult for the aircraft, and the pilots were unable to confirm the presence of any North Vietnamese attackers. Over the next several hours, the ships reported several "torpedo attacks, the visual sighting of torpedo wakes, searchlight illumination, automatic-weapons fire, and radar and sonar contact" (Ford, 1997).

Senior officers on board stated that the circumstances — including darkness, stormy seas, and nervous, inexperienced crewmen — called for a "thorough investigation," although McNamara told Congress there was "unequivocal proof" of a second "unprovoked attack" on U.S. ships (Ford, 1997). Without a thorough investigation and solely on the basis of McNamara's statements and Johnson's recommendations, Congress passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution.

McNamara's statements were fully supported by the Johnson administration. However, many others challenged them. At a joint executive session of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committee regarding the resolution, Senator Wayne Morse, who referred to the conflict as "McNamara's War," stated: "I am unalterably opposed to this course of action which, in my judgment, is an aggressive course of action on the part of the United States. I think you are kidding the world if you try to give the impression that when the South Vietnamese naval boats bombarded two islands a short distance off the coast of North Vietnam we were not implicated" (Ford, 1997).

McNamara's Testimony

McNamara firmly denied U.S. naval involvement in the South Vietnamese-run operations, stating that the DeSoto operations were neither support nor cover for 34-Alpha raids. According to Tourison (Ford, 1997), "The MarOps (maritime operations) were not CIA-supported South Vietnamese operations that the United States had no control over, as former Secretary of Defense McNamara claimed. These operations were under U.S. control, not South Vietnamese."

According to McNamara at the time of the incident, the Maddox crew had no knowledge of the 34-Alpha raids. McNamara has since acknowledged that this claim was false, but denied knowing so at the time. In fact, the crew knew of the 34-Alpha operations and were concerned that those operations were putting their ship in danger. Many argue that this situation made the crew nervous, rendering them unreliable sources regarding the alleged second attack in the Tonkin Gulf.

When the Senate approved the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, Senators Morse and Ernest Gruening opposed it. However, Congress voted 416 to 0 in support. Morse stated, "I believe that within the next century, future generations will look with dismay and great disappointment upon a Congress which is now about to make such a historic mistake" (Ford, 1997).

The events surrounding the resolution reveal a tremendous flaw in the U.S. decision-making system at the time. Government leaders misrepresented the situation to U.S. policy-makers without properly analyzing the available data. Unfortunately, the consequences were grave and led to full U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War.

Evidence shows that the decoded message on which the NSA's August 4 warning to Maddox had been based actually referred to the original attack on August 2, not the alleged second attack. In addition, the "unequivocal proof" of the second attack consisted of decrypted North Vietnamese damage assessments of the first attack, presented to U.S. decision-makers as evidence of the alleged second attack. According to a U.S. News and World Report study, former CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence Ray S. Cline clearly exposed this series of errors in 1984 (Ford, 1997).

Given the enormous pressure surrounding the situation, the fact that some decision-makers were confused by messages suggesting two separate attacks is understandable. However, their rash actions resulted in grave consequences. In his 1999 book, Argument Without End: In Search of Answers to the Vietnam Tragedy, McNamara tallied the human cost of the Vietnam War (Ford, 1997): "It is estimated that something on the order of 3.8 million Vietnamese — North and South, military and civilian — were killed. The United States lost 58,000. Had the United States lost in proportion to its population the same percentage as Vietnam, 27 million Americans would have died."

Even McNamara, in his book In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam, admits that the U.S. "may have provoked a North Vietnamese response in the Tonkin Gulf," but claims it was an innocent mistake. He nonetheless maintains, "Charges of a cloak of deception surrounding the Tonkin Gulf incident are unfounded. The idea that the Johnson administration deliberately deceived Congress is fake" (Ford, 1997).

Many others disagree. Daniel Ellsberg, the former Johnson administration official who released the Pentagon Papers to the press, addressed the question of whether the Johnson administration deceived Congress (Ford, 1997): "Did McNamara lie to Congress in 1964? I can answer that question. Yes, he did lie, and I knew it at the time. I was working for John McNaughton — he was Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. He knew McNamara had lied. McNamara knew he had lied. He is still lying. [Former Secretary of State Dean] Rusk and McNamara testified to Congress prior to their vote. Congress was being lied into what was to be used as a formal declaration of war. I knew that. I don't look back on that situation with pride."

Ellsberg was not the only one who exposed the conspiracy. In 1977, former Under Secretary of State George Ball stated: "Many of the people associated with the war were looking for any excuse to initiate bombing. The DeSoto Patrols were primarily for provocation. There was a feeling that if the destroyer got into trouble, that would provide the provocation needed" (Ford, 1997).

For those convinced that the Johnson administration knowingly deceived Congress and the American people, the only remaining question is "why?" The resolution clearly stated that it authorized the use of "all measures including the commitment of U.S. Armed Forces" upon request of South Vietnam or the Laotian government (Ford, 1997). Notably, this resolution had been drafted in May 1964 — three months before the "unprovoked attacks" took place, whether in actuality or not.

When the resolution was drafted, Johnson was running his presidential campaign on a platform of peace. His opponent, Senator Barry Goldwater, was advocating a tougher U.S. stance in Southeast Asia. An "unprovoked attack" by North Vietnam would enable Johnson to respond with limited force and improve his image with the American people without appearing to agree with his main political opponent. The timing was perfect.

Many people believe this was Johnson's plan when he used deceptive tactics to pass the resolution. In response to the Tonkin Gulf attacks, the president launched a limited airstrike and warned Hanoi that the U.S. would not tolerate further aggression. As a result, just prior to the November election, the American public viewed him as a firm leader who was still not pushing for war. His approval rating increased and he was reelected. The resolution had also granted him the power to declare war.

McNamara himself describes the significance of the controversial Tonkin Gulf Resolution (Ford, 1997): "The fundamental issue of Tonkin Gulf involves not deception, but rather, misuse of power bestowed by the resolution. The language of the resolution plainly granted the powers the President subsequently used, and Congress understood the breadth of those powers. But no doubt exists that Congress did not intend to authorize, without further full consultation, the expansion of U.S. forces in Vietnam from 16,000 to 550,000 men, initiating large-scale combat operations with the risk of an expanded war with China and the Soviet Union, and extending U.S. involvement in Vietnam for many years to come."

President Johnson's Role

For Johnson and all Americans, the Vietnam War was a great tragedy (Herring, 1996). Johnson had not created the U.S. commitment in Vietnam and initially tried to set it aside. However, pressure from the U.S. government and military caused him to reluctantly take on the war — a war he was ultimately unable to win. The war undid much of Johnson's domestic achievement, including his Great Society programs, and it all but tore the country apart.

Johnson inherited the situation in Vietnam when he assumed the presidency. While he repeatedly assured the American public that he would defend the nation's interests without going to war, he faced harsh political opposition when his presidential reelection drew near. He had to demonstrate that he was not too soft. This is most likely the reason for his actions in the Tonkin Gulf Crisis.

Johnson's Tonkin Gulf Resolution was most likely issued through deception, yet it allowed him to "take all necessary measures" to "prevent further aggression" and gave him the power to launch an undeclared war in Vietnam (Herring, 1996). With this authority and his reelection secured, Johnson led the country into war without fully grasping the ramifications of his decisions.

Johnson had inaccurately assumed that the war would be over before serious domestic opposition arose (Herring, 1996). This proved to be a gross miscalculation. By the end of 1967, the war had affected the U.S. in ways he never imagined, and the country had become deeply divided. Many critics attacked the war on moral grounds. Others urged Johnson to pursue it more aggressively. As the war continued, more deaths occurred and more money was spent, and more and more Americans questioned this heavy investment of lives and resources. By late 1967, the administration was shocked by the growing opposition. Johnson was viewed as a failure in the eyes of the American public.

Conclusion

Several years later, Congress realized that it had made a mistake in approving the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (Herring, 1996). In 1973, Congress passed the War Powers Act, which required the U.S. president to report to Congress within 48 hours all U.S. combat operations. It also required the president to limit all troop deployments to sixty days without congressional approval.

Despite the veto of Richard Nixon, this act was passed into law, although it was never formally embraced and never truly achieved its intended aim of ensuring "that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities" (Herring, 1996).

As a result of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, in early 1965 Johnson ordered the deployment to South Vietnam of major U.S. ground, air, and naval forces, initiating the Vietnam War, which killed millions of people and cost the U.S. billions of dollars. Today, many people continue to wonder what might have happened had the Johnson administration been truthful about the fateful events of early August 1964.