Universalism vs. Relativism in Human Rights Debate

Introduction

The closest thing to a universally accepted definition of human rights comes from the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). That body's definition is founded on the principle that human rights are inalienable and universal — that is, they apply to all human beings, and that all are entitled to these rights without discrimination. The UN definition also holds that human rights are "interrelated, interdependent and indivisible" (OHCHR, 2016). The OHCHR cites such rights as the right to work, the right to self-determination, to social security and education, to equality before the law, and to freedom of expression (OHCHR, 2016).

How these broad concepts are to be operationalized is not specified by the OHCHR. Indeed, there are some inherent contradictions immediately apparent between the definition set forth by the OHCHR and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the foundational document for the modern neoliberal concept. As an example, Article 2 states that "no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs," which conflicts with the principle of equality under law, given that each territory has its own laws and these differ dramatically. We cannot all have the same equality when living under different laws. There are further pragmatic issues not conceived in 1948, such as the reality that the world's resources are finite, yet meeting the rights of all humans — if the number of humans continues to grow exponentially — will eventually produce a zero-sum game in which the rights of some must inevitably be sacrificed to meet the rights of others.

Beyond such pragmatic issues, there are philosophical critiques of the human rights concept, in particular as it manifests today. Broadly, such critiques stem from universalist considerations or from relativist considerations. This paper concerns itself with these critiques and seeks to answer the question of whether these positions are reconcilable. Since the Universal Declaration, the apparent conflict between universalism and relativism has characterized debate about the nature of human rights (Perry, 1997; Donoho, 1990).

Fundamental Underpinnings of Human Rights

The idea of human rights is rooted in the idea of natural rights — that human beings possess specific rights by their very nature. In Western culture, these rights have traditionally extended only to dealings among human beings, whereas in other cultures, such as those of many Native American peoples, these rights also govern our relationship with the environment. In the West, then, human beings hold such special rights as a distinct class, separate from the rights of anything else on this planet, a fact that itself gives rise to several conflicts subject to critique (Wenar, 2015). The UN's vision of human rights largely evolves from Western tradition. Influences on this tradition include "the Magna Carta, the English Bill of Rights, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the United States Constitution," along with philosophical roots in Suarez, Grotius, Pufendorf, Locke, and Kant (Nickel, 2014). Shestack (1998) points out that human rights are intended to trump other rights, including the rights inherent to one's culture; a culture is a subset of humanity, its rights important but lesser.

The universality of human rights is one of the most fundamental underpinnings of the concept. The idea that all humans possess these rights is critical to its political dimension, wherein state actors are responsible for providing such rights to all those within their borders. However, universality is also one of the most important sources of conflict within the understanding of human rights, because it gives rise to relativist arguments. Rights can conflict with one another. How the rights of women or minorities can be reconciled with the right to practice religion — knowing that some religions actively practice discrimination in various forms — is one of the unresolved tensions of the UN's definition. Such conflicts arise because both universality and relativism are built into the concept of human rights, and scholars have used a variety of case studies to highlight such conflicts, a classic example being the Middle East (Halliday, 1995).

Another underpinning is that human rights are of high priority — they are, in other words, trumps, more important than other rights (Nickel, 2014; Wenar, 2015). Human rights are more important than corporate rights, state rights, and rights that apply to humans but are not among those considered universal. Again, this concept is important for the implementation of human rights by state actors, but it gives rise to conflicts. One example is that in a democratic state, the people elect officials to set policy, and thus policy should reflect the will of the people. As Mill argued, one person in disagreement with all others has equal rights to all the others. In any political system, there is therefore a trade-off between the right of people to determine their own course and the demand that, say, water or education must be provided for all. Both are human rights, both can exist in conflict with one another, and no resolution has yet been offered by the bodies that have taken it upon themselves to declare the definition of human rights.

Universalism

As universalism is at the root of the modern conception of human rights, it is naturally one of the points where critics examine the notion. The universalist perspective not only holds that human rights are universal, but that they can be defined and that they are always right. Such an approach leaves no room for interpretation. This brings about conflict with the ability of cultures to self-determine — where such cultures define their own ideas of human rights differently. The concept of universalism is critical to the idea of human rights, which specifically seeks to protect the rights of minorities, women, and other groups to whom such rights have not traditionally been extended; there are many case studies tackling this challenge (James, 1994). The extension of such rights has to some extent been considered a precondition for acceptance into the international community, at least in principle, with human rights being used as a framework for negotiating minority rights in conflict resolution (Ghai, 2000).

One criticism of the universalist approach lies in its strong Western influence. Different cultures sometimes hold varying perspectives on human rights, and even on the idea that such rights are universal at all. Universality is, in some views, a Western concept which, without the balance of relativism, turns the concept of human rights into something of a Trojan horse promoting Western values across the world (Renteln, 2013). This view is at odds with the fundamental concept of human rights, however. The general idea is that all humans have equal rights, and that cultures cannot simply pick and choose which people hold which rights. Universalism is necessary to counterbalance the entrenched structures of power and privilege that exist — power and privilege do not give any human or any sovereign entity the right to dictate or devolve rights to people.

One of the other issues with universalism, something to which relativists cling, is the idea that there is no inherently superior culture in this world. Each of the world's cultures has arisen from its own context, has its own value, and can reasonably make its own determinations about many issues of rights and justice. The world's different cultures can, under this thinking, be compatible with the notion of universal human rights. Some cultures, for example, are more collectivist — oriented around community — and it is to the community that human rights are understood to accrue. This seems at odds with the universalist approach, which favors the idea that human rights accrue to the individual (Basnet & Albalooshi, 2012). There is substantial inherent conflict between these two ideas, in particular with respect to the rights of women, to minorities within a community, and to the LGBTQ community in many of the world's societies. Human rights are defined as "human" rather than "community" for a reason. It is only in the way such rights are described that some appear more individual and some more communal — the human rights concepts are sufficiently broad in their language that both interpretations are reasonable.