U.S. Counterterrorism Deterrence Methods and Strategy

Introduction: The Imperative of Counterterrorism

Terrorism is a major threat in today's society. Because of that fact, it is imperative that nations have measures in place to combat threats against their worldwide interests. For the United States, those measures include numerous methods that allow the nation to deter and combat terrorism at the local, national, and international levels. This paper outlines those measures and methods and discusses their impact on the threat of terrorism. It also examines the use of those methods in relation to the nuclear threat posed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and their more recent application as a deterrent against terrorist forces.

While terrorist threats are numerous in today's world, the methods used by the United States to counter those threats help ensure that, although some terrorism is inevitable, attacks are kept to a minimum. In addition, while each tool used to fight terrorism makes a contribution, there are limits to each method when used in isolation. By combining the various methods, the campaign against terrorism can be a successful one (Pillar, 10).

Military Force and Nuclear Deterrence

There are many counterterrorism methods in use by the United States. The first of these is the use of military force, including armed forces, nuclear weapons, and other missile capabilities (Pillar, 11). With the development of precision-guided munitions, the use of armed force has become a powerful, though rarely employed, counterterrorism tactic (Pillar, 10). Nuclear weapons, first tested in 1945, further extended the range of these tactics for counterterrorism purposes (Glasstone, "Nuclear Weapons").

The nuclear weapon as a deterrent has worked in multiple instances for the United States. Beginning with the Cold War, the United States used the threat of nuclear weapons to thwart enemies (Keller, C6). During the Cold War, the Soviet Union placed nuclear weapons in Cuba in 1962, targeting the United States. In response, President Kennedy threatened nuclear retaliation against the Soviets, and the missiles were removed from Cuba later that year (LaFeber, "Cold War"). The strategy of nuclear deterrence rested on demonstrating that the United States had the capability to destroy any enemy that did not cease its hostile actions. As Bill Keller of the New York Times wrote in 2001, "It is generally accepted that U.S. nuclear strength deterred the Soviet Union from raining nuclear warheads on America" (Keller, C6).

This nuclear deterrent was again invoked with respect to Libya in 1986 following terrorist attacks, and once more in 1996, when Libya was attempting to construct a large underground facility to develop nuclear weapons. In response, Defense Secretary William Perry stated that the U.S. would consider using the B61-11, a nuclear anti-gravity "bunker buster," against the facility. Shortly thereafter, Libya halted construction (Friedman, "Mini-Nukes, Bunker Busters, and Deterrence").

In addition to nuclear deterrents, the general use of military force—including ground troops, air strikes, and other armed tactics—has also been used to combat and deter terrorism. Following terrorist attacks linked to Libya in 1986, Iraq in 1993, and Osama bin Laden in 1998, the United States employed significant military force to prevent further attacks. This type of action often involves rapid air strikes as a dramatic demonstration of power intended to deter additional terrorist activity. In Iraq, the now-infamous "Shock and Awe" campaign was employed in this fashion (Pillar, 11). In Afghanistan, both British and American military operations went beyond any previous counterterrorism actions, seeking not only to deter existing terrorists but also to eliminate conditions that would produce future ones. In this way, the use of armed forces serves both a deterrent purpose and the goal of forcing current terrorist activity to cease (Pillar, 12).

Intelligence Agencies and Criminal Prosecution

Beyond military force and the threat of nuclear retaliation, intelligence agencies are also key to terrorist deterrence. The use of the CIA, FBI, and other information-gathering bodies provides two primary deterrent elements. The first is the identification of terrorist networks, combined with those networks' awareness that intelligence is being collected on them (Pillar, 12). Using international intelligence makes it increasingly possible to identify, locate, and prosecute those responsible for terrorist activities (National Commission on Terrorism [NCT], 18). As increasing numbers of terrorist groups are identified and stopped, the deterrent effect of this method grows.

Intelligence agencies also serve to bring terrorist groups to justice—itself a deterrent. By prosecuting terrorists in criminal court, the United States applies internationally the same deterrents it uses within its own legal system (NCT, 26). Imprisoning a terrorist obviously reduces the threat that person will strike again. More importantly, the prospect of being caught, tried, and punished can deter some terrorists from attacking in the first place (Pillar, 8). When this is combined with active intelligence gathering, international communities can coordinate to capture and convict terrorists. The knowledge that such cooperation exists can itself deter would-be international terrorists from committing acts against the countries sharing that information.

This form of deterrence has been well applied in the recent war on terrorism. In numerous cases, international intelligence agencies have pooled information about terrorist organizations and used it to assist in the detention and arrest of many suspects. Whether these actions have measurably deterred terrorism is not fully documented, but as the National Commission on Terrorism stated, "Good intelligence is the best weapon against international terrorism" (NCT, 7).

Conclusion: A Coordinated Anti-Terrorism Strategy

The United States has a vast arsenal of anti-terrorism techniques at its disposal. By deploying those components together, it is possible to produce a cohesive deterrent far more effective than any single component used alone. If these methods are not used in conjunction with one another—but instead applied as separate, uncoordinated measures—they can actually undermine each other. The use of military force, for instance, can interfere with the gathering of intelligence, effectively negating the contribution of each component (Pillar, 13).

To effectively deter terrorism, the United States and its allies should always pursue the most effective means that causes the least harm to all countries involved. Economic sanctions, social sanctions, and diplomacy must be attempted first, in order to protect the lives of people within the affected country as well as those at home. Clear policies must be in place to allow the fair yet firm enforcement of all deterrent methods, and to coordinate those efforts as effectively as possible. It is only through organized, uniform deployment of all available deterrent methods that terrorism can truly be restricted and prevented.

References

Encarta. "Sanctions." Microsoft Encarta 97 Encyclopedia. CD-ROM. Microsoft Corporation.

Friedman, Benjamin. "Mini-Nukes, Bunker Busters, and Deterrence: Framing the Debate." Center for Defense Information: Terrorism. 26 Apr 2002. Center for Defense Information. 21 Apr 2004. http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/mininukes-pr.cfm

Glasstone, Samuel. "Nuclear Weapons." Microsoft Encarta 97 Encyclopedia. CD-ROM. Microsoft Corporation.

Keller, Bill. "Missile Defense Is Not About Defense — It's About Offense." New York Times. 31 Dec 2003: C6.

LaFeber, Walter. "Cold War." Microsoft Encarta 97 Encyclopedia. CD-ROM. Microsoft Corporation.

National Commission on Terrorism (NCT). Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism: Report of the National Commission on Terrorism. Oklahoma City, OK: National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, 2001.

Pillar, Paul R. "The Instruments of Counterterrorism." Terrorism: Threat Assessment, Countermeasures, and Policy. In U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda. (Nov 2001): 10–13.