Workplace Discrimination Jurisprudence: Griggs and Beyond

Introduction: Law, Ambiguity, and Jurisprudence

Laws are seldom as finite and concrete as they are often perceived by the public and portrayed in the media. They are often somewhat ambiguous — even purposefully so — in order to achieve greater justice. This might at first seem counterintuitive: the greater the ambiguity in the law, the more room there might be to breach it. In reality, however, some degree of ambiguity is necessary to ensure that the gray areas of human activity have recourse to something other than the black-and-white letter of the law. That something else is jurisprudence — the ability of judges to determine exactly how the ambiguities of the law apply to specific cases. Through jurisprudence, laws are refined and become more clearly defined, while also remaining able to change and adapt as circumstances warrant.

One very important area of jurisprudence in the United States since the latter half of the twentieth century, and especially since the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, has been the issue of workplace discrimination. A large number of cases have been brought to the courts — including many that reached the Supreme Court, the final arbiter of law in the United States — involving alleged discrimination by a defendant who does not necessarily dispute the specifics of the conduct in question, but contests whether that conduct meets the legal definition of discrimination. These cases have been brought before the courts precisely to determine what behaviors constitute unlawful discrimination in the workplace; though discrimination is illegal, the legal definition of discrimination is not explicitly clear.

A landmark case in this area is Griggs v. Duke Power Co. (1971). Although the defendant had not engaged in actions that were explicitly or even solely discriminatory toward racial minorities — specifically African Americans — the Court found that the company's actions were in fact discriminatory based on its interpretation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. A very different yet similarly grounded ruling was made in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson (1986), which determined that discrimination producing intangible results was still illegal conduct. Another case from the same year, Johnson v. Transportation Agency (1986), had markedly different effects on the issue of workplace discrimination and its legality. Each of these cases is examined in detail and in relation to one another below, in order to provide an understanding of current workplace discrimination law.

Griggs v. Duke Power Co. (1971)

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 outlawed discrimination in the workplace and in other spheres on the basis of gender, race, religion, national origin, and other factors. As clear as these prohibitions seem, however, they were not spelled out with complete explicitness. There were many instances where abuses continued through the invocation of perceived legal loopholes, and there was often very little that authorities could — or would — do about these situations until the law had been more clearly defined. Several cases helped to shape the law into a more concrete form, but one of the most influential to reach the Supreme Court and lead to a comprehensive reassessment of the Civil Rights Act was Griggs v. Duke Power Co. (1971).

The Duke Power Company had maintained, until 1964, a policy of workforce segregation that prevented African Americans from working in any capacity other than in the Labor Department, which contained the company's lowest-paying positions. After the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the company changed its policy, requiring a high school diploma and a minimum score on two separate aptitude tests for employment in any other department (Oyez: Griggs, 2009). A substantially higher proportion of African Americans lacked high school diplomas and were generally less educated — and therefore less likely to achieve the minimum aptitude test scores — so Duke Power's new policies had largely the same effect as their earlier, overtly discriminatory policy of segregation, despite circumventing what the company believed to be the letter and scope of the law.

Willie Griggs filed a class action suit on behalf of himself and other African American employees, claiming that the Duke Power Company's transfer, promotion, and hiring practices — all subject to the new educational requirements — were discriminatory and therefore illegal. The district court dismissed the suit at the outset, and the Court of Appeals reviewed the case and found that no discriminatory practice was occurring (Oyez: Griggs, 2009). The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case and ultimately overturned the Court of Appeals' ruling. Because the law in question was an Act of Congress, the Supreme Court was the only court with sufficient authority to issue a ruling that significantly expanded the Act's application and meaning; its decision carried ramifications for all lower courts.

The Supreme Court grounded its ruling in the finding that the diploma and aptitude test requirements had a racially disproportionate effect on hiring and promotion practices without any work-related justification for those requirements (Oyez: Griggs, 2009). Had there been a legitimate work-related reason — for example, had the aptitude tests directly and solely measured the ability to perform jobs in specific departments — the practice would not have been deemed discriminatory even if it resulted in a racial disparity. As it stood, however, there was no practical rationale for these requirements, and the Court explicitly found that their purpose was the continuation of discriminatory practices that had long been in place at Duke Power, with no other legitimate justification whatsoever (Oyez: Griggs, 2009).

Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson (1986)

In another case fifteen years later, a very different set of facts led to a similarly significant broadening of the interpretation and application of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in the area of workplace discrimination. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson (1986) arose from a suit brought by the respondent, Mechelle Vinson, against her employer, Meritor Savings Bank, after she was terminated following an extended sick leave (FindLaw, 2009). Vinson had been promoted several times during her four years of employment at the bank — and it was not disputed that these promotions were merit-based — but Vinson claimed she had also been subjected to intense sexual harassment by her supervisor, Sidney Taylor (FindLaw, 2009).

As in the Griggs case, several lower courts had reached conflicting rulings, and the matter made its way to the Supreme Court for a determination of how the law actually applied to the situation. Taylor denied the harassment claims, but a lower court determined that the conflicting accounts were not even relevant: because there had been no economic or tangible harm from the alleged harassment, Vinson had no legal recourse, and the bank itself could not be held responsible — if any misconduct had occurred at all — since it had never been made aware of Taylor's alleged actions (FindLaw, 2009). The Court of Appeals reversed both determinations, asserting that the creation of a "hostile environment" was itself a sufficient result to constitute harassment under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Meritor Savings Bank then appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeals' ruling and appears to have accepted the case largely to establish a more certain and permanent interpretation of the Civil Rights Act as protecting against both the tangible and intangible effects of workplace discrimination (FindLaw, 2009). The Court declined to rule explicitly on the question of the bank's liability for Taylor's actions — and thus did not address the broader issue of institutional responsibility — but it held that the language of the Civil Rights Act was not limited in scope to tangible harms; it also covered the creation of hostile working environments. The Court found further support for this interpretation in the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's direct and explicit guidance specifying that the Civil Rights Act did apply to discrimination resulting in a hostile working environment (FindLaw, 2009).

Just as the Court held in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. (1971) that the scope of the Civil Rights Act was not limited to overtly discriminatory acts but included any act whose primary effects were discriminatory, it held in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson that the Act was not limited to discriminatory or harassing conduct that resulted in tangible detriments. The first case broadened and clarified the acts that qualify as discriminatory; the second broadened and made more concrete the effects of those acts that are actionable in the courts. Through these exercises of jurisprudence, the Supreme Court continued to adapt and clarify the full impact and scope of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the protections it affords against discrimination and harassment based on gender, race, and other factors — decades after the Act was enacted.

Conclusion: Jurisprudence and the Evolution of Discrimination Law

The changes in the application of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 brought about by these Supreme Court decisions are not only a demonstration of the power of jurisprudence, but also illustrate what many regard as a form of judicial activism — the making of law by the courts rather than by the legislature. Certainly, drastic interpretations and reinterpretations of the Act's language and effects occurred in all three cases, and the controversy surrounding the last ruling discussed here continues to generate debate today. This, however, is ultimately the strength of the system of jurisprudence and the manner in which laws are made and revised in the United States: there is always room for change. As society develops different needs and different values, it is highly probable that the Supreme Court will reinterpret the Act in new ways in the future.

FindLaw (2009). Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson (1986). Accessed 11 December 2009.

Oyez. (2009). Griggs v. Duke Power Company (1971). Accessed 11 December 2009. http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1970/1970_124

Oyez. (2009). Johnson v. Transportation Agency (1986). Accessed 11 December 2009. http://www.oyez.com/cases/1980-1989/1986/1986_85_1129?sort=ideology